

NORTHEAST UTILITIES



THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY
THE HARTFORD ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY
HOLYOKE WATER POWER COMPANY
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

General Offices • Selden Street, Berlin, Connecticut

P.O. BOX 270
HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06101
(203) 666-6911

November 19, 1982
MP-1-2187

Mr. Ronald C. Haynes
Regional Administrator, Region 1
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Reference: Facility Operating License No. DPR-21
Docket No. 50-245
Reportable Occurrence RO-82-24/3L

Dear Mr. Haynes:

This letter forwards the Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence RO-82-24/3L required to be submitted within thirty days pursuant to the requirements of the Millstone Unit 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.a. An additional three copies of the report are enclosed.

Yours truly,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

for R. Herbert
E. J. Mroczka

Station Superintendent
Millstone Nuclear Power Station

EJM/TST:bjc

Attachment: LER RO-82-24/3L

cc: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C. (30)

Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control,
Washington, D. C. (3)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, c/o Document Management Branch,
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attachment to LER 82-24/3L
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
Millstone Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1
Provisional License Number DPR-21
Docket Number 50-245

Identification of Occurrence

A Main steamline high flow instrumentation setpoint was found to be less conservative than that established by Technical Specifications.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

Prior to occurrence the unit was shutdown for a refuel outage.

Description of Occurrence

On October 19, 1982, at 1340 hours, while performing Main Steam Line High Flow Functional Calibration Test, pressure switch 261-2D tripped at 95 psid. Technical Specification, Table 3.2.1 requires a high flow main steamline trip level setting at less than or equal to 120 percent of rated steam flow. This corresponds to a differential pressure less than or equal to 94 psid.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

Failure of the switch to trip at its desired setpoint is attributable to setpoint drift.

Analysis of Occurrence

The primary function of the main steamline instrumentation is to detect a break in the main steamline, thus maintaining primary containment integrity by a Group 1 isolation. For the worst accident, a main steamline break outside the drywell, the trip setting of 120 percent of rated steam flow in conjunction with flow limiters and main steamline closure, limit the mass inventory loss, such that fuel is not uncovered, fuel temperatures remain less than 1500°F and the release of radioactivity to the environs is below guidelines.

Failure of switch 261-2D to trip within its required setpoint did not impair the operability of the system. The switch is one of four switches arranged in a one out of two twice logic system. The remaining switches were found to be at the proper setpoint and would have initiated the required action upon receipt of a main steamline high flow condition.

Corrective Action

The pressure switch was reset to its required setpoint and tested satisfactorily.

The switch is a Barton Model No. 278 with a range of 0-200 psid.

Similar occurrence: 80-04/3L