Central file

NOV 1 2 1992

Mr. Joseph A. Cambel 286 Mckinley Avenue Brooklyn, New York 11208

Dear Mr. Cambel:

·

In your letter of October 19 to Chairman Palladino, you expressed concern about a number of issues regarding nuclear power plant safety. One specific concern dealt with plans to speed up the licensing process and the potential negative impact this might have on reactor safety. The intent of these plans is not to reduce safety, but to improve the efficiency of the licensing process by reducing unnecessary delays in that process. An example of a means to increase this efficiency includes changes in the process involving public hearings. The proposed changes would allow plant construction and operation to proceed where indicated without the necessity of complete prior resolution of every item being considered in the hearing process. Another significant issue addressed in the plans is the development of criteria for determining which issues have sufficient safety impact to require backfitting of currently operating nuclear power plants. The intent of this issue is not to avoid backfitting of operating plants where such backfitting is indicated in the interest of safety, but to accomplish such backfitting in a systematic fashion that causes the least disruption to plant operations.

The accident at Three Mile Island 2 (TMI-2) clearly identified the need to examine the issues of shift scheduling, staffing, training, and control room design. As a result, the NRC staff developed the "NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident" (NUREG-0660) to provide a comprenensive and integrated plan to improve safety at power reactors. In addition to increasing the number of licensed operators in the control room, the Action Plan calls for addition of a Shift Technical Advisor (STA) to provide increased engineering capability to the staff of all plants. The STA must have a bachelcr's degree or its equivalent in a scientific or engineering discipline, as well as specific training in the response and analysis of the plant for abnormal events and accidents. This person must also be trained in plant RD-25 NU-Safet design and layout, including capabilities of control room instrumentation and controls.

While the Navy nuclear power training program is considered to be highly successful, the design differences between Naval and commercial reactors preclude using all aspects of the Navy system in the civilian training program. The NRC recognizes, however, that training in the nuclear industry must be upgraded. In response to Action Plan items that address the upgrading of training, NRC's Division of Human Factors Safety has undertaken

		 OFFICIAL	PECORD	OPY	 115000 1001-335.060
DATE		 			 *****
SURNAME)	******	 		******	
OFFICE		 			

COMMS NRCC COMMS NRCC ESPONDENCE PDR NUW 144

mau

an effort to develop and implement a training program plan. Essential to this plan is an assessment of nuclear plant training that will serve as a reliable basis upon which the NRC can assure the quality of licensed and non-licensed power plant personnel. This training plan, in conjunction with NRC's Integrated Human Factors Program Plan, outlines the implementation of the effort to upgrade training throughout the industry.

Your concern regarding the number of gauges in control rooms is being addressed in that utilities are required to perform a detailed design review of their control rooms and report any human engineering discrepancies found to the NRC. Utilities will be required to correct those discrepancies that could adversely affect safe operation of their plants. In addition, utilities will be required to install a Safety Parameter Display System that will provide a concise display of critical plant variables to the control room operators to aid them in rapidly and reliably determining the safety status of the plant.

I hope I have adequately addressed your concerns. Thank you for your letter.

Sincerely,

Original signed by

Hugh L. Thompson, Jr., Director Division of Human Factors Safety Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

*SEE PREVIOUS OGB ROR CONCURRENCE

NRC FORM 318	(10-80) NRC'A 0240		OFFICIAL	RECORD COPY	100000-1001-336-00
DATE	***********	11/17/82	11/9 /82		
SURNAME)		idBooher	*VMoore	HThomoson	
OFFICE		LOB/DHFS	HFEB/DHFS	DHEB	

an effort to develop and implement a training program plan. Essential to this plan is an assessment of nuclear plant training that will serve as a reliable basis upon which the NRC con assure the quality of licensed and non-licensed power plant personnel. This training plan, in conjunction with NRC's Integrated Human Factors Program Plan, outlines the implementation of the effort to upgrade training throughout the industry.

Your concern regarding the number of gauges in control rooms is being addressed in that utilities are required to perform a detailed design review of their control rooms and report any human engineering discrepancies found to the NRC. Utilities in the required to correct those discrepancies that could adversely affect safe operation of their plants. In addition, utilities will be required to install a Safety Parameter Display System that will provide a concise display of critical plant variables to the control room operators to aid them in rapidly and reliably determining the safety status of the plant.

I hope I have adequately addressed your concerns. Thank you for your letter.

Sincerely,

Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

			control to	LQB:C HBooher 11/ /82			
	LOBADHES	LOB/DHFS: ASU	HFEB/C //	DHFS:DD	DHFS:D	NRR:DD	NRR:D
OFFICE SURNAME	DMorisseau:p 11/9/82	abJPersensky 11/5/82	VMoore 11/9/82	JKramer 11/ /82	HThompson 11/ /82	EGCase 11/ /82	HRDEnton 11/ /82
IRC FORM 318	(10-80) NRCM 0240		OFFICIAL	RECORD C	OPY		USGPO: 1981-335-96

. . . .

DISTRIBUTION Central Files NSIC TERA NRC PDR SECY 82-1064 (3) HDenton/ECase HThompson PPAS DEisenhut SHanauer RMattson **RVollmer** PCheck BSnyder MGarver EDO-12426 MBridgers EDO-12426 DHFS R/F (2) LQB R/F JPersensky DMorisseau HBooher LCrocker VMoore JKramer

CONTROL NO. 12426 FROM ACTION CONTROL DATES COMPL DEADLINE Joseph A. Cambel 11/18/82 DATE OF DOCUMENT Brooklyn, New York INTERIM REPLY 10/19/82 TO PREPARE FOR SIGNATURE OF FINAL REPLY Manpatr Chairman Palladino CHAIRMAN FILE LOCATION 2/82 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OTHER LETTER AMEMO REPORT OTHER DESCRIPTION SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS Views concerning safety of nuclear power plants ASSIGNED TO DATE INFORMATION ROUTING SECY-82-1064 Denton, NRR f/ 10/27/82 Case/Denton APPROP. ACTION Thompson 1. PPAS 10/28/82 2. Eisenhut 3. Hanauer 4. Mattson 5. Vollmer 6. Check 7. Snyder NRC FORM 232 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (6(80) PRINCIPAL CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL Send three (3) copies of reply to Secy Correspondence and Records Branch ACTION SLIP Logging Date 10/26/82 Inspector & Auditor views concerning the safety of nuclear Policy Evaluation 0/19/82 Gen. Counsel Date Solicitor Secretary Date Rec'd Off, EDO Date. . HRC SECRETARIAT bac Return original of incoming with response Cambe EDO, GC, CL, SOL, PA, SECY, IA, PE Brooklyn, N.Y Joseph A. power plants Palladino For the Commission: Signature block omitted Exec. Dir./Oper. Prepare reply for signature of Commissioner Cong. Liaison Public Affairs For appropriate action -3 Commissioner 0 \square For direct reply* Chairman For information 30 Incoming From: To: Subject No. 20 Remarks Ă

NRC FORM 52A (3-82)