

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 50-309	PAGE (3) 1 OF 2
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TITLE (4)
Control Room Ventilation System inoperable during preventative maintenance

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
01	05	94	94	-- 001 --	00	02	04	94	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER

OPERATING MODE (9) 7	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10) 100	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME James M. Taylor, Senior Nuclear Safety Engineer	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (207) 882-6321
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO		N/A		

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On January 13, 1992, and on February 12, 1992, with the plant in the power operating condition, both trains of control room ventilation were made inoperable when panels were opened for fan maintenance. Opening the panels prevents effective isolation of both trains of control room ventilation by allowing a path for atmospheric air to enter.

Plant Technical Specification 3.25.B requires two trains of control room ventilation to be operable when the reactor is critical. Therefore the plant was in a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.

The cause for this event appears to have been a failure to recognize how opening the panels affected the ventilation system and not having the activity classified as a cold shutdown activity.

Planned maintenance activities requiring the removal of these panels have been scheduled for times when the plant is in cold shutdown.

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TEXT CONTINUATION

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company	50-309	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2 OF 2
		94	-- 001 --	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

On January 5, 1994, during a maintenance planning meeting, plant personnel planning a maintenance activity on control room ventilation fans FN-11A&B determined that opening access panels to perform the work would make both trains of control room ventilation(VI) inoperable. Control room ventilation is designed to be isolated from the environment in the event of an accident requiring safety injection and/or containment isolation. With either panel open the ventilation system would not isolate from the environment making the system inoperable.

A review of maintenance records indicated that on January 13, 1992 and again on February 12, 1992 the access panels for fans FN-11A and FN-11B were opened with the plant in a power operation condition. As Technical Specification 3.25.B requires two trains to be operable while the reactor is critical, a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications existed for a short period of time.

In order for this event to create adverse consequences a design basis accident would have had to occur while the panels were open. Records indicate that the panels were open for a maximum of eight hours for each occurrence.

The cause of this event appears to have been a failure to recognize how opening the panels affected the ventilation system and not having the activity classified as a cold shutdown activity.

In order to prevent recurrence of this event, planned maintenance activities for fans FN-11A and FN-11B have been scheduled for times when the plant is in cold shutdown by classifying preventative maintenance activities for FN-11A and FN-11B as cold shutdown activities.

Other similar events, none of which involve FN-11A or FN-11B, include LER 88-007 which involved a design deficiency and LERs 92-011, 93-002, 93-012 and 93-022 which involve compromising both trains of control room ventilation by opening a panel to change a filter.