



**PSEG**

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

November 24, 1982

Mr. R. C. Haynes  
Regional Administrator  
USNRC  
Region 1  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70  
DOCKET NO. 50-272  
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-086/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-086/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

H. J. Midura  
General Manager -  
Salem Operations

RF:ks

*947*

CC: Distribution

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PDR ADOCK 05000272  
S PDR

The Energy People

*IEU*

Report Number: 82-086/03L  
Report Date: 11-24-82  
Occurrence Date: 10-27-82  
Facility: Salem Generating Station Unit 1  
Public Service Electric & Gas Company  
Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Penetration Fire Barriers - Non-Functional.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-398.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 6 - RX Power 0% - Unit Load 0 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On October 27, 1982, during performance of fire barrier penetration surveillance for the 122' Elevation of the Auxiliary Building, 5 penetrations were found to be non-functional. Penetrations 1417A10001SS, 1417A10003N, 1417A20005S, 1417B20007E, and 1417B20008E were involved. Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11 was already in effect dating back to 0001 hours, October 29, 1981, due to other open penetrations (See LER 81-106/03L). A fire watch patrol for the area was already assigned, in compliance with the action statement.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

One fire barrier was open as the result of construction; two penetrations were found inadequately sealed. Sealing of the remaining two barriers was apparently overlooked at installation and had remained undetected during subsequent surveillance. The surveillance procedure originally did not specifically identify the penetrations or their location. An improved procedure had recently been implemented; this is the first occasion on which the improved procedure was performed for this area.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The functional integrity of the penetration fire barriers ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility. This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire affecting redundant safety related equipment. The barriers are a passive element in the fire protection program.

Technical Specification 3.7.11 requires:

With one or more of the above required penetration fire barriers non-functional, establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected penetration within 1 hour.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

As noted, a fire watch was stationed throughout the occurrence. The event therefore involved no risk to the health and safety of the public. Due to further degradation of the design feature, however, the occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation. It is therefore reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b.


CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The non-functional fire barriers were sealed on October 27, 1982. As noted, an improved surveillance procedure is being utilized to demonstrate required fire barriers are functional. The procedure contains provisions to identify and include any additional non-functional barriers as they are discovered.

FAILURE DATA:

Similar problems were discovered during recent surveillance of fire barriers in the Control Room (see LER 82-046/03L).

Prepared By R. Frahm

  
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General Manager -  
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 82-106