



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

November 17, 1982

Mr. R. C. Haynes
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75
DOCKET NO. 50-311
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-130/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-130/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

H. J. Midura
General Manager -
Salem Operations

RF:ks

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CC: Distribution

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PDR ADOCK 05000311
S PDR

The Energy People

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Report Number: 82-138/03L
Report Date: 11-17-82
Occurrence Date: 10/31/82
Facility: Salem Generating Station Unit 2
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

No. 23 Containment Fan Coil Unit - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Reports 82-378 and 82-426.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - RX Power 82% - Unit Load 910 MWe

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On two separate occasions, at 0430 hours, October 31, 1982, and at 0240 hours, November 5, 1982, the Control Room Operator observed that No. 23 Containment Fan Coil Unit (CFCU) service water flow was slightly less (approximately 2450GPM) than the 2500GPM required by the Technical Specifications in the low speed mode of operation. In each case Action Statement 3.6.2.3a was entered, retroactive to the time of discovery. Both containment spray systems were operable throughout the occurrence.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Subsequent to the occurrence on October 31, a service water leak was detected in a cooling coil of No. 23 CFCU (See LER 82-128/01T). Upon completion of repair of the leak, on November 2, 1982, the unit was returned to service and was satisfactorily tested in both high and low speed modes of operation.

In the second instance, during investigation of the low flow, the CFCU was cycled into the low speed mode by the instrument technician and the flow rate was observed to be within specification. In both cases, the cause of the low service water flow was assumed to be silt clogging Back Pressure Control Valve 23SW57; cycling of the valve during the subsequent maintenance flushed out the silt.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The CFCU's operate in conjunction with the containment spray systems to remove heat and radioactive contamination from the containment atmosphere in the event of a design basis accident. Operability of this equipment is necessary to ensure offsite radiation dose is maintained within the limits of 10CFR100.

Action Statement 3.6.2.3a Requires:

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

With one group of the above required cooling fans inoperable and both containment spray systems operable, restore the inoperable group of cooling fans to operable status within 7 days or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.

Containment cooling capability was provided by the redundant CFCU's and the containment spray systems. The occurrence, therefore involved no risk to the health and safety of the public. Due to the loss of redundancy in engineered safety features, the event constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by the limiting conditions for operation. The occurrence is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:


As noted above, maintenance on the service water leak in the first instance apparently corrected the problem. The CFCU was tested satisfactorily, and the unit was declared operable. Action statement 3.6.2.3a was terminated at 2200 hours, November 2, 1982.

In the second instance, starting the CFCU apparently corrected any flow problem which had existed. The CFCU was tested satisfactorily, returned to service and Action Statement 3.6.2.3a was terminated at 0800 hours, November 5, 1982. In view of the nature of the occurrences, no further corrective action was deemed necessary.

FAILURE DATA:

Not applicable.

Prepared by R. Frahm



General Manager -
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 82-102B