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16805 WCR 19 1/2, Platteville, Colorado 80651

February 15, 1991
Fort St. Vrain
Unit No. 1
P-91070

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Mail Stop P1-37
Washington, D.C. 20555

DOCKET NO: 50-267

SUBJECT: PROCEDURE DISTRIBUTION
Gentlemen:

We are transmitting herein the following:

Issue 56 of AOP INTRO
Issue 58 of AOP-A
Issue 58 of AOP-B
Issue 56 of AOP D-1
Issue 2 of RERP-TRANSPORTATION

Two copies of these procedures have also been transmitted to Region IV, Emergency Response Coordinator, in accordance with 10CFR50.54(q) (Reference P-91072).

In accordance with 10CFR50.54(q), we have determined that the changes in these issues do not decrease the effectiveness of the Fort St. Vrain Emergency Plans and the plans, as changed, continue to meet the intent of 10CFR50.47(b) and 10CFR50 Appendix E.

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Page 2
February 15, 1991

If difficulties or questions arise in filing these procedures, please contact Mr. M. H. Holmes at (303) 480-6960.

Sincerely,




Charles H. Fuller
Manager, Nuclear Production
Fort St. Vrain Nuclear
Generating Station

CHF/bj

Attachments

cc: J. B. Baird
Senior Resident Inspector
Fort St. Vrain

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Senior Emergency Planning Specialist
Fort St. Vrain



02/13/91 NRC

ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES

NO.	SUBJECT	ISSUE NUMBER	EFFECTIVE DATE
INTRO	Abnormal Operating Procedures Introduction	56	02-13-91
A	Moisture In-Leakage	58	02-13-91
B	Reactor Scram	58	02-13-91
B-2	DELETED		01-09-88
C	Loop Shutdown	57-Last	03-28-90
D-1	Single Circulator Trip	56	02-13-91
D-2	Three Circulator Trips	54-Last	03-21-90
E	Abnormal Reactor Power Change	56-Last	03-28-90
F	Restoration of Essential Electric Power	1	11-05-90
F-1	Main Turbine Emergencies	58-Last	03-28-90
F-2	Low Condenser Vacuum Turbine Trip	55-Last	03-28-90
F-3	Loss of Outside Power and Turbine Trip	55-Last	03-28-90
F-4	Loss of Outside Power and Turbine Trip with Failure of One Diesel Generator Set to Start	55-Last	03-28-90
G	Loss of Active Core Cooling	56-Last	03-23-90
H-1	Abnormal Radioactive Liquid Waste From Plant	57	04-19-90
H-2	Abnormal Radioactive Gas Release From Plant	57	04-25-90
H-3	High Activity in the Plant	57	04-19-90
I	Discussion of Fire	56	08-01-90
I-2	Chemical Spill Response	1	01-16-91




FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO 02/13/91

ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES

NO.	SUBJECT	ISSUE NUMBER	EFFECTIVE DATE
J	DELETED		05-14-82
K-1	Environmental Disturbances - Earthquake	59	04-19-90
K-2	Environmental Disturbances - Tornado	56	04-19-90
L	Loss of an Instrument Air Header	57	04-19-90
M	Loss of Hydraulic Power	56-Last	03-21-90
N	Loss of an Instrument Bus	56	04-19-90
P	Loss of a D.C. Bus	57	04-19-90
Q	Steam Leak or Inadvertent Lifting of Steam Relief Valve	57-Last	04-25-90
R	Loss of Access to Control Room	54	06-30-89
S	Loss of HVAC to 480 Volt Switchgear Room	54-Last	03-23-90
V	Restoration of PCRV Integrity	1	11-05-90
CLASS	Event and Emergency Classification Overview	7	07-26-89



NRCI

TITLE: ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES INTRODUCTION

RESPONSIBLE FOR:	<i>M. E. Doniston</i>	AUTHORIZED BY:		
AUTHORIZED BY:	<i>[Signature]</i>			
PORC REVIEW	PORC 920 FEB 6 - 1991		EFFECTIVE DATE	<i>2-13-91</i>
DCCF NUMBER(S)	<i>90-1638</i>			

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I. FUNCTION:

The Abnormal Operating Procedures provide instructions for the operating staff to return systems and equipment to normal following the use of the Emergency Operating Procedures.

Each Abnormal Operating Procedure provides the operator with the symptoms needed to determine that an abnormal condition does exist and the operator actions which he must perform to prevent further deterioration of plant parameters or to return the plant to normal.

Each Abnormal Operating Procedure also includes the actions required to return the plant to a more normal condition and/or to cope with further slowly developing deterioration of plant parameters. The actions also contain steps requiring more complex reasoning or analysis.

The Abnormal Operating Procedure are an integral part of the overall FSV emergency preparedness program. The Abnormal Operating Procedure have been structured so as to facilitate the transition from Abnormal Operating Procedure to the appropriate RERP implementing procedure or event reporting procedure with minimal delay or confusion. In order to further aid with classification and reporting decision making, an "Event and Emergency Classification Overview" procedure is provided at the back of this document. This procedure discusses the classification systems, provides guidelines for event classification, serves as a reference for pertinent reporting or activation tables, and provides a summary table that discusses reporting/activation requirements.

The Abnormal Operating Procedure are intentionally brief to be suitable for implementation. To provide the background and explanation required for study and understanding of the procedures by the operators, separate appendices have been prepared. The appendices are indexed and titled to correspond to the Abnormal Operating Procedure they support. It should be emphasized, however, that the appendices are study guides only and are neither needed, nor intended, for use during abnormal plant conditions.

II. FORMAT:

Each Abnormal Operating Procedure is presented in a symptom - action matrix format consisting of symptoms, and operator actions. Symptoms include plant conditions, alarms, and indications that are associated with the condition. The operator actions are few, and as brief as possible to stop the degradation of conditions, mitigate their consequences, and allow the operators time to evaluate the situation.

The symptom - action matrix presentation format was selected for a number of reasons, as follows:

- A. It provides an abbreviated presentation of symptoms and operator actions which must be readily usable during an abnormal plant condition.
- B. It allows specific operator actions to be identified against specific alarms or plant conditions; and,
- C. It does not preclude the use of precautionary notes or caution statements where deemed appropriate.

An additional feature of the symptom-action Matrix format is that it permits shift supervisor and reactor operator actions to be identified as follows:

R.O.	S.S.
xx	xx

III. ADMINISTRATIVE RULES:

- A. It shall be the responsibility of the Shift Supervisor or the reactor operator to terminate defueling activities down when the safety of the reactor is in jeopardy or a reactor protection circuit setpoint has been exceeded.
- B. It shall be the responsibility of the Shift Supervisor to investigate an unexplained count rate change and report his findings to the Station Manager or Superintendent of Operations.
- C. It shall be the responsibility of all employees to gain a working knowledge of the Technical Specifications as they apply to specific job requirements, and to take appropriate steps to assure compliance with them.

IV. ALARMS AND NOTIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES:

- A. The audible alarm system in the control room, referred to in the procedure as an "alarm" or "common alarm", is an automatically actuated annunciator system with three distinct alarm sounds. They are:



- (1) A "Siren" indicating reactor scram;
- (2) A "Bell" indicating loop shutdown, circulator trip; and,
- (3) A "Horn" indicating any equipment system abnormalities, and I-09 alarm.

As required, the control room annunciator alerts the operating staff to an abnormal condition in the plant. The reactor operator has control over the duration and silencing of all alarms.

- B. The plant emergency alarm consists of two distinct sounds. These sounds will be broadcast over the plant Gai-Tronics system to warn personnel of an emergency in the plant. The two alarms are:

- (1) Siren - general alarm to indicate fire or other emergency.
- (2) Yelping - radiation alarm.

The plant emergency alarm is activated by operating personnel in the control room. All personnel, upon hearing the alarm, shall report immediately to their pre-assigned emergency station for accountability and further instructions as designated in Administrative Procedure G-5, "Personnel Emergency Response". Visitors shall be escorted to the security building for signout and exit from the plant.


The Shift Supervisor shall, as soon as possible, announce over the Gai-Tronics system, the nature of the emergency, and any pertinent instructions to the plant personnel.

V. COMMUNICATIONS:

During an emergency situation requiring removal of plant personnel from the plant to either an onsite or offsite location, communication lines shall be established as described in the Radiological Emergency Response Plan.


VI. SUPPORT PERSONNEL:

In the event that any emergency condition exists which requires notification of plant management, the Shift Supervisor, or his designee, shall notify a member of plant management (denoted in the Control Room implementing procedure), who shall be responsible for the notification of the remaining plant management personnel and department supervisors.



VII. COMMITMENTS:

None



*NRC
1*

TITLE: <u>MOISTURE IN-LEAKAGE</u>			
RESPONSIBLE FOR:	<i>M E Venston</i>	AUTHORIZED BY:	
AUTHORIZED BY:	<i>[Signature]</i>		
PORC REVIEW	PORC 920 FEB 6 - 1991		EFFECTIVE DATE <i>2-13-91</i>
DCCF NUMBER:	<i>90-1639</i>		

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(A)
 MOISTURE IN-LEAKAGE
 SYMPTOM-ACTION MATRIX

	SYMPTOMS
ACTIONS	1.1 Primary Coolant Moisture High, ME-9306 or ME-9307 on I-05B, 3-1
OPERATOR ACTION	
2.1 IF Primary Coolant moisture level is abnormal And increasing with no known cause, THEN attempt to identify source of in leakage.	XX
2.2 If EES section is identified as source of moisture THEN establish cooling via reheater or operating loop per SOP 22-01.	XX

INTRODUCTION

Section A of the Abnormal Operating Procedures deals with water leaks into the Primary Coolant System.

In the following section, each step of the Abnormal Operating Procedure is discussed to aid the operator in understanding its basis. To facilitate relating each step to its discussion, each AOP step is repeated and underlined to set it off from the discussion that follows.

DISCUSSION OF SYMPTOMSSYMPTOMS

- 1.1 Primary coolant moisture level high, ME-9306 or ME-9307 on I-05B, 3-1.

OPERATOR ACTION

- 2.1 IF primary coolant moisture level is abnormal AND increasing with no known cause, THEN attempt to identify source of in-leakage.

If the rate of moisture increase is low, as would be the case with a small leak, source identification will be difficult at best. The operation of the circulator auxiliaries should be checked and corrected if that is the source of the moisture ingress.

- NOTE: Cooling with a flooded reheater outlined in Step 2.2 requires permission of Superintendent of Operations or Station Manager.

- 2.2 IF EES section is identified as source of moisture THEN establish cooling via reheater of operating loop per SOP 22-01.

This action will isolate the leak and permit continued core cooling.

SOP 22-01 describes the necessary precautions and procedures associated with cooling on a flooded reheater.



NRC
1

TITLE: <u>REACTOR SCRAM</u>			
RESPONSIBLE FOR:	<u>M. E. Deniston</u>	AUTHORIZED BY:	
AUTHORIZED BY:	<u>[Signature]</u>		
PORC REVIEW	PORC 920 FEB 6 - 1991		EFFECTIVE DATE <u>2-13-91</u>
DCCF NUMBER (S)	<u>90-1640</u>		

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(B)
 REACTOR SCRAM
 SYMPTOM-ACTION MATRIX

ACTIONS	SYMPTOMS		
	1.1 Startup Count Rate High (RMS- Not in RUN) 1-03B 4-4, 5-4, 6-4	1.2 Neutron Flux Rate of Change High (ISS-Start Up) 1-03B 4-3, 5-3, 6-3	1.3 Loss of Plant Power 1-03B 4-2, 5-2, 6-2
OPERATOR ACTION			
2.1 Insert manual scram.	XX	XX	XX
2.2 Ensure reactor internal maintenance terminated.	XX	XX	XX
2.3 Ensure all PCRV openings closed.	XX	XX	XX
2.4 Monitor Critical Safety Functions per EOP's.	XX	XX	XX



INTRODUCTION

Reactor scram is the ultimate defense against any circumstance or condition that threatens to damage the reactor core and release radioactive fission products. Reactor scram is initiated automatically by the Plant Protective System (PPS) in a number of situations described in the following discussion of symptoms.

The specific PPS actions that are initiated by reactor scram are as follows:

1. The control rod brakes are de-energized.
2. Power to Rod Drive Motor Control Centers (N-9225, East and N-9226, West) are interrupted (K49-51 and K48-50 green lights on - Board I-10).
3. First-in scram annunciator and indicating light are actuated, indicating which logic channels have tripped, A, B, or C.

DISCUSSION OF SYMPTOMS


SYMPTOMS

1.1 Startup Count Rate High (RMS Fuel Loading) I-03B 4-4, 5-4, 6-4

This scram is actuated when either source range nuclear channel equals or exceeds a neutron count rate of $1.0E+5$ counts/second with the Reactor Mode Switch not in the RUN position. The scram action is initiated by 1 of 2 logic trip by the Nuclear Start-up Channels I or II.

1.2 Neutron Flux Rate of Change High (ISS Start-Up) I-03B 4-3, 5-3, 6-3

This scram is actuated as a result of Wide Range Nuclear Channels III, IV or V equaling or exceeding a neutron flux rise of 5 DPM.



1.3 Loss of Plant Power I-03B 4-2, 5-2, 6-2

Undervoltage detectors sense the voltage on all three phases of all three essential buses. Detection of voltage loss persisting for 30 seconds by 2 of the 3 detectors on 2 of the 3 busses will produce 2 of 3 scram channel trips, causing a reactor scram.

The accident of concern is the loss of outside power, and failure of one diesel generator to start. A scram is required to allow for heat removal with less than a normal complement of plant equipment.

DISCUSSION OF OPERATOR ACTION

2.1 Insert manual scram.

Insert manual scram following automatic scram as a backup to the PPS to insure a full scram. A manual scram can be inserted by operating the scram handswitch to the scram position, by depressing two of three push buttons on I-49, or by placing the RMS (Reactor Mode Switch) to the off position. Inward rod motion and decreasing flux are observed to verify that the scram is having the desired effect.

2.2 Ensure reactor internal maintenance terminated

The operator should advise any personnel involved in operations from the refueling floor that a scram has occurred and that further operations should be terminated until it is determined to be safe to proceed.

2.3 Ensure all PCRV openings closed

Openings through the PCRV should be closed as soon as possible to prevent the out leakage of primary coolant and potential release of activity.

2.4 Monitor Critical Safety Functions per EOP's.

If the operator verifies that any critical safety function is not being met, the operator will proceed to appropriate EOP.



NRC

TITLE: SINGLE CIRCULATOR TRIP

RESPONSIBLE FOR:	<i>M. E. Deniston</i>	AUTHORIZED BY:		
AUTHORIZED BY:	<i>[Signature]</i>			
PORC REVIEW	PORC 920 FEB 6 - 1991		EFFECTIVE DATE	2-13-91
DCCF NUMBER (S)	90-11641			

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(D-1)
 SINGLE CIRCULATOR TRIP OR ONE CIRCULATOR TRIP IN EACH LOOP
 SYMPTOM-ACTION MATRIX

ACTIONS	SYMPTOMS		
	1.1 Helium Circulator Speed High	1.2 Helium Circulator Penetration Pressure High	1.3 Helium Circulator Loss of Bearing Water
	1A 105A 1-1 1B 105A 1-3 1C 105D 1-1 1D 105D 1-3	1A 105A 4-2 1B 105A 4-4 1C 105D 4-2 1D 105D 4-4	1A 105A 2-2 1B 105A 2-4 1C 105D 2-2 1D 105D 1-4
OPERATOR ACTION			
1.1 Ensure penetration inter- space block valve closed.		XX	
1.2 Ensure tripped circulator water speed, water turbine inlet, and water turbine outlet block valves close.			XX
1.3 Verify/set circulator brake and seal and isolate circulator auxiliaries.		XX	XX
1.4 Monitor critical safety functions per EOP's.	XX	XX	XX

INTRODUCTION

Circulator trips are initiated by the Plant Protective System (PPS) to protect the circulators and associated equipment against various auxiliary equipment and control system failures.

When the cause of the trip is loss of bearing water pressure, all the circulator auxiliaries are isolated. In this event, the circulator brake is applied when the speed has coasted down to 700 rpm. Twenty seconds later, the static shaft seal is automatically applied.

DISCUSSION OF SYMPTOMS

1.1 Helium Circulator Speed High.

Speed sensors monitoring shaft speed actuate the circulator trip logic system when circulator speed exceeds 8,800 rpm. Actuation of at least two of the three sensors is required to cause trip.

Excessive circulator speed is an indication of a speed controller failure or other circulator system failure necessitating rapid shutdown of the circulator. The speed sensing system response and trip setting are chosen so that, for the case of the maximum overspeed situation possible (loss of restraining torque), the circulator speed will remain within design limits.

1.2 Helium Circulator Penetration Pressure High.

Pressure exceeding 810 psig in the circulator penetration will actuate pressure switches. Actuation of at least two of the three switches is required to cause trip.

Circulator penetration overpressure is indicative of a pipe rupture within the penetration. A circulator trip is initiated and the purified helium pressurizing line to the penetration is closed to prevent moisture backflow into the purified helium system. The relief of the overpressure is handled by the circulator penetration relief valves. The trip point is set above normal operating pressure but below the circulator penetration relief valve setting.

1.3 Helium Circulator Loss of Bearing Water.

Pressure switches sensing the difference between primary coolant pressure and bearing water pressure actuate at a differential of 475 psid. Actuation of two of the three switches is required to cause trip of the steam drive and prevent automatic water turbine start.



NOTE: After a loss of normal bearing supply (loss of all three pumps in a loop) the NBW isolation valves (-1) and the flow control valves close to prevent re-establishing normal bearing water on top of back-up bearing water. These valves must be shut (on controller/handswitches) in order to re-open.

Loss of bearing water is potentially damaging to the helium circulator. The trip point is set to ensure that the normal and auxiliary bearing water sources are available; if not, the circulator is tripped. The line to the bearing water accumulator opens automatically, due to reversal of differential pressure across a check valve, to allow use of the stored water during circulator coast down.

DISCUSSION OF OPERATOR ACTION

2.1 Ensure penetration interspace block valve closed.

High penetration pressure indicates a bearing water pipe leak in the penetration. The purified helium penetration interspace block valve is shut automatically to prevent water from backing up the line and getting into the purified helium system. The operator acts as a backup to the PPS.

2.2 Ensure Tripped Circulator Water Speed, Water Inlet, and Water Outlet Block Valves Close.

This step verifies proper circulator shutdown by PPS.

2.3 Verify/Set circulator brake and seal, and isolate circulator auxiliaries.

- 1) The circulator must coast down to less than 700 rpm before brake will set. The static seal is inhibited from setting by a 20 second time delay after the brake is applied.

The static seal will be damaged if applied while the shaft is turning. The circulator brake is provided to stop the shaft when it is necessary as a result of dynamic seal or bearing malfunction.

- 2) Isolate circulator auxiliaries.

By isolating circulator auxiliaries, any leakage in bearing water piping or buffer helium piping will be stopped.




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2.4 Monitor Critical Safety Functions Per EOP's.

Monitor critical safety functions per EOP's and perform steps of EOP's as required.



NR21

RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN - IMPLEMENTING

NO.	SUBJECT	ISSUE NUMBER	EFFECTIVE DATE
RERP-ALERT	RERP-Implementing Procedure - ALERT	1	07-24-87
RERP-SITE AREA	RERP-Implementing Procedure - Site Area Emergency	2	05-09-88
RERP-GE	RERP-Implementing Procedure - General Emergency	1	07-24-87
RERP-NOTIFICATION	RERP - Implementing Procedure: Follow-up Notifications	3	11-14-88
RERP-CED	RERP Implementing Procedure - Corporate Emergency Director	1	07-24-87
RERP-CR	RERP - Implementing Procedure - Control Room	14	08-08-90
RERP-ECP	RERP-Implementing Procedure - Activation of the Executive Command Post	14	06-23-89
RERP-FCP	RERP-Implementing Procedure Activation of the Forward Command Post	16	10-11-89
RERP-PCC	RERP-Implementing Procedure - Activation of the Personnel Control Center	20	04-05-89
RERP-SEOC	RERP-Implementing Procedure Activation of the State Emergency Operations Center	12	04-12-89
RERP-TRANSPORTATION	RERP-Implementing Procedure - Transportation	2	02-06-91
RERP-TSC	RERP-Implementing Procedure: Activation of the Technical Support Center	21	05-16-90
RERP-RECOVERY	RERP-Implementing Procedure Recovery Operations	2	07-31-88




RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN - IMPLEMENTING

RERP-VC

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04-18-88




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TITLE: <u>RERP-IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE - TRANSPORTATION</u>			
RESPONSIBLE FOR:	<i>J. Boalsh</i>	AUTHORIZED BY:	
AUTHORIZED BY:	<i>A. Fulmer</i>		
PORC REVIEW	PORC 919 JAN 30 1991		EFFECTIVE DATE 2-6-91
DCCF NUMBER(S)	91-0037		
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
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1.0 PURPOSE

NOTE: Control Room notification requirements for non-emergency and emergency classifications are identified in RERP-CR.

- 1.1 The key objective of this procedure is to ensure appropriate actions are taken, or are being taken, by either PSC or respective state and local emergency response personnel to ensure the health and safety of the public and environment in the vicinity of a transportation situation is not endangered.
- 1.2 This procedure provides guidance to Public Service Company of Colorado (PSC) employees on actions to take upon receiving notification of a spent fuel shipping transportation situation after the shipment has left PSC property.
- 1.3 This procedure identifies key "players" and teams by shipping program titles. The Shift Supervisor and Control Room will have in their possession during any given shipment, a listing of the appropriate on-duty personnel and contact numbers corresponding to the titles utilized within this procedure.
- 1.4 This procedure will assist the Shift Supervisor, Control Room staff and shipping program personnel in making decisions concerning appropriate PSC response to any given transportation situation reported. Attachment B to this procedure contains a decision matrix to assist in determining appropriate PSC response to any given transportation situation. However, each situation will be analyzed on a case-by-case basis and the final decision on response actions will remain with PSC management personnel.
- 1.5 This procedure will also ensure that appropriate Media Relations personnel are kept informed of any situation with complete and accurate information for dissemination to the media and general public.
- 1.6 The driver/escort team and/or shipping agent dispatcher are required to inform PSC of delay while in transit. In such an event, the on-duty shipping coordinator shall be immediately informed. Any notifications to governor's designees and the NRC for delays fall outside the scope of this procedure.



2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 RERP-PLANT

2.2 RERP-CR

2.3 PSC DEFUELING/DECOMMISSIONING PUBLIC INFORMATION PLAN

3.0 DISCUSSION

3.1 The defueling campaign associated with Fort St. Vrain will involve numerous shipments of spent fuel to a storage facility. All of these shipments undergo a thorough inspection (both mechanically and radiologically) prior to leaving PSC property. Regardless of these precautions, a situation involving a spent fuel shipment can occur. These situations could include shipment delay in route due to weather conditions, law enforcement, mechanical breakdowns, or public protest; situations to the transport vehicle; or even a severe situation involving an unlikely breach of the shipping cask containment. Each situation has the potential of impacting the general public and environment, thus causing a delay in the completion of the spent fuel shipping program. PSC's response to, and control of, each situation, especially in the area of public safety, information, and perception, is essential to ensure a safe and timely completion of FSV reactor defueling.

3.2 At all times while responding to a transportation situation off of PSC property, the PSC Transportation Response Team (TRT) is in an assist position. The team is there to assist the local response forces, as needed, and to gather an independent set of data concerning the situation for corporate records. At no time will the TRT make any decisions concerning local response actions, however, the TRT may provide recommendations, if asked.



3.3 The TRT will typically be comprised of the following positions and corresponding responsibilities:

3.3.1 TRT Coordinator (1): Responsibilities include;

Command and Control of all PSC response personnel and actions,

Communications to FSV and PSC Corporate personnel concerning the situation,

Liaison between TRT and local response personnel,

Alternate media/public spokesperson,

TRT transportation and equipment coordination.

3.3.2 TRT Assessment Specialist (1 or more):
Responsibilities include;

Radiological assessment,

Mechanical/Damage control assessment,

Assisting local response forces, as directed by the TRT Coordinator.

NOTE: There may be more than one individual responding as a TRT Assessment Specialist. Different disciplines (i.e., health physics background, cask engineering background, fuel engineering background, etc.) may be sent with the TRT depending on given conditions of the situation.

3.3.3 TRT Media Relations Representative (1 or more):
Responsibilities include;

Primary media/public spokesperson,

Assisting with communications to FSV and PSC Corporate personnel.

3.4 A Communications-Assessment Team (CAT) will be established, if needed, in the Technical Support Center (TSC) at the FSV site. The TSC contains sufficient communications capabilities within the PSC network, to the NRC (ENS and HPN phones) and to state and local agencies. This team will be comprised of various technical assessment, communications and management personnel. The CAT will have the capability to obtain all necessary documentation and personnel to assist in evaluating situations concerning shipping cask integrity and situation recovery. The CAT will also be responsible for ensuring all TRT assessment information is passed on to appropriate personnel and agencies and assisting corporate Media Relations personnel in formulating any necessary media/general public information releases.

4.0 PREREQUISITES

4.1 FSV/PSC has received, and has validated, a notification from either a local response agency, a bonafide shipping notification contact, or the contract shipping company of a situation involving a FSV spent fuel shipment. Attachment A to this procedure contains a notification receipt form to be used for such notification receipts.


5.0 LIMITATIONS

5.1 None

6.0 PRECAUTIONS

6.1 All notifications made to PSC concerning a transportation situation should be verified to be valid prior to initiating response actions. This validation can be performed using one of the following guidelines:

- 6.1.1 Call contract shipping dispatch for verification communication to driver.
- 6.1.2 Call respective state shipping notification contact for verification.
- 6.1.3 Call respective state law enforcement agency (if different from step 6.1.2).
- 6.1.4 Call respective local response agency (if known).



6.2 The Shift Supervisor and Control Room personnel should be ready to identify all personnel making notifications and note any particular identifiers heard during the notification (background noise, background music, voice specifics such as; male/female; speech problems; etc.). The Transportation Situation Receipt of Notification Form (Attachment A) provides space to note any of these items.

6.3 All media/general public information releases will be coordinated through PSC Media Relations Department personnel.

6.4 Any event for which a news release is planned or another government agency has been notified must be classified as a 4-hour non-emergency as a minimum.

7.0 EQUIPMENT

7.1 Equipment available to be dispatched with the TRT is identified in the TRT Equipment List (Attachment D to this procedure).

8.0 PROCEDURE

8.1 Shift Supervisor/Control Room (SS/CR) Actions

8.1.1 The SS/CR will obtain and fill in a copy of Attachment A to this procedure upon receiving a notification of a transportation situation.

8.1.2 The SS/CR should verify situation notifications with the trucking dispatcher as they have direct communications capabilities with the individual trucks.

8.1.3 The SS/CR will then notify the on-duty FSV Shipping Coordinator to inform him/her of the receipt of notification and to assist in determining classification and notification requirements, if any.

8.1.4 The SS/CR will initiate any required non-emergency or emergency notifications per RERP-CR.

8.1.5 Notification of delays (no media concerns) can be routinely expected. Upon receipt of such notifications the SS/CR shall inform the on-duty shipping coordinator and no further actions are required of the SS/CR.




8.2 FSV Shipping Coordinator (SC) Actions

- 8.2.1 The SC will review the decision matrix (Attachment B) with the Shift Supervisor upon receiving the appropriate information from the SS/CR.
- 8.2.2 Based upon the decision matrix and all pertinent information known concerning the transportation situation, make or recommend an appropriate response action.
- 8.2.3 Verify the SS/CR has made a decision of non-emergency or emergency classification, and has made, or is making appropriate notifications per RERP-CR, as needed.
- 8.2.4 Based upon the decision made, notify the on-duty TRT Coordinator and/or PSC Media Relations Department personnel for briefing and/or deployment.
- 8.2.5 If dictated by the situation, respond to the FSV Control Room to assist the SS/CR with additional receipts of follow-up notifications. The SC may eventually join the CAT in the TSC, if this team is formed.
- 8.2.6 Make any notifications of delays totaling 6 hours or greater per shipment, to appropriate governor's designees and the NRC. These notifications are controlled and documented in accordance with the applicable spent fuel shipping procedure.
- 8.2.7 In the event of Step 8.2.6, inform the SS that governor designees have been contacted and that a 4-hour non-emergency notification must be made.

8.3 Transportation Response Team (TRT) Deployment Actions

- 8.3.1 The TRT Coordinator will determine the most efficient means of transportation to the situation site and make appropriate arrangements for such transportation.
- 8.3.2 The TRT Coordinator will ensure all required members of the TRT have been notified and arrange for a pre-deployment briefing location and time.
- 8.3.3 The TRT Coordinator will ensure necessary equipment per Attachment D is checked and packed for transportation to the situation site.



8.3.4 The TRT Coordinator will receive last minute instructions/information concerning the situation from the SC or CAT prior to deployment to the situation site.

8.3.5 Necessary communication links with the SC/CAT will be established whenever possible while enroute and at the situation site.

8.3.6 At the situation site, TRT members will perform duties as outlined in Section 8.5.

8.4 PSC Communications-Assessment Team (CAT) Actions

8.4.1 PSC management personnel will notify and assemble necessary technical assessment and communications personnel in the Technical Support Center (TSC) at the Fort St. Vrain site.

8.4.2 Necessary communication links with corporate and state agencies associated with the transportation situation will be established, whenever possible.

8.4.3 Ensure PSC Media Relations personnel are kept fully informed of the situation.

8.4.4 Keep regulatory agencies informed of the situation.

8.5 Transportation Response Team (TRT) On Scene Actions


8.5.1 The TRT Coordinator will identify him/herself to the Incident Commander (or cognizant response agency representative) or the shipment drivers at the situation scene and report that the TRT is available for any assistance.

8.5.2 The TRT Coordinator will direct and control all PSC personnel at the scene.

8.5.3 The TRT Media Relations Representative (TRT Coordinator if media representative is not available) will obtain a briefing from the local response media representatives as to what has already been released to the media and keep appropriate counterparts in the CAT or corporate contacts informed of any changes in the situation.

9.0 COMMITMENTS

9.1 None



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10.0 ATTACHMENTS

- | 10.1 Attachment A - Transportation Situation Receipt of
| Notification Form
- 10.2 Attachment B - Response Decision Matrix
- | 10.3 Attachment C - NRC 1-Hour Notification Form
- | 10.4 Attachment D - TRT Equipment List



TRANSPORTATION SITUATION RECEIPT OF NOTIFICATION FORM

Date: _____ Time Call Received: _____

Name of Caller: _____ Organization: _____

Phone Number of Caller: _____ Location of Caller: _____

Caller Identifiers (background noise, music, etc.): _____

Problem/Notification: _____

Was vehicle disabling device engaged? Yes No Unknown

Exact Location of Vehicle: _____

Radiological Problems: _____

Current Weather Conditions at Vehicle: _____

Shipping Company Dispatcher notified for verification: _____ (name) _____ (time)

On-Duty Shipping Coordinator notified: _____ (name) _____ (time)

Station Management notified: _____ (name) _____ (time)

Classification Declared at time: _____ (check appropriate line)

- NO CLASSIFICATION FOUR HOUR NON-EMERGENCY EVENT
- ONE HOUR NON-EMERGENCY EVENT NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT
- ALERT

Completed by: _____ (signature)



RESPONSE DECISION MATRIX

Coding: M - Mandatory Action X - Recommended Classification
 O - Optional Action blank - No Action Needed

SITUATION	1	2	3	4	5	6	A	B	C	D	E
Truck Delay ≥ 1 hour (no media concerns)						X	M		O		
Truck Delay ≥ 1 hour (with media concerns)				X			M	M	O	O	O
Truck Malfunction (cask secure)						X	M	M	O		
Public Protest (with media coverage)				X			M	M	O	O	O
Truck Accident - No Injuries (no media coverage)						X	M	M	M		
Truck Accident - No Injuries (with media coverage)				X			M	M	M		
Truck Accident - Injuries				X			M	M	M	O	O
Cask out of Position				X			M	M	M	M	M
Fire Involving Cask (breach no determined)			X				M	M	M	M	M
Abnormal Radiation Levels Reported from the Cask		X					M	M	M	M	M
Cask Breached		X					M	M	M	M	M
Notification of Lost Shipment While in Transit					X		M	O	O		O
Notification of Recovery of Lost Shipment					X		M	O	O		
Actual Loss, Theft, Diversion or Sabotage of a Shipment	X						M	M	M		O

CLASSIFICATION RECOMMENDATION

- * 1 - ALERT
- * 2 - Notification of Unusual Event
- * 3 - 1 Hour Non-emergency Report
- * 4 - 4 Hour Non-emergency Report
- * 5 - Notification to the NRC - 1 Hour
(Attachment C)
- * 6 - No Classification Required

RESPONSE RECOMMENDATIONS

- A - Inform Shipping Coordinator
- B - Inform PSC Media Relations
- C - Inform On-Duty TRT
Coordinator
- D - Dispatch TRT to Scene
- E - Assemble CAT

* Make appropriate notifications per RERP-CR.



NRC 1 HOUR NOTIFICATION FORM

HAVE CALLER REPEAT INFORMATION FOR ACCURACY:

Date: _____

Time: _____

Caller's Name: _____

Fort St. Vrain, Unit #1 (Region 4)

This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71, reporting of Safeguards events.

EVENT DESCRIPTION: At _____ (event time) on _____

Fort St. Vrain experienced the following:

(Circle one): Discovery of the loss of a spent fuel shipment.

Recovery of a previously reported lost spent fuel shipment.

Any Other Details: _____

NOTIFICATIONS:	Name of Contact	Time
Shipping Coordinator:		
NRC Operations Center: (ENS or 9-1-301-951-0550)		
Plant Management:		
Other:		

TRT EQUIPMENT LIST

The following is a list of available equipment for response to a transportation situation.

Stored in TSC:

Company Handheld Radios
Radio Belt Holders
Spare Radio Batteries

Stored in TRT Response Trunk:

Portable Radio Battery Chargers (115 VAC)
Clip Board with paper
Box of Black Ink Ball Point Pens
Box of #2 Lead Pencils
Box of Red Ink Ball Point Pens
Colorado Road Map
Wyoming Road Map
Utah Road Map
Idaho Road Map
Complete set of Anti-C's
Box of Disposable Gloves
Set of Shoe Covers
Plastic Sample Collection Bottles
Rolls of Radiological Boundary Tape/Rope
Radiological Boundary Signs
Battery Operated Lantern
Spare Lantern Battery
Pair of Binoculars
25 foot Tape Measure
Response Team Hard Hats
Response Team Safety Vests

Stored and Maintained by Health Physics/Emergency Planning:

Eberline RO-2 Radiac Equipment (or equivalent)
Eberline RM-14/15 Radiac Equipment (or equivalent)
Extra RM-14/15 Probes (GM Tubes)
Cellular Telephone Kit
Camera and Film