

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | W | I | P | B | H | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | _____ | 5
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T
01 | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 8 | 2 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 8 | 2 | 9
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 | On 10/31/82, after insulation had been removed from the "B" loop RTD by-
03 | pass line on Unit 1 for ISI purposes, Maintenance personnel found evi-
04 | dence of a body-to-bonnet leak on RC-559B, the "B" loop RTD bypass
05 | isolation valve. Further investigation revealed boric acid wastage on
06 | 4 of 12 studs. This occurrence is reportable in accordance with Tech-
07 | nical Specification 15.6.9.2.A.3 as an abnormal degradation of the
08 | reactor coolant pressure boundary.
7 8 9

09 | C | B | 11 | E | 12 | B | 13 | V | A | L | V | E | X | 14 | E | 15 | D | 16 |
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20
17 | 8 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 0 | 1 | T | 0 |
7 8 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
18 | A | 18 | A | 19 | Z | 20 | Z | 21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Y | 23 | Y | 24 | N | 25 | V | 0 | 8 | 5 | 26
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 | It is believed that a body-to-bonnet leak on valve RC-559B caused the
11 | wastage of the 4 studs. All of the studs and nuts on RC-559B were re-
12 | placed and the bolting on 3 similar valves were examined and no
13 | recordable indications were found.
7 8 9

15 | H | 28 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29 | N/A | 30 | B | 31 | Inservice inspection | 32
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46

16 | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | N/A | 35 | N/A | 36
7 8 9 10 11 44 45

17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | Z | 38 | N/A | 39
7 8 9 11 12 13

18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | N/A | 41
7 8 9 11 12

19 | Z | 42 | N/A | 43
7 8 9 10

20 | N | 44 | N/A | 45
7 8 9 10
8211290739 821119
PDR ADOCK 05000266
S PDR
NRC USE ONLY
68 69 80

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 82-019/01T-0

Wisconsin Electric Power Company
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1
Docket No. 50-266

In preparation for inservice inspection of a weld on the "B" loop common RTD bypass return line, insulation was removed from the line revealing unusually high levels of surface contamination on the piping surface. An investigation by Maintenance personnel on October 31, 1982, as to the possible cause of the contamination revealed evidence of a body-to-bonnet leak on RC-559B, "B" loop isolation valve for the RTD bypass return line.

Valve RC-559B was disassembled by Maintenance and the studs were examined on October 31, 1982. There was evidence of boric acid wastage on 4 of the 12 studs. The boric acid wastage of the affected studs was as follows:

<u>Stud</u>	<u>Original Diameter</u>	<u>Depth of Wastage</u>
1	5/8"	3/8"
2	5/8"	1/8"
3	5/8"	1/16"
4	5/8"	5/16"

The degradation of the bolting was evaluated on November 3, 1982, and determined to be reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 15.6.9.2.A.3 as an abnormal degradation discovered in the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

Valve RC-559B was reassembled on November 1, 1982, and the studs and nuts were replaced with new ones. The following manufacturing data applies to the affected valve.

Manufacturer:	Velan Valve Manufacturing Co.
Size:	3"
Rating:	1500#
Type:	Gate
Drawing:	88406
Bolting Material:	A193 GRB7
Bolting Size:	5/8-11 UNC x 4-5/8"

Three additional valves of similar design were examined and no indications of boric acid wastage of their bolting was noted. The additional valves examined were as follows.

<u>Valve</u>	<u>Description</u>
RC-559A	"A" loop RTD bypass line return isolation valve (3" Velan gate valve).
RC-543	Loop "A" decon connection isolation valve (4" Velan gate valve).
RC-544	Loop "B" decon connection isolation valve (4" Velan gate valve).

To allow easy inspection of the bolting on RC-559A&B and to aid in future leak detection, removable insulation will be installed on these valves.

For the past year, there has been a very small (unquantifiable) but detectable primary system to containment leak. The leak has been continuously monitored and several attempts to locate it were made, however, the attempts to locate the leak were unsuccessful. It is believed that the body-to-bonnet leak on RC-559B was contributing if not solely responsible for the previous primary-to-containment leak.

The health and safety of the public was not endangered by this occurrence.