



EDISON DRIVE  
AUGUSTA MAINE 04336  
(207) 623-3521

November 15, 1982  
MN-82-230

JHG-82-215

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region I  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Reference: (a) License No. DPR-36 (Docket 50-309)

Subject: Maine Yankee Reportable Occurrence #82-037/03L-0 - Shock Suppressor  
Self-Aligning Rod End Bushing

Dear Sir:

Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report for Maine Yankee Reportable Occurrence No. 82-037/03L-0. This event does not represent a violation of the Technical Specifications but is reportable under the requirements of Technical Specification 5.9.1.7.b.

We trust this information will be satisfactory. Should additional information be required, please feel free to contact us.

Very truly yours,

MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'A. J. Garrity'.

John H. Garrity, Senior Director  
Nuclear Engineering & Licensing

JHG:pjp

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Robert A. Clark  
Mr. Paul A. Swetland

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10 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

"A" A self aligning rod end bushing in shock suppressor number 35, RC-HSS-102, failed in compression mode during functional operability testing required by Technical Specifications. The snubber, located in the loop one safety injection line, accomodates pipe stresses during a seismic event. An assumed seismic induced failure of the rod end bushing would not have placed the plant in an unanalyzed condition. The health and safety of the public was not affected.

27 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

"B" The most likely cause of the Torrington, part number 175F28, self aligning rod end bushing failure was lack of adherence to the functional test procedure. Evaluation of a similar failure during previous testing resulted in a test procedure change directing shimming of the rod end eye to the testing machine prior to test to avoid misalignment of loose bushings. Investigation of the present failure reveals that test personnel neglected to shim the rod end eye as required, even though the rod end bushing was loose. The personnel involved have been instructed to strictly adhere to procedural requirements. The snubber was properly retested satisfactorily with a new bushing.

Since it is possible that the bushing breakage may not have been due to procedural noncompliance, an additional number of snubbers were tested as required by Technical Specification. No snubber self aligning rod end bushings have broken in service during ten years of plant operation. The snubbers are tested at manufacturer's rated loads which are significantly higher than expected in service in most cases.

The failed bushing has been sent to a metalurgical laboratory for analysis. A program for further evaluation of this failure is being developed.