April 9, 1976 Mr. L. J. Evans, Jr. Program Davelopment Sareguards Division Muclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Bear in, Evans: Enclosed please find our expanded chart snowing the applicability of the Inserim and Companion Rules to the MOV fuel cycle and to ROSD convities. This chart raises important issues regarding the scope of the Interim Rule and the definition of Category III plutonium. These issues are discussed on the following page. Sincerely, David L. Bodde 62.67 Liclosuro 8212080081 821025 PDR FOIA WEISS82-441 PDR ENERGY SYSTEMS GROUP . TRW INC . 2030 M STREET, N.W. . WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036

Interim Rule Coverage. Suppose less than 2Kg of SGP per day flows through a given portion of a plant, say the analytical lab. Although a "significant amount" of eigmental plutonium may never be present at any one time, the total through a tover a year's operation would nevertheless be quite large. Should a time dimension be included in the Interim Rules to control this situation?

Definition of Category III Plutonium. The separation of Pu into categories was based on the ratio $\frac{Pu}{238U}$. When this ratio is below .04, the material is considered Category III under the definitions used in the attached chart. This ratio was selected because the critical mass of such a material increases asymptotically at about 4% Pu. At issue is whether the definition of Category III material should be increased to, say, 5% Pu.

- · Factors which favor such an increase.
 - An economic incentive apparently exists to increase MOX Pu concentrations to the 5% range. This is because the buildup of neutron-absorbers in reload cores makes higher reactivity in the fuel desirable. However, we are not aware of any analysis which quantifies this marginal benefit.
 - Even at 5%, the concentration of Pu is too low to make the material directly usable in a fission bomb. 1)
- · Factors weighing against such an increase.
 - At 4% or below, there is absolute assurance that a bomb would be unworkable.

¹⁾ M. Willrich and T.B. Taylor Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards 1974, p. 15.

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	STAGE OF MOX FUEL CYCLE	(1)MOX FUE	L FABRICATION)
MATERIAL		RECEIVING & STORAGE	Pu BLENDING & STORAGE	MOX BLENDING	FUEL PELLET & ROD FABRICATION	P O
	P _U > 20% or only fissile elemen:	E + IR	E + IR			
CATEGORY I	²³⁵ U > 90% U					
	233 U				8	
MAN III	20% > P _U > 4%	E + C (?)	E + C (?)	E + C (?)	E + C (?)	Ε
CATEGO	90% > 225 U > 16% (?)					
67 til	P ₁₁ < 4%			Ε	E	
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- .- (par) & TRICA (%)

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MOX PLENDING	FUEL PELLET & ROD FABRICATION	FUEL ROD STORAGE	GEN PROCESS TRASH&SCRAP STORAGE E + IR (?)	ANALYTICAL LAB E + IR (?)		RECEIVING & STORAGE	ASSEMBLY	S
2017 - p. 2018 - 2019 -	E + C (?)		5 . 6 (2)	5 + C (2)	F + C (?)	F + C (?)	E + C (?)	1.0
+ C (?)								
E	Ε	Ε	Ε	E	E	E	E	
E	E 📵	€ 🔞	E	Ε	E	E	Ε	

	70 M	X FUEL CYCLE	AND ROSD ACT	IVITIES	.001n110n3			
LANT		GANS OR TRITON	(3) REACTOR			TRAIS PORTATION	(4)REPROCE	SSING FACI
Y	STOREGE		RECEIVING 8 STORAGE	use	SPENT FUEL STORAGE		SPENT FUEL RECEIVING & STORAGE	
								E + IR (
?)	+ C (?)	E + C (?)						
	100 Attit. Materials							
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NT FUEL EIVING STORAGE REA	SEPARATIONS	Pu NITRATE STORAGE	GEN PROCESS TRASH &SCRAP STORAGE			Pu NITRATE TO OXIDE CONVERS.		GEN PROTRASH&S
	E + IR (?)	E + IR (?)	E + IR (?)	E + IR (?)	E + IR	E + IR	E + IR	E + 1
						0 (a	
				E + C (?)				
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Έ	Pu OXIDE STORAGE	GEN PROCESSI TRASH&SCRAP _ STORAGE	A BUTT	INTERIM PuO ₂ STORAGE	TRANSPORT	DEFINED AS IN IR & CFR 70.4 (j) INCLUDES LWBR, HTGR, LMFBR
-	E + IR	E + 17 (?)	E + IR	E + IR or C (?)	E + IR	E + C
	The section of the se					E + C
9						E + C
						E + C (?)
						**E + C (?)
	ξ.			E	E	6.2
0						E