

#### UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

JUL 1 : 1890

MEMORANDUM FOR: Thomas T. Martin, Regional Administrator

Region I

Thomas E. Murley, Director

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Jack R. Goldberg, Assistant General Counsel for Enforcement

Office of the General Counsel

FROM:

James Lieberman, Director

Office of Enforcement

SUBJECT:

OI REPORT 1-90-006 CINTICHEM INCORPORATED: INCOMPLETE AND

INACCURATE INFORMATION TO NRC

This report concluded that, based on Region I's May 30, 1990 memorandum (Exhibit 5 of the OI report), Cintichem Inc. did not violate the requirements of 10 CFR 50.9. Given that conclusion and the fact that the licensee was cited for the technical violation (exceeding radioactive discharge limits) in Combined Inspection Report Nos. 50-54/90-80 and 70-687/90-80, dated March 19, 1990 this report is considered closed.

> James Lieberman, Director dffice of Enforcement

cc: H. Thompson, DEDS J. Fartlow, NRR

B. Hayes, OI S. Weiss, NRR

9102080353 901123 PDR FDIA BEREZAN 90.40/ PDR FO A-90-401 B-15

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	*16.3				Ron Bellowy
UBJECT Mc Gavern	Contichen		9143	15/ 2/3/	Sol Bres
CAL 1-90-005					Tan Dragoum
					mike Auton
					S. West, NEL
I told Mr. Mc Gare	in that we we	Cot 100		40	Docker Nos. 50-5
					Dick Cooper
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but would like him to					
they make a release to					
be done at some time					
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\$ U.S. C.P.O. 1983-281-529-6346	CONVERSATION REC	ORD		DEPA	NAL FORM 271 (12-76) ETMENT OF DEFENSE

#### OTHER EVENTS OF INTEREST

The following item is described because it may be perceived by the public to be of public health or safety significance. The item did not involve a major reduction in the level of protection provided for public health or safety; therefore, it is not reportable as an abnormal occurrence.

#### Releases to Indian Kill Reservoir by Cintichem, Incorporated, Tuxedo, New York

On April 4, 1990, licensee management announced a decision to decommission the reactor and hot laboratory facilities. This decision was made after an in-depth analysis on the long-term economic viability of the reactor. The licensee will prepare a detailed decommissioning plan for submission to the NRC for its approval.

Prior to the decision to decommission, on February 9, 1990, Cintichem reported identification of iodine-131 (I-131) and sodium-24 (Na-24) in an onsite retention pond that collects runoff from the storm drain system. The NRC and New York State dispatched teams to the site (NRC licenses operation of the 5Mw reactor and use of special nuclear material; the State of New York licenses the possession and use of byproduct materials in hot cells and related facilities adjacent to the reactor). Until February 20, the NRC and New York State believed that no releases of radioactively contaminated water to the nearby Indian Kill Reservoir had occurred. However, on February 20, the licensee indicated that, prior to completing the analysis of water samples from the retention pond early on February 9, the onsite retention pond was drained to the reservoir several times due to runoff from heavy rainfall. The retention pond was later determined to have had I-131 slightly in excess of the NRC limits for releases to unrestricted area. The State of New York subsequently measured I-131 in the reservoir, but at levels less than the EPA's standards for drinking water. While there was no effect on public health or safety, the event is of particular interest because: (1) the reservoir serves as a drinking water source for about 150 families in the Tuxedo, NY area; and (2) the plant is one of the nation's largest manufacturers of radioisotopes for medical purposes. The details of the event are as follows:

The licensee irradiated uranium oxide targets in its pool-type reactor. The target material was transferred through a water-filled canal to a storage pool (called a gamma pit) below the hot cells. After being placed in the hot cells, a variety of radioisotopes produced in the irradiation process were separated, refined and shipped for use with various radio-pharmaceuticals to diagnose and treat a number of medical conditions.

On December 12, 1989, NRC Region I received notification that the licensee, through its routine sampling program, had identified a possible discharge of slightly contaminated water in a storm drain in the onsite parking lot. However, samples from a number of surface and groundwater locations on site revealed no additional measurable contamination and no obvious source of the contamination in the storm drain water. In particular, an onsite

retention pond which received water from the storm drain system (and which itself drained to the Indian Kill Reservoir) showed no detectable contamination. The NRC monitored the licensee's actions to identify the source of the radioactivity, and on January 5, 1990, following the latest in a series of cyclic changes in the amount of radioactivity in the storm drain, NRC Region I instructed the licensee to release no water from the retention pond to the reservoir prior to sampling and analyzing the samples to ensure that no measurable release to the reservoir occurred. Until February 9, 1990, no measurable activity was observed in the retention pond. On February 9, 1990, Cintichem reported to Region I the identification of several radioisotopes in the retention pond. All but one were at concentrations that could be released to unrestricted areas. However, I-131 was present at nearly twice the maximum permissible concentration (MPC) permitted for such releases. Following the discovery of radioactivity in the retention pond on February 9, 1990, all discharges to the reservoir were halted. The licensee began pumping the contents of the retention pond to onsite holding tanks and additional tanks were brought on site. The licensee processed this water to remove the radioactivity and transferred it to another tank for sampling and analysis prior to discharge downstream of the reservoir.

Between February 9 and 16, 1990, a team of specialists monitored the licensee's corrective actions, confirmed that the reactor had been shut down, confirmed the licensee's measurements of radionuclides in water, and assured that, after its arrival on site, all liquid releases met regulatory limits. The team also monitored the licensee's actions to identify the source of the contamination leaks. A concrete wall in a portion of the gamma pit was identified as a source of the leak to the retention pond. A leak was also identified in a part of the reactor coolant system called the hold-up tank.

On February 13, 1990, an NRC Order was issued to Cintichem requiring submission of a plan of short and long term actions to correct current and prevent future leaks.

Subsequently, on February 20, 1990, the licensee informed the NRC that several discharges, contaminated with I-131 at about twice the appropriate MPC and with several other radioisotopes at concentrations less than MPC, were made from the retention pond to the reservoir on February 9, 1990. Subsequent to this notification, the NRC issued Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) No. 1-90-005 on February 23, 1990, which confirmed the licensee's commitment to (1) stop all intentional releases of water from the onsite retention pond to the reservoir, (2) eliminate leakage/seepage from the retention pond to the reservoir through the discharge pipe, (3) divert all discorges from the retention pond to a discharge point in the creek downstream of the reservoir, but only after sampling and analyses to assure the radioactivity is below applicable maximum permissible concentrations, and (4) immediately notify the NRC Region 1 Office if radioactivity is measured in the retention pond above background levels or if any unmeasured releases

occur. Subsequent to receipt of this CAL, the licensee notified the Region I Office on the evening of February 23, 1990, that elevated levels of radioactivity (although less than the appropriate MPCs) were found in the retention pond and that, due to heavy rainfall during the day, the retention pond had to be discharged to the stream prior to completion of analyses, in order to protect the integrity of the retention pond. These releases were made in accordance with the CAL.

On March 5, 1990, in response to the February 13, 1990 NRC Order, the licensee submitted a plan for locating and repairing all leaks, and verifying the effectiveness of the repairs. Implementation of this plan would include various tests of the integrity of the reactor pool system, repair all identified leaks, retest of all systems for water leakage, and development and installation of a monitoring system or program for the early detection of leaks in the reactor pool system. As a result of the reactor shutdown, no new production of radioisotopes was occurring.

NRC representatives, along with representatives of the New York State agencies responsible for regulating activities at Cintichem involving radioactive material, met with local officials and members of the public on several occasions to inform them of the situation at Cintichem. Both regulatory bodies agree that the releases to the reservoir, though undesirable, did not represent a hazard to public health and safety.

After the licensee had indicated that he would be decommissioning the reactor and the hot cells a meeting was held on April 11, 1990, involving NRR, NMSS, Region I, New York State, and the licensee to discuss (1) development and funding of a decommissioning plan, (2) development of a plan to repair and use the transfer canal and gamma pit for removal of fuel, and (3) current actions under present licenses to remove loose radioactive material.

1.		GENERAL
1.	1	Reactor Name (Acronym) Cintichem Nuclear Reactor (CNR
1.		racense italiper treatmentalitation interest
1.3		THE SOURCE PLANISHED THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPE
1.4	6 1	Reactor Address
		Cintichem Incorporated
		P.O. Box 816 Tuxedo, New York 10987-0816 U.S.A.
1.0	3 1	
1.6		AMMANUT ANADA CLEVER PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY
1.7	-	ALUE ALUER AND A
3.1		At an a second contract of the second contrac
1.9	F	teactor Administrators
		Michael D. Johnson, Reactor Supervisor
		Pohert A County Donate Day
1.1	0 F	cactor Facility Staff
	a	Scientific/Technical
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		TO THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERT
1.1		
	8.	Chief Reactor Operator
	b.	Shift Supervisor\$25,500-38,200
1.12	R	eactor Architect/Engineer
1.13	R	eactor Constructor
		White Plains, New York
1.14	Or	and the country outpoints whilear Tackwalage
		Tocated published and immediate vicinity.
1.16	Re	actor Operating Status  Located within 50 mile radius of New York City.
	A.	Initial Criticality Date
	c.	
	e.	Pulses/Year, Average Energy
1.17	Re	
		THE RESERVE OF THE PARTY OF THE
	a.	Coverage
	b.	Annual Premium
		Not provided
2.	RE/	ACTOR
2.1	Res	actor Type
2.2	Res	actor Type Open pool, light water moderated, plate fuel. Research reactor.
- 1	b.	Configuration Open pool
		Overall Dimensions
		그들이 하는 아이들에 대한 경기 때문을 받았다. 그 그렇게 그렇게 그렇게 되었는데 그렇게 되었다면 하는데 그렇게 되었다면 하는데

	Material Magnetite and ordinary co-crete.
	d. Normal Operating Pressure
	Mormal Operating Temperature
3.3	
3.516	Volume
	b. Overall Dimensions
	c. Lattice Configuration Grid: 9 elements wide × 6 elements long.
	d. Number of Elements
	1. Standard
	2. Control
	f. Subdivided Core  J. Number of Subdivisions
	2. Subdivision Differentiating Characteristics
	3. Number of Elements per Subdivision
2.4	Containment
	a. Type Confinement building
	b. Volume
	c. Material Reinforced oncrete
2.5	Moderator Light water
2.6	Slanket Gas
2.7	Reflectors
2.8	Thermal Shield
2.9	Biological Shield
	a. External Radiation Levels
2 10	Power Level
311.10	a. Normal Steady State
	b. Pulsing Not applicable
2.11	Normal Average Thermal Power Density
	a. Volumetric
	(2.10.a/2.3.a)
	b. Linear
	(2.10.a/(Number of Plates/Pins × Plate/Pin Length))
2.12	Normal Specific Power
-14	(2.10.a/5.1.b)
40.00	Reactor Control
	a. Safety Rods  1. Number
	2. Shape and Dimensions
	0.85 in (2.16 cm) × 2.23 in (5.66 cm) × 24.5 in (62.23 cm) long.
	3. Material and Loading Silver, indiusn, cadmium.
	4. Normal Withdrawal/Insertion Speed
	5. Scram Insertion Speed
	6. Total Reactivity 0.12 Delta K/K
	7. Normal Average Reactivity Addition Rate
	8. Scram Mechanism Safety rod magnet current interrupt at " % pewer, 3 second period, or low core flow.
	b. Pulse Rods
	1. Number
	2. Shape and Dimensions
	4. Normal Withdrawal Insertion Speed
	5. Scram Insertion Speed
	6. Total Reactivity
	7. Normal Average Reactivity Addition Rate

## Cinti frem Nuclear Reactor 5 MW

	8. S. ram Mechanism
	Regulating Rods
	1. Number
	2. Shape and Dimensions
	S. Material and Loading Stainless steel
	5. Normal Wi'hdrawa asertion Speed
	5. Total Reactivity 0.0029 Delta K/K
	6. Normal Average Reactivity Addition Rate
	7. Scram Mechanism
	l. Chemical Shim Control
	1. Chemical
	3. Control Mechanism
	4. Total Reactivity
	Burnable Poison
	1. Isotop s Utilized
	2. Location Not applicable
	8. Loading Not applicable
	4. Total Reactivity Not applicable
	[1] [1] [4] [4] [4] [4] [4] [4] [4] [4] [4] [4
3.	FUEL
3.1	Standard Fuel Element
	L. Configuration
	b. Element Dimensions
	. Overall Plate/Pin Dimensions
	i. Number of Plates Tyrs per Element
	b. Distance Setween Plate 'in Centerlines
	L Active Portion of Fuel Plate/Pin
	1. Dimensions
	2. Composition
	3. U-235 Exrichment
	4. Fissile Material Density
	1. Compositor
	2. Dimensions
	k. Clad
	1. Composition
	%. Thit aress
	. Side Plate
	1. Composition
	2. Thickness
* 0	L. Etructural Material
9-36	Con rol Rod Fuel Element
	<ul> <li>Specify Differences from Standard Fuel Elements. 9 plates, all fueled. 1.25 in (3.18 cm) × 2.32 in (5.89 cm)</li> <li>entral control red slot.</li> </ul>
3.5	Fuel Cycle
	s. Criteria for Refueling
	5. Frequency of Refueling
	c. Formal Flement Lifetir e
	L. Average 1/-235 Burnup
	2. Peak U- 35 Burnup
	3. Maximu : Allowed U-235 Burnup
	e. Number of ! lements Replaced During Typic/.l Refueling

	f. Spent Fuel
	1. Mininum Cooling Time
	2. Maximum Amount in Storage
	h. Spent Fuel Shipping Cask BMI-1 Cask (owned by Cintichem)
	L. Spent Fuel Handling
	<ol> <li>Fuel Failure Detection</li></ol>
3.4	Fuel Inventory
	a. Current Fissile Material Inventory Status
	1. New Fuel In-Process
	2. New Fuel On Hand
	S. Fuel In-Core
	4. Spent Fuel In Storage
	6. Non-fuel Special Nuclear Material
	b. Fissile Material Inventory Needed to Assure Co., tinuity of Operations
	1. New Fuel In-Process
	2. New Fuel On Hand
	3. Fuel In-Core
5.5	Puel Source
	s. Fuel Fabricator CERCA
	Romans, France
	b. Fuel Supplier
	c. Fissile Material Origin
	d. Enrichment Supplier
	e. Method of Fabrication
	f. Fuel Element Cost
4.	HEAT TRANSFER DATA
4.1	Fuel Element Heat Transfer Ares
4.2	Fuel Element Flow Area
4.3	Fuel Element Wetted Perimeter
4.4	Fuel Meat Thermal Resistivity
4.5	Clad-Coolant Heat Transfer Coefficient (at Hot Spot)
4.6	Hest Flux at Piate Surface
	a. Normal Average Heat Flux
	b. Peak Heat Flux
	1. Without Hot Channel Factors
	2. With Hot Channel Factors
	c. Axial Peaking Factor in Hot Channel (from Axial Fission Rate Distribution)
	1. Without Hot Channel Factors
	2. With Hot Channel Factors
4.5	d. Hot Spot Location
4.7	Peak Operating Fuel Plate/Pin Temperature
	a. At Plate/Pin Surface
	1. Without Hot Channel Factors
	b. Inside Puel Meat
	1. Without Hot Channel Factors
	2. With Hot Channel Factors

4.8	Primary Coolant
4.9	Coolant Flow
	s. Flow Direction
	b. Flow Induced By
	c. Normal Flow Rate
	d. Maximum Flow Rate
	e. Mean Core Fl. w Velocity
	f. Normal Core Inlet Temperature
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	The state of the s
	1. Without Hot Channel Factors
	2. With Hot Channel Factors
	L. Coolant Pressure at Core Outlet
	j. Coolant Pressure at Hot Spot
	1. Without Hot Channel Factors
	2. With Hot Channel Factors
4.10	Hot Channel Factors (Including Only Effects Other than Nuclear Peaking; Specify Breakdowns)
	a. For Coolant Temperature Rise
	b. For Film Temperature Rise
	c. Others
4.11	Core Heat Dissipation SystemPrimary-secondary heat exchanger. Cooling tower for secondary coolant.
4.12	Shutdown Heat Removal System
	s. Worst Case Elapsed Time from Shutde wn to Coolant Independence
	Without Fuel Distortion
4.13	Emergency Core Cooling System Core apray nozzle directed toward the reactor core.
	The second control of the second control of the sector core.
5.	NUCLEAR DATA
э.	NUCLEAR DATA
5.1	Fuel Loading
	a. Minimum Critical Mass
	h. Normal C. es Londing
	b. Normal Care Loading
	c. Maximum K. Componenta
	1. Temperature
	2. Equilibrium Xenon
	8. Equilibrium Samarium
	6. Xenon Override
	5. Burnup (Including Burnable Poison)
	6. Experimental Sample
	Control and beam tubes 0.021 Dalta K/K
	6. Total
	d. Shutdown Margin 0.005 Delta K/K with the most reactive control rod fully withdrawn.
5.2	Reactivity Coefficients
	a. Temperature
	1. Moderator
	2. Doppler
	5. Fuel Expansion
	4. Burnable Poison
	b. Void
5.3	Neutron Flux Densities
	a. Steady State Average Thermal
	b. Steady State Peak Thermal
	e. Steady State Average Fast
	1.0 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100 ×
	d. Stead: State Sak Sast  8.0 × 100 n/cm*/sec  9.0 Peak Pulsing Power  Not applicable
	Not applicable
	f. Pulse Integrated Power

5.4	Pulsing Characteristics
	a. Pulse Period
	b. Full Width at Helf Maximum
	c. Maximum Frequency of Pulses
5.5	Fission Density
	a. Normal Average
	b. Peak 1.31 × 10 <sup>m</sup> fissions/in' (8.0 × 10 <sup>s</sup> fissions/cc)
	c. Axial Peak/Average Rado for Typical Element
5.6	Maximum Fission Product Inventory Approximately 1.0 × 10' Ci
6.	OPERATING EXPERIENCE
6.1	Forced Outages in the Past Five Years
	a. Equipment Malfunction
	b. Personnel Error
	c. Full power Operating Hours
7.	SAFEGUARDS
	마시스 하나 아이들은 아이들은 아이들은 아이들은 아이들은 아이들은 아이들은 아이들은
7.1	Agency Responsible for Regulatory Jurisdiction
8.	PAST MODIFICATIONS AND FUTURE PLANS
6.1	Past Major Modifications
	a. Power Increase/Date
	Uranium-aluminum (U-Al) alloy to Uranium aluminide nowder
	c. Other/Date
8.2	Fallere Major Modifications
	n Power Increase Date
	None planned Evaluating low enriched fuel/Date not provided
	c. Decommissioning Date
	d Other/Date
8.3	FULLIFE RESCROPE
	a. Type/Date
9.	REACTOR, LABORATORY, AND EXPERIMENTAL FACILITIES
9.1	Accelerators
9.2	a. Description
	s. Description
	b. Dimensions
	C. Thermal Neutron flux
	We Fast Newtron Flux
	Not recorded
9.3	Converter blocks
	s. Description
	AN ACHIEVELENIALE CLICATERISTICS CONTROL OF THE PARTY OF
	a receiment reduction fruit
	West and the state of the state
	s. Gamma Dose Rate

	나 뭐 그렇게 되었다. 그는 이 사는 그 사람들이 얼굴하면 하는 것이 하는 것이 하는 것이 없는 것이다.
9.4	Critical Assemblies
	a. Description
	b. Dimensions
	c. Thermal Neutron Flux
	d. Fast Neutron Flux
	e. Gamma Dose Rate
0.5	Gamma Sources
	a. Description
	b. Dimensions Not provided
	c. Gamma Dose Rate
9.6	Hot Cells
810	a. Description
	b. Dimensions
9.7	Irradiation Racks
	a. Description
	b. Dimensions
	c. Thermal Neutron Flux
	d. Fast Neutron Flux
	e. Gamma Dose Rate
8.9	Neutron Activation Analysis
30.000	a. Description
9.9	Neutron Generator
	a. Description
	b. Thermal Neutron Flux
	c. Fast Neutron Flux
9.10	Neutron Radiography
1 15.5	a. Description
9.11	Neutron Sources
****	a. Description
	b. Dimensions
	c. Thermal Neutron Flux
	d. Fast Neutron Flux
9.12	Neutron Spectrometer
0.14	a. Description
0.19	Pneumatic Tubes
6.10	a. Description
	b. D'mensions
	1: 1.5 in (3.81 cm) diameter.
	c. Thermal Neutron Flux
	d. Fast Neutron Flux
	e. Gamma Dose Rate
9.14	Radioisotope Laboratories
	a. Description
	hot cells, ra tiochemical labs, offices, target preparation areas and shipping area.
9.15	Reactor Core
	a. Description
	b. Dimensions
	c. Thermal Neutron Flux
	d. Fast Neutron Flux
	e. Gamma Dose Rate Not provided
9.16	Reactor Pool
	a. Description

	b.	Dimensions
	¢.	Incrmal Neutron Flux
	d.	Fact Neutron Fills West of the
	٠.	EA V 10 and A
9.17		ermal Column
	а.	Description
	b.	I/Imensions
	Bir.	I Dermai Reutron Flux
	d.	FROM NEUTROD FIELD
	e.	Gamma Dose Rate
10.	RE:	SEARCH AND TECHNICAL PROGRAM AND REACTOR UTILIZATION SUMMARY
10.1	Res	earch, Technical, and Training Program
		The Cintichem Nuclear Reactor initially was used for metal product research, activation analysis, medical product research and numerous other research programs. A business emerged making the Cintichem Reactor a major supplier of medical radioisters.
		processed after irradiation. The separated isotopes are distributed world wide
10.2	Pri	ncipal Isotopes Produced Phosphorous (P)-32, molybdenum (Mo)-99/technecium (Te)-99, tin (Sn)-113, iodine (I)-125, iodine (I)-131, and xenon (Xe)-133.
11.	CO	MPUTER CODES UTILIZED IN DESIGN
	N.	보다면 그 이 나는 내가 있는데 그 나는 사람들이 살아 있다면 살아 있다면 살아 있다면 살아 있다면 없다.
12.1	PART	tronice
E 2. 480	GIFT.F	CTALEST LYCKIND
		Reactor Vessel
	955	表 特殊的 - 1.4 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
2.35	CA C. M.	t Transfer
2.	FAC	ILITY DESIGN AND OPERATION REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
		Final Hazards Summary Report - UCNR Research Reactor; June 17, 1957.
		The state of the s
		Supplement 2 to Final Hazards Summary Report; June 21, 1977. CNR Technical Specifications. Appendix A to License R-81; May 17, 1979. USNRC NUREG-1059 Safety Evaluation Report; June, 1984.

#### 2 SITE CHARACTERISTICS

2.1 Site Description

Amost. Cintichem, Inc. The Union Carbide Subsidiory & Inc., Medical Projucts Division, nuclear reactor facility is located within the city of Tuxedo, in Orange County, New York. 7/2/8: Orange County, in southeastern New York State, is bordered on the south by New Jersey and is approximately 40 mi northwest of New York City. Tuxedo, in the extreme southeastern corner of Orange County, is approximately 4 mi north of the New Jersey state line. The plant site is located on 100 acres of land, owned by Union Carbide. It is in an industrial park area known as Sterling Forest and is about 3-1/4 mi northwest of the village of Tuxedo Park. Figure 2.1 is a map of the area surrounding the site. The plant itself, constructed along Long Meadow Road on the eastern slope of Hogback Mountain, is at an average elevation of 800 ft above mean sea level (MSL). A layout of the UCS complex is shown in Figure 2.2.

The five principal buildings at the plant site are

Building 1 Reactor

Hot Laboratory (structurally joined to the reactor building) Building 2

Building 3 Maintenance Building 4 Administration Building 5 Heating Plant

There is also a small concrete block structure at the north end of the plant site used for temporary storage of drummed, miscellaneous low-level radioactive wastes.

## 2.2 Geography

The UCS reactor site is within a 22,000-acre woodland area called Sterling Forest, which is owned by a private development company. Sterling Forest contains three residential areas, several small research centers, the UCS facility, and a conference center. These developed areas make up a total of less than 1,500 acres. The remainder of the land is undeveloped. Adjoining Sterling Forest to the east is another large undeveloped area that is a part of the Palisades Interstate Park System. This 75,000-acre woodland contains approximately 31 summer camps, but essentially no year-round residents.

The approximately 20,500-acre undeveloped portion of Sterling Forest is managed ecologically by the Sterling Forest Development Corporation. This organization permits regulated (license and bag-limit) hunting in designated, marked portions of the area.

Regulated fishing also is permitted in designated lakes on the property. The Sterling Forest Development Corporation employs regulated lumbering, the main objective of which is to remove dead and disease-infested trees and promote maintenance of healthy understory.

23




Figure 2.1 10-mile radius map of site

Figure 2.2 Reactor building-site plan

#### 2.3 Topography and Surface Drainage

The reactor site is about 1,500 ft southwest of Indian Kill Brook, a small stream flowing southeast for a mile and a half to the Ramapo River. The plant borders Long Meadow Road at an elevation of approximately 800 ft.

There is a very low north-south topographic divide between Indian Kill Brook drainage and drainage of Warwick Brook to the south, which also flows east to the Ramapo River. These two small streams (Indian Kill Brook and Warwick Brook) drain into the Ramapo River from the vicinity of the site a.d thus dominate the surface drainage pattern away from the site.

Aithough the relief in the area is only 400 to 700 ft from valley floors to ridge tops, the hillsides are considered to be steep and rugged. From a past era of glaciation, the area features clogged drainage systems such as swamps, ponds, and lakes along stream channels. Fill, clay, sand, gravel, and boulders of every size also strew the hillsides. The reactor building is located at the eastern toe of the north trending spur of Hogback Mountain, which slopes from an elevation over 1,500 ft down to the level of Indian Kill Lake at an elevation of 700 ft.

As stated above, surface drainage from the site is exclusively by way of Indian Kill Brook. Indian Kill Brook enters the Ramapo River 1-1/2 mi east of the plant at el 463 ft. Tuxedo Lake stands at el 560 ft. Wee Wah, the aujoining lake to the north, stands lower than Tuxedo Lake to which it is joined by a small stream of high gradient. Wee Wah Lake consists of two segments. The southern, higher segment is separated from the northern, lower segment by a stream of steep gradient. This northern segment, in turn, discharges over an earth dam and masonry spillway to a small stream that discharges into Ramapo River. Thus, if Indian Kill Brook were contaminated as a result of some incident, contamination of this chain of three lakes by surface flow from the plant would not be possible.

## 2.4 Demography

The UCS plant is located in a thinly populated area. The closest occupied offsite area is the Laurel Ridge housing development which contains 132 houses at a minimum distance of 1,100 ft east of the reactor building. A second development, consisting of 27 houses in an area called Clinton Woods, is located 3,200 ft to the north. There are no other housing developments within 1.5 mi of the reactor.

Table 2.1 shows the population distribution in 22.5° compass sectors out to 50 mi. The north sector is centered on true north but includes 11°15' on either side of true north, a total of 22.5°. Likewise, all other sectors embrace an arc of 22.5°. The table indicates the most heavily populated areas to be to the southeast, south-southeast, and south of the site within the 20 to 50 mi radii. The high population density of these sectors is a result of the large metropolitan centers, e.g., New York City, Newark, and Bayonne.

Table 2.1 Population density around the Union Carbide reactor by 16 compass sectors out to 50 miles\*

	-		M	liles		
Sector	0 - 5	5 - 10	10 - 20	20 - 30	30 - 40	40 - 50
N NNE NNE ENE ESE SSE SSW SW VNW NW	614 346 108 187 107 330 132 3,878 91 43 0 125 68 878 192 190	16,851 1,903 1,081 10,489 17,330 7,481 18,858 11,829 10,892 10,393 2,951 2,834 23,192 2,195 2,196 2,108	36,264 12,958 14,135 47,176 61,749 15,506 72,622 142,070 96,848 42,750 18,238 27,381 10,754 8,022 28,510 18,339	29,237 53,101 26,503 43,204 30,032 49,112 476,642 454,282 499,486 124,960 60,235 20,741 19,855 21,651 8,858 8,964	23,692 104,808 31,023 50,442 76,475 275,267 132,749 2,296,153 971,105 133,923 \$7,985 30,893 13,179 8,775 6,016 18,853	19,458 48,873 26,850 183,112 84,156 127,105 1,753,651 2,334,641 2,611,407 133,281 45,567 35,991 7,900 7,443 17,724 7,908

<sup>\*</sup>Population estimates based on 1980 Census of Population and Housing.

# 2.5 Nearby Industrial, Transportation, and Military Facilities

As stated earlier, UCS is located about 3 1/4 mi from Tuxedo Park, New York, in an industrial park. Other tenants in the industrial park are light industry. The closest major highway or railroad is about 1.5 miles from the plant.

The closest military installation is West Point, about 10 mi from UCS. There are no commercial airports closer than 40 mi from the plant and the nearest and military airport, is located approximately 16 mi away on the outskirts of Newburgh, New York.

As none of the above industrial transportation, or military activities occur close to the reactor, the staff concludes that these activities pose no threat to the safe operation of the UCS reactor.

## 2.6 Meteorology and Climatology

The climate of the Sterling Forest area is predominantly influenced by air mass movements and prevailing winds from an inland direction. Cold frontal 35 mph in winter and considerably more slowly in summer. This is a part of paths toward the northeastern United States. About 40% of the low centers

pass over or close to southeastern New York so that there is regular change in weather patterns without any consistent periods of stagnation.

Centers of high pressure alternate more or less regularly with the lows. In the wintertime, their movement is variable, depending on the strength of cold air outthrusts from the arctic area to the northwest. This movement is slowest during summer and early fall so that, with the prevailing westerlies aloft reaching their most northerly movement at the same time, high-pressure centers can become stationary for a few days during these seasons. During a 2-year period of inversion observation, only 21 inversions persisted for more than 12 hours and only 6 persisted longer than 24 hours.

Mean ambient air temperatures vary from  $28^{\circ}F$  (minus  $1^{\circ}C$ ) in January, to  $75^{\circ}F$  ( $24^{\circ}C$ ) in July, with extremes of  $-19^{\circ}F$  ( $-30^{\circ}C$ ) and  $105^{\circ}F$  ( $41^{\circ}C$ ). Precipitation is fairly uniform throughout the year with an average rainfall of about 44 in.

Dispersion values,  $\chi/Q$ , from field sampling and measurements were obtained at various atmospheric monitoring points and from the reported annual releases of I-125 and I-131. These were used to compare against calculated concentrations of the particular isotopes at the corresponding points. In all cases, the predicted value exceeded the measured value. Additional calculations were performed to investigate the local topographical effects on the  $\chi/Q$  values.

#### 2.7 Geology

The UCS plant site is located within a seismogenic zone trending along the Ramapo Fault System. The Ramapo Fault System and other fault systems within the zone encompass the Manhattan Prong, Newa & Basin, and the Hudson Highlands. They are made up of semiductile thrust and strike-slip faults of Precambrian and early Paleozoic age, and brittle faults with dip-slip and oblique sense of motion, generally of Mesozoic and younger age. The younger faults show evidence of long periods of recurrent movement. The seismogenic zone is approximately 30 km (18 mi) wide and is centered on the northeasterly striking, southeasterly dipping Ramapo Fault System. The hypocentral depths are from 0 to 10 km (6 mi) and the focal mechanisms indicate either reverse or right lateral strike-slip motion on the northeast striking faults.

On the basis of the available data from recent investigations and mapping of the Ramapo Fault System, there is no evidence of recent movement. Many of the investigations by the U.S. Geological Survey and by consultants for the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant applicant were conducted for the specific purpose of determining the age of deformation in the vicinity of the Ramapo Fault System and whether or not there is evidence of geologically old fault activity. The staff concluded that the Ramapo Fault System should not be considered capable within the meaning of 10 CFR 100, Appendix A.

The plant is situated on a northerly trending spur of Hogback Mountain along Long Meadow Road. Bedrock is highly metamorphosed and consists of very dense, hard Precambrian granite gneiss that is fractured near the surface. Drill holes in the area produced nearly complete core recoveries and ground water was measured at a depth of 85 ft below the surface.

#### 2.8 Hydrology

As stated in Section 2.3, the surface water features of significance in connection with the operation of the UCS reactor are the Indian Kill Reservoir, Indian Kill Brook, Warwick Brook, and the Ramapo River.

Surface drainage from the site is exclusively by way of Indian Kill Brook, but because of the unique surface hydrology, even if the Indian Kill Brook were contaminated, it is not remotely possible to carry such contamination by surface flow to any of this chain of three lakes (Section 2.3).

Indian Kill Brook presents the only obvious path for contamination by underground flow, that is, through alluvial sand, silts, and gravels that lie beneath the stream channel, resting on the gneissoid bedrock of the region. Water passes downstream easily but slowly through these alluvial deposits. Such waters could not possibly ascend into the chain of Tuxedo Lakes. Furthermore, it does not seem possible that water could pass underground beneath the mountainous ridges, through the fractures in the hard rocks. The mountainous tract, which is bounded by Indian Kill Brook, Long Meadow Road, Warwick Brook, and Ramapo River, naturally contains some ground water within fractures in the rocks. But this water drains outward to the nearest and most accessible exists. namely either Indian Kill Brook, Warwick Brook, or Ramapo River. Water cannot pass against this outward flow, across this mountainous tract, and even assuming it could, it could not pass the boundary of Warwick Brook, which flows east to Ramapo River. Therefore, the possibility of contamination of the Tuxedo Lakes chain by water from the vicinity of the plant may be dismissed. The only reasonable route for contaminated liquid effluents that might come from the plant site would be via Indian Kill Brook to the Ramapo River and thence to the Passaic River in New Jersey.

## 2.9 Seismulogy

Recent studies in New York State and adjacent areas have brought to light some of the geotectonic features that account for the seismicity in the region. Aggarwal and Sykes (1978) conclude that earthquakes occur predominantly along northeast trending faults of which the Ramapo fault is one such fault. However, in a more recent study (1983), Kafka concludes that earthquakes recorded from 1970 to 1982 by the microearthquake networks in the New York City metropolitan area do not corroborate evidence that northeast trending faults lying to the northwest of the Newark Basin (such as the Ramapo Fault) are any more active than those lying to the north and east of the basin. Woodward-Clyde Consultants (1982) report that earthquakes instrumentally located in the region do not lie preferentially along either the Ramapo Fault or along other northeast trending structures. No spatial correlation is observed between the distribution of epicenters and geologic structures or terranes that are mapped at the surface. The two largest events since the local seismic network has been operating in the New York metropolitan area were not associated with the Ramapo Fault but rather were located in the Coastal Plain east of the Newark Basin (Cheesequake, New Jersey) and in the Valley and Ridge Province north of the Newark Basin (Wappingers Falls, New York). Epicenter locations of magnitude 2 and larger earthquakes appear to be in the region surrounding the Newark Basin. Although the Ramapo Fault shows a spatial correlation with some of the earthquakes, fault plane solutions for many of these events indicate primarily thrust-type faulting on north-to-west striking planes, which is inconsistent with movement on the Ramapo Fault (Woodward-Clyde, 1982).

A relevant observation made by Kafka (1983) is that similarities between the distribution of seismicity of the recently (instrumentally) recorded earthquakes and the distribution of more than 200 years of historic earthquakes suggest that the seismic activity in this area has been relatively stationary over the last few hundred years.

The highest intensity reported for historic earthquakes in the area is Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) VII (1737, 1884). Kafka (1983) estimated the 1884 earthquake epicentral magnitude to be 4.9 ( $m_p$ ). However, both the 1737 and

1884 earthquakes occured east of the Newark Basin and, as Kafka points out, the 1884 earthquake may have occurred offshore. There are, however, several earthquakes that occurred within the Ramapo Fault zone that have magnitudes estimated to be in the 4.7-4.8 range (Aggarwal and Sykes, 1978).

#### 2.10 Conclusion

The staff has reviewed and evaluated the UCS reactor site and contiguous regions for natural and manmade hazards and concludes that there are no risks associated with the site that make it unacceptable for the continued operation of the reactor at the power level of 5 MW.




Figure 3.1 Reactor building elevation

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Figure 4.1 Reactor building at elevation 808.25 feet

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At orto Sterling Fake Rel at

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samples were evaporated during preparation, any iodine present would have been driven off. The analytical method employed does not appear to be appropriate to determine the content of all radionuclides, including iodine in the process water. Use of an inadequate analytical method to determine the content of all radionuclides in water samples was identified as an apparent violation of T.S. 3.9.3.3 (54/89-80-12; 687/89-80-12). See Paragraph 10.2.

## 11.1.5 Analysis of the Reactor Pool Water

The licensee measures radioactivity of the reactor pool water to implement Sections 4.8.(2) and 4.8.(3) of Technical Specification requirements. The inspector reviewed the licensee's analytical procedure for the reactor pool water analysis. The reactor group supplies one gallon of pool water for analysis each month. The sample is held for one week before the analysis is performed. The gallon of pool water is then boiled down to 30 milliliters and counted for identification of the radioactive isotopes required by Section 4.8.(2) of the Technical Specifications. I addition, the licensee takes a daily grab sample (10 ml) of the reactor pool water to meet the Section 4.8.(3) requirement. That sample is boiled down to dryness on a planchet and measured for gross beta-gamma activity. The inspector stated that entrained noble gases, iodines, and any other volatile nuclides (if present) would be driven off by evaporation during sample preparation. In addition, the one-week delay prior to the analysis would allow all of the short-live nuclides to decay prior to analysis. Therefore, the inspector stated that the licensee's method for the analyses of the reactor pool water did not meet Technical Specification requirements since the analytical techniques used were not appropriate to identify all nuclides present. This was identified as apparent violation of Technical Specification 4.8.(2) and 4.8.(3) requirements (54/89-80-18).

One reactor pool water sample was analyzed in the NRC Mobile Laboratory in order to determine which radionuclides were present. Twenty milliliters of the reactor pool water were diluted to 50 milliliters and analyzed. Following are the NRC analytical results.

Nuclide	Activity (uCi/ml)
Ar-41	(2.6 +/- 0.2)E-4
Xe-135	(1.25 +/- 0.04)E-4
Na-24	(6.67 +/- 0.03)E-3
I-131	(3.1 +/- 0.4)E-5
I-132	(1.12 +/- 0.12)E-4

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JUNE 18 1990

Licensee/Facility

Notification 6/18/90

Cintichem Incorporated Tuxedo, New York Duckets Nos 70-687 and 50-54 Subject NYS-DEC Consent Order

#### REPORTABLE EVENT NUMBER

On June 7, 1990, the State of New York, Department of Environmental Conservation (NYS-DEC) announced that Cintichem Incorporated was assessed a \$200,000 penalty for violations of NYS-DEC requirements between October 1989 and February 1990. A consent order, signed by the company, was also issued on the same date. The violations stemmed from events at the facility which resulted in identification of radioactive leaks to onsite locations from the hot cell ventilation system and portions of the pool water system. The consent order calls for environmental and managerial audits, submission of an air emission permit application and the establishment of interim air emission limits, establishment of a groundwater monitoring program development of a program for remediation of contamination released from the facility, and retention of contractor personnel to perform the technical engineering and analytical obligations r quired by the order. This consent order will substantially replace the commitments previously made by the licensee to the NRC in Confirmatory Action Letter No. 90-005 dated February 23, 1990. It does not affect the provisions of an NRC order issued on February 13, 1990 which required the licensee to shutdown the reactor and submit a plan for short term and long term actions to correct current and prevent future leaks.

The licensee subsequently announced on April 4, 1990, that the reactor and hot cell facilities will be shutdown permanently and decommissioned. The licensee is currently preparing a decommissioning plan which will be submitted to the NPC for approval.

Information concerning this announcement was received by the NRC from the NYS-DFC on June 15, 1990.

REGIONAL ACTION: Region I will follow-up.

Contact: R. Boros

FTS: 346-5213

5-14