

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

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USNRC REGION 1
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

O. W. DIXON, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

November 19, 1982 NOV 24 A 8: 51

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II, Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


SUBJECT: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50/395
Operating License No. NPF-12
Thirty Day Written Report
LER 82-027

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Licensee Event Report #82-027 for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. This Thirty Day Report is required by Technical Specification 6.9.1.13.(b) as a result of entry into Action Statement (a) of Technical Specification 3.6.5.1, "Containment Systems, Hydrogen Monitors," on October 22, 1982.

Should there be any questions, please call us at your convenience.

Very truly yours,



O. W. Dixon, Jr.

ARK:OWD:dwf
Attachment

cc: V. C. Summer	A. R. Koon
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DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On October 21, 1982, with the Plant in Mode 3, one of the two containment hydrogen monitors (Hydrogen Monitor "B") was inoperable due to a defective detector cell. Technical Specification 3.6.5.1, "Containment Systems, Hydrogen Monitors", requires that two monitors be operable for Modes 1 and 2. Because replacement parts could not be obtained prior to planned entry into Mode 2 on October 22, 1982, a Technical Specification change was requested by SCE&G and granted by the NRC to allow entry into Mode 2 for initial criticality with one monitor operable. On October 22, 1982, the Plant entered Mode 2 under the subject Technical Specification Action Statement.

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

No adverse consequences resulted from this event. Hydrogen Monitor A was operable at the time of entry into Mode 2 and the requirements of this specification have been met since that time.

CAUSE(S) OF THE OCCURRENCE

The hydrogen monitor detector cell was inoperable.

IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN

The hydrogen monitor detector cell was replaced. Applicable Surveillance Test Procedures were performed, and the monitor was returned to service on October 26, 1982.

ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE

Except for the normal surveillance requirements on the hydrogen monitors to demonstrate operability, the licensee plans no further action at this time.