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FEB 24 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Llewellyn Evans, Jr., Chief
Security Programs Branch
Division of Safeguards, NMSS

FROM: Ralph J. Jones, Chief
Materials Protection Standards Branch
Office of Standards Development

SUBJECT: BASIC CAPABILITIES FOR TRANSPORTATION PROTECTION
OF SNM

We have reviewed the subject item submitted with your memo of Feb. 16, 1977. We should not attempt to adopt the five fixed site capabilities to transportation. This produces even more redundancy than when they are applied to fixed sites.

For transportation protection, we want to assure effective response to an attempt to steal the material, either by stealth or by force and to assure against sabotage either to spread hazardous material or to effect a theft. Only three basic capabilities are needed to accomplish these things.

1. Assure timely detection and effective response to unauthorized conditions of access by either force or stealth to SNM during transport, including transfer points.
2. Assure that only authorized and confirmed materials are placed in or removed from cargo vehicles or transfer storage locations.
3. Assure that only authorized persons have access to transport vehicles, including escort vehicles, or transfer point storage areas associated with the transport of SNM.

Basic essential elements for capability 1 would include:

- a. Trained, equipped, qualified guards and armed escort personnel,
- b. Escort vehicles and transfer station guard and surveillance procedures,
- c. Communications systems and procedures with LLEA and transfer point security forces,

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- d. Communications systems and procedures with a fixed base to permit vehicle location and continuous status monitoring, and
- e. Cargo vehicle security design, systems, or procedures.


Basic essential elements for capability 2 would include:

- a. Procedures to verify and confirm the identity of material placed in or removed from the cargo vehicle or transfer storage, (These procedures would be coordinated with shipping and receiving procedures at fixed sites.)
- b. Search procedures to assure that there are no unauthorized materials already in cargo vehicles or transfer storage that could aid theft or sabotage, e.g., explosives in a truck or aircraft, and
- c. Locks and seals on material containers, cargo compartments, and storage areas.

Basic essential elements for capability 3 would include:

- a. Procedures for establishing job functions that should permit access to transport vehicles, transfer point storage areas or SNM in such areas, (Such procedures should be coordinated with fixed site authorization procedures.)
- b. Procedures to limit access to those persons in authorized job functions, (Such procedures should take into account access to vehicles and storage areas prior to their being used for SNM transport or storage, e.g., during vehicle maintenance. These procedures also could include the escort or driver surveillance procedures during stops in transit.) and
- c. Procedures for assuring the trustworthiness of personnel having significant access to vehicles or material.

The above are some preliminary thoughts which we would be happy to discuss and develop further.


Ralph J. Jones, Chief
Materials Protection Standards Branch
Office of Standards Development