



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 113 TO

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-6

ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.,

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO. 50-368

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated October 17, 1990, Entergy Operations, Inc. (or the licensee) requested an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) appended to Facility Operating License No. NPF-6 for Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No. 2 (ANO-2). The proposed change to the ANO-2 Technical Specification 3/4.7.8, Hydraulic Shock Suppressors (Snubbers), will add a note to allow extension of the currently required inspection period, between August 8, 1990, and February 6, 1991, to the 1991 Refueling Outage, 2R8; in no case later than May 7, 1991.

The current 12-month interval for inspection is based on one snubber out of a group of 103 inaccessible snubbers failing the visual examination during the last refueling outage. This was the only failure in 403 snubbers inspected during the last ANO-2 refueling outage. According to the licensee, the snubber failed due to an installation error and not service-induced causes, thus, it does not indicate a generic problem.

2.0 EVALUATION

The snubber that failed the visual inspection was a mechanical Anchor-Darling snubber. The snubber was found fully extended with the corner of the shroud bent inward allowing a total movement of only approximately 1/8". In its fully extended position, the shroud travels beyond the indicator tube approximately 1/8". When travel occurred in the compression direction, the corner of the shroud of the failed snubber caught on the guide tube bending it inward. This could only occur with the snubber fully extended.

When the problem was identified, all snubbers of this type were reviewed to ensure no other snubber would reach full extension in either the hot or cold condition. If the snubbers installed in ANO-2 traveled to within 3/8" of full extension, they were identified and an additional inspection was performed specifically to look for damaged shrouds, loose or bent shrouds, loose or broken dust cover rivets, and snubbers with excessive installed lateral swing angles. No other snubbers were identified using the above criteria and ANO does not expect other failures of this type during service. ANO determined the condition was an installation error not a service-induced failure and does

not indicate a generic problem. Therefore, an extension of the interval until the 2R8 refueling outage will not increase the probability of snubber visual failures.

The current TS requirements do not take the snubber population at a plant into consideration in determining the next inspection interval. To alleviate this situation, the staff has developed an alternate schedule for visual inspections that maintains the same confidence level as the existing schedule and generally allow the licensee to perform visual inspections and corrective actions during plant outages. These alternate requirements for snubber visual inspection intervals and corrective actions were issued to all licensees and applicants via Generic Letter 90-09 dated December 11, 1990. Staff evaluation based on this approach indicates that for the number of failures and total snubber population of ANO-2, the same confidence level can be maintained regarding the operability of snubbers within specified limits for an increased inspection interval of at least that requested by the licensee. Therefore, based on the past inspection results of snubbers at ANO-2 and our evaluation, we find the proposed one-time TS change to ANO-2 acceptable.

3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment involves a change in a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes in surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposures. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Section 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date: January 29, 1991

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