\*Docket Number 50-346 Ličense Number NPF-3 Serial Number 1876 Attachment

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Serial No	1886	Date02/15/	91

#### FLANT SYSTEMS

#### BASES

## 3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDVATER SYSTEMS (Continued)

Following any modifications or repairs to the Auxiliary Feedwater System piping from the Condensate Storage Tank through auxiliary feed pumps to the steam generators that could affect the system's capability to deliver water to the steam generators, following extended cold shutdown, a flow path verification test shall be performed. This test may be conducted in MODES 4, 5 or 6 using auxiliary steam to drive the auxiliary feed pumps turbine to demonstrate that the flow path exists from the Condensate Storage Tank to the steam generators via auxiliary feed pumps.

Verification of the turbine plant cooling water valves (CV 196 and CV 197), the startup feedwater pump suction valves (FV 32 and FV 91), and the startup feedwater pump discharge valve (FV 106) in the closed position is required to address the concerns associated with potential pipe failures in the auxiliary feedwater pump rooms, that could occur during operation of the startup feedwater pump.

# 3/4.7.1.3 CONDENSATE STORAGE FACILITIES

The OPERABLITTY of the Condensate Storage Tank with the minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available to maintain the RCS at HOT STANDBY conditions for 13 hours with steam discharge to atmosphere and to cooldown the Reactor Coolant System to less than 280°F in the event of a total loss of offsite power of of the main feedwater system. The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable be ause of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics. Under normal conditions (i.e., no

# 3/4.7.1.4 ACTIVITY

The limitations on secondary system specific activity ensure that the resultant offsite radiation dose will be limited to a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 limits in the event of a steam line rupture. This dose includes the effects of a coincident 1.0 GPM primary to secondary tube leak in the steam generator of the affected steam line. These values are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

## 3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES

The OPERAFILITY of the main steam line isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blowdown in the event of a steam line rupture. This restriction is required to 1) minimize the

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Amendment No. 58, 96, 122 Rev. 11/18/87

loss of offsite power)