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*copy Bechtel  
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Lee V. Gossick, Executive Director for Operations  
RE THE "MOTHER JONES" ARTICLE RE TARAPUR REACTORS

In this article a number of Mr. Jacobs' dramatic scenarios were fabri-  
cations of his imagination.

1. My trip report did not mention and nowhere did I say that I visited the Tarapur reactor; in fact I did not go to the plant: all the conferences in India were held in offices or laboratories near the city. Hence I made no inspections and did not see "an incredible sight of Indian workers perched high in the rafters...using bamboo poles..." Neither did I write, or say to Jacobs, that Tarapur was "a prime candidate for a nuclear disaster...though my oral report upon my return could have conveyed that impression. *He asked me* about the use of bamboo poles; I confirmed that I had heard that this was so, could understand how it might have happened, but did not know it as a fact. Mr. Jacobs ~~was perhaps~~ *was perhaps* irked with me for trying to answer his questions in perspective rather than the way he may have wished. *in my report*
2. Mr. Jacobs states that my report "did not raise an immediate alarm" but "instead it was sent to 'files' which...means that no action is to be taken." *Constitution*

I told him that my trip report was sent to the Commission and that follow-up assistance in the areas requested was arranged. I believe that I also mentioned that several earlier AEC assistance teams had been sent, but I did not dwell on either of these extensively and he did not inquire further on this. *very bad*

*upon my return to Tarapur*  
Actually, my trip report was discussed at Commission level and a Commissioner promptly called GE (and possibly Bechtel) to request an immediate conference. This conference was rather a stormy one. GE maintained that most of the problems were caused by the Indians, for operating too long before shutdown and cleanup, for not following procedures, etc.; that GE had already supplied assistance and equipment far beyond their legal obligations to the extent of millions of dollars. Nevertheless, agreement was reached for experts to furnish assistance on the items requested and persons were sent to Tarapur, possibly including one or more from Oak Ridge, *though* I do not recall clearly.

*I/1*

*but did not pursue this in any systematic way.*

- 3. Mr. Jacobs did not reveal in our discussion that his focus of attention was centered on Tarapur; he mentioned several times a concern about how industry was carrying out its responsibilities in building overseas reactors, ~~but~~ At no time was the issue of AEC's (or NRC's) role of responsibilities and policies re overseas reactors mentioned except in a very general way, and little explanation of this extensive activity was provided. The role of IAEA was discussed briefly.

It appears of course that Mr. Jacobs may not be so interested in the role of IAEA or in how India could help itself to improve the safety situation as he is in advancing the antinuclear cause in the United States....

Nevertheless, there does exist the very real fact that optimum controls do not now exist through the IAEA, through vendor practices, or otherwise, for coping with reactor safety problems in the many nations now on or near the threshold of nuclear power; There could be many more Tarapur-type situations!

*IAEA has begun to advance effective programs for development of codes, training program*

*for developing nations, and the first* Clifford K. Beck, Special Assistant to Executive Director for Operations  
*beginning of safety inspection. These are good beginnings, but at this time far more must be done, or some other means must be taken*