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Dalwyn R. Davidson
VICE PRESIDENT
SYSTEM ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION

November 24, 1982

Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator, Region III
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

RE: Perry Nuclear Power Plant
Docket Nos. 50-440; 50-441
Contact Leads on HMA Relays
Supplied by General Electric
[RDC 61(82)]

Dear Mr. Keppler:

This letter is being submitted to replace our letter dated October 29, 1982, which discussed the HMA relays supplied by the General Electric Company (GE) to The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI) for use in Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1. Our first report on this subject was dated September 17, 1982. The letter dated October 29, 1982, contained inaccurate information concerning our evaluation of the deficiency. A revised description of the results of the inspection for the Unit 1 HMA Relays is contained in this letter, as well as an analysis of the safety implication and the corrective action taken.

Description of Deficiency

During a review of documentation related to implementation of the GE Field Disposition Instruction (FDI) WNQB for Unit 1 conducted after filing our report on October 29, 1982, it was determined that the inspection of the HMA relays supplied for Unit 1 had actually been performed in July 1982. This inspection identified two relays as having insufficient lead to terminal spacing. The deficient relays were number E12A-K18A, located in control room panel 1H13-P629, and number C61A-K2, located in local panel 1C61-P001.

The inspection conducted September 30, 1982, discussed in our letter dated October 29, 1982, was performed to assure completion of corrective action only and was not properly characterized in our letter.

Analysis of Safety Implications

The design function of relay E12A-K18A is to automatically start Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump "A" during LOCA conditions. Failure of the relay would result in the failure of RHR system "A" to perform its intended safety function. This constitutes a reportable deficiency per 10CFR50.55(e). It should be noted that RHR System "B" would still be operable. The equivalent relay in the "B" System was inspected and found to be acceptable.

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The design function of relay C61A-K2 is to energize the turbine tripped alarm. The turbine system is non-essential to safety and, therefore, the deficiency concerning this relay is in effect not reportable.


Corrective Action

As prescribed by FDI WNQB, the relays identified as having insufficient lead to terminal spacing were corrected by assembling heat shrinkable insulating tubing over the contact leads using instructions set forth in the FDI. Implementation of the corrective action resulted in completion of the FDI September 29, 1982.

This completes the evaluation of the reportable condition concerning the Unit 1 HMA relays. All affected Unit 1 relays have been inspected and the necessary corrective action successfully completed.

The report for the Unit 2 HMA relays will be submitted by October 31, 1983.

Sincerely,



Dalwyn R. Davidson
Vice President
System Engineering and Construction

DRD:pab

cc: Mr. M. L. Gildner
NRC Site Office

Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

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