



PEACH BOTTOM—THE POWER OF EXCELLENCE

**PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY**

PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION

R. D. 1, Box 208

Delta, Pennsylvania 17314

(717) 456-7014

February 4, 1991

Docket No. 50-277

Document Control Desk  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report  
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station - Unit 2

This LER concerns inoperability of Emergency Diesel Generator due to personnel error and procedural deficiency that resulted in a Tech Spec violation. Revision 1 is being submitted to clarify the corrective actions and to include the appropriate EIIS codes.

Reference: Docket No. 50-277  
Report Number: 2-90-034  
Revision Number: 01  
Event Date: 11/12/90  
Report Date: 02/04/91  
Facility: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station  
RD 1, Box 208, Delta, PA 17314

This LER is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Sincerely,

cc: J. J. Lyash, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector  
T. T. Martin, USNRC, Region I

9102080358 910204  
PDR ADOCK 05000277  
S PDR  
078000

IF22  
11

### LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1): Peach Bottom Atomic power Station - Unit 2  
DOCKET NUMBER (2): 05000021  
PAGE (3): 1 OF 03

TITLE (4): Inoperable Emergency Diesel Generator Due to Personnel Error and Procedural Deficiency Results in a Tech Spec Violation

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER	
1	1	12	90	034	01	02	04	92		050000	

OPERATING MODE (9): N  
POWER LEVEL (10): 080

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 50. (Check one or more of the following) (11):

<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.38(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(a)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.38(a)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Remarks below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12):  
NAME: A. A. Pulvio, Regulatory Engineer  
TELEPHONE NUMBER: 717-456-1701

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC/US	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC/US

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14):  
 YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE):  
 NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15):

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16):

On 11/12/90, at 1615 hours, with Unit 2 operating at approximately 80% power and Unit 3 in shutdown, it was discovered that the E3 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Droop selector switches were in the PARALLEL position. These switches must be in the UNIT position in order to allow the EDG to perform its required safety function. This condition existed since 11/9/90, during which time testing of the other EDG's was not performed as required by Technical Specifications. The causes of the event were personnel error and procedural deficiency. There were no actual safety consequences as a result of this event. The Droop selector switches were returned to the UNIT position on 11/12/90 and the E3 EDG was subsequently verified to operable. The plant operator involved in this event was counseled on the importance of attention to detail. SO 52A.8.A, "Diesel Generator Daily Shutdown/Pre-Startup Inspection", was revised to require verification that the Droop selector switches are in the Unit position. There were no previous similar events.

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 2	DOCUMENT NUMBER (2) 05010027	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR 90	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 034	REVISION NUMBER 01			
					02	OF	03

TEXT (if more space is required, use the back of NRC Form 366A or 70)

### Reasons for the Report

This report is being submitted as required by 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(1)(B) due to a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications (Tech Specs).

### Unit Conditions at Time of the Report

Unit 2 was in the RUN mode at 80% of licensed reactor power.

Unit 3 was in cold shutdown for a scheduled midcycle outage.

### Description of Event

On 11/12/90, at 1615 hours, it was discovered by Plant operations personnel during preparations to start the E3 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) (E1IS:EX), that its associated Droop selector switches (E1IS:SEL) were in the PARALLEL position. These switches, which allow testing of the EDG, must be in the UNIT position in order to allow the EDG to perform its required safety function. This condition existed for approximately three days, during which time testing of the other EDG's had not been performed as required by Technical Specification (T.S.) 4.5.F.1.

### Cause of the Event

The causes of the event were personnel error and procedural deficiency.

On 11/9/90, following operation of the E3 EDG per system operating procedures, the Plant Operator, (PO) (Utility, Non-Licensed) assigned to secure the EDG failed to return the Droop selector switches to the UNIT position. The requirement to verify that the Droop selector switches are in the UNIT position following EDG operation is part of normal PO training for the operation of EDG's.

System operating procedure SO 52A.1.D, "Diesel Generator Lineup for Automatic Start", which is used to secure the EDG following its operation, does not contain a step to verify that the Droop selector switches are returned to the UNIT position. Instead, the procedure states that check-off list COL 52A.1.A-3, "E3 Diesel Generator Normal Standby", should be performed as directed by Shift Management. This procedure, which contains a verification of Droop selector switch positions, is not normally performed due to its length and a reliance on the training and experience of Plant Operators.

### Analysis of the Event

No actual safety consequences occurred as a result of this event.

During a design basis loss of coolant accident (DBA LOCA) it is assumed that one EDG will fail to perform its safety function. The E1, E2, and E4 EDG's were proven to be operable during normal surveillance testing following this event. Therefore, the consequences of a DBA LOCA, had one occurred during the period of time the E3 EDG was inoperable, would not have been increased.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)  Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0   5   0   0   0   2   7   7	LER NUMBER (3)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		9   0	—   0   3   4	—   0   1	0   3	OF	0   3

TEXT IF more space is required, use additional NRC Form 306A's (17)

Corrective Actions

The E3 EDG Droop switches were placed in the UNIT position immediately following the discovery of this event on 11/12/90 at 1615 hours. COL 52A.1.A-3 was performed to ensure adequate lineup of the E3 EDG and the diesel generator was subsequently started and proven to be operable.

The Plant Operator involved with this event was counseled on the importance of attention to detail. An initiative has recently been undertaken to investigate the issue of attention to detail. Corrective actions are currently being formulated which are expected to significantly reduce this type of error.

SO 52A.8.A, "Diesel Generator Daily Shutdown/Pre-Startup Inspection", was revised to require verification that the Droop selector switches are in the UNIT position. SO 52A.8.A is required to be performed following the operation of an EDG per system operation procedures. Additionally, this procedure is performed daily as part of the plant operator rounds.

Previous Similar LERs

No previous similar LERs were identified in which an EDG was rendered inoperable due to an inadequate system lineup.