

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

MAR 17 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

L. J. Evans, Jr., Chief

Requirements Analysis Branch, NMSS

FROM:

J. Mark Elliott, Chief

Reactor Safeguards Section Program Support Branch, NRR

SUBJECT:

COMMENTS ON "BASIC CAPABILITIES NEEDED TO

PROTECT SNM WHILE IN TRANSIT", MARCH 15

We have comments with regard to capabilities 1 and 3.

The discussion of detection systems under capability 1 seems inappropriate since detection systems are again discussed under cargo security (capability 2) and since they do not control access but rather only indicate violations of access controls. We, therefore, suggest elimination of the discussion of detection systems from capability 1. In place of this discussion there should be a statement of the need for sealed containers, locks, searches, inspections, etc., which do control access but which are not mentioned.

The discussion of capability 3 never explicitly mentions the need for a sufficient response force to satisfactorily meet all security contingencies. We believe that this should be stated explicitly.

J. Mark Elliott, Chief Reactor Safeguards Section Program Support Branch, NRR

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