



**GPU Nuclear**  
P.O. Box 388  
Forked River, New Jersey 08731  
609-693-6000  
Writer's Direct Dial Number:

November 3, 1982

Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Administrator  
Region I  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station  
Docket No. 50-219  
Licensee Event Report  
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-43/03L

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-43/03L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.2 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

Peter B. Fiedler  
Vice President and Director  
Oyster Creek

PBF:lse  
Enclosures

cc: Director (40 copies)  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Director (3)  
Office of Management Information and  
Program Control  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector  
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station  
Forked River, NJ 08731

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION  
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report  
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-43/03L

Report Date

November 3, 1982

Occurrence Date

October 4, 1982

Identification of Occurrence

Operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation per Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.5.B.3, when it was discovered that an inspection port cover plate was not in place on Standby Gas Treatment System No. 1.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.2.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

Mode Switch Position	- Run
Thermal Power	- 1156 MWt
Generator Load	- 370 MWe

Description of Occurrence

While performing routine surveillance testing of the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS), a low flow indication was noted on SGTS Train No. 2. A technician was dispatched to rezero the pitot tube flow indicator, but no change was evident in system flow. The technician subsequently found an inspection port cover plate out of place in the ductwork of SGTS Train No. 1. The inspection port is located between the absolute filter and charcoal adsorber. The cover plate was found laying in the ductwork and was put back into place. Upon remeasurement, a normal flow rate was indicated.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The apparent cause was attributed to improper installation of the access port cover after a HEPA filter DOP test was performed on September 23, 1982, to verify filter efficiency.

### Analysis of Occurrence

The function of the Standby Gas Treatment System is to filter and exhaust the reactor building atmosphere to the stack during secondary containment isolation conditions, thus minimizing the release of radioactive effluent from the reactor building to the environment. Under these circumstances, the SGTS replaces the Reactor Building Ventilation System which exhausts directly to the stack. The SGTS consists of two separate filter trains, each capable of providing 100% treatment capacity. The two filter trains are interconnected via a cross-connect valve which opens along with an inlet and a discharge valve for each system upon an automatic initiation signal. Both exhaust fans start upon initiation as well. After a 2-4 minute delay, the standby train will automatically shut off and isolate, while the selected train will remain in operation with the cross-connect valve open to provide cooling flow via a restricting orifice through the standby filter train. After a delay of a few minutes, the cross-connect valve closes.

In this case, the inspection port which was open was located in the standby system (Train No. 1). SGTS No. 2 was placed manually into operation for a ten (10) hour surveillance run with the cross-connect valve remaining open. As the interconnection is downstream of each filter train and the pitot tube is upstream in the common inlet duct, air drawn through the open inspection port and cross-connect valve short-circuited the train being tested and low inlet flow was indicated. Upon replacement of the inspection port cover plate, normal flow rate through Train No. 2 resumed.

If this situation had occurred during secondary containment isolation conditions, when radioactive effluent was released into the reactor building, the ability of SGTS No. 1 to perform its intended function would have been degraded. As SGTS No. 2 remained fully operable, the safety significance of this event was minimized.

### Corrective Action

The inspection plate was replaced and SGTS No. 1 was declared operable.

Review of the surveillance procedure verified that instructions were incorporated to address the closing and dogging of the covers. A review of the completed surveillance forms verified that this step had been completed. Further investigation raised concerns regarding the adequacy of the procedure to assure proper dogging. The dogging mechanism operation will be reviewed to determine whether or not additional instructions should be incorporated into the procedure to prevent this event from recurring.

### Failure Data

No component exhibited failure.