

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-373/82-46(DETP); 50-374/82-19(DETP)

Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374

Licenses No. NPF-11; CPPR-100

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
P. O. Box 767
Chicago, IL 60690

Facility Name: LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: LaSalle Site, Marseilles, IL

Inspection Conducted: September 10, 18, October 2, 5-8 and 18, 1982.

Inspectors: <i>J. Hopkins</i> J. Hopkins	<u>11/1/82</u>
<i>R. Lanksbury</i> R. Lanksbury	<u>11/1/82</u>
<i>E. Maura</i> E. Maura	<u>11/1/82</u>
<i>D. Robinson</i> D. Robinson	<u>11/1/82</u>
Approved By: <i>I. Jackiw</i> I. Jackiw, Chief Test Programs Section	<u>11/4/82</u>

Inspection Summary

Inspection on September 10, 18, October 2, 5-8 and 18, 1982 (Reports No. 50-373/82-46(DETP); 50-374/82-19(DETP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection to witness startup testing, review startup test results, and review previously opened items. During the inspection an allegation dealing with weld rod control was received and investigated. The inspection involved 80 inspector-hours onsite by four NRC inspectors including 24 inspector-hours during off-shifts.

Results: Of the four areas inspected no items of noncompliance were identified in three areas. One item of noncompliance (failure to follow procedure - Paragraph 6) was identified in the fourth area.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

- *R. Bishop, Assistant Superintendent
- E. Pfister, Lead Nuclear Engineer
- R. Kyrouac, QA Supervisor, Operations
- **T. Quaka, QA Supervisor, Construction
- **K. Hall, QA Engineer
- **W. Vahle, Lead Mechanical Engineer, Construction
- K. Krane, Morrison Construction Company, Welding Engineer
- W. Kimberling, Morrison Construction Company, QC Engineer

The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees including members of the operations, technical, and construction QA staff.

*Denotes person attending exit interview of October 8, 1982.

**Denotes persons attending exit interview of October 18, 1982.

2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(CLOSED) Open Item (373/82-42-01): The licensee reconducted Sections C, D, E, and F of STP-70, RWCU, and obtained acceptable design flow rates for the normal and blowdown modes for both heat exchanger groups.

3. Startup Test Witnessing

a. STP-28, Shutdown from Outside the Control Room

The inspector witnessed the remote shutdown test, STP-28, on September 10, 1982 and noted that test prerequisites were met and the appropriate revision of the test procedure was in use by test personnel. The test was performed with the reactor at approximately 137 MWe and the generator synchronized to the grid. The reactor scram was initiated from outside the control room after the simulated evacuation to the remote shutdown panel. The MSIV's were shut approximately two minutes after the scram and three SRV's were cycled open individually. After stabilizing pressure and level the reactor was held in stable hot standby for a minimum of 30 minutes prior to completing the test and returning control to the control room. The test was performed with the minimum crew requirements as defined in technical specifications. Crew performance appeared to be correct and timely during the performance of the test. A quick review of the recorded plant parameters indicated that plant response was as expected.

b. STP-71, Residual Heat Removal

The inspector witnessed portions of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System Startup Test as described in Startup Test Procedure (STP) No. 71 on September 18 and October 2, 1982. The inspector noted that the adjustment of the steam condensing mode RHR loop inlet pressure and level controllers was delayed due to inaccurate

temperature indications at the RHR heat exchanger service water outlets. Upon investigation the licensee concluded that the RTD's were located too close to the heat exchanger outlets to allow adequate fluid mixing within the pipe; therefore, additional sensors were located further downstream. The inspector witnessed the adjustment of the steam condensing mode Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) suction pressure controller and noted significant problems with maintaining the minimum required NPSH for the RCIC pump and that the suction pressure was subject to large fluctuations due in large part to the cycling of the barometric tank pump. The inspector also noted that the RCIC mini flow valve had to be racked out to permit continuation of the test. The acceptability of the test results under these conditions will be addressed at a later date and is considered an open item (373/82-46-01). The inspector also witnessed an attempt to place the RHR heat exchangers in the steam condensing flow for suction within 30 minutes. The inspector noted that the licensee took about 50 minutes to place the system in service and obtained only 41% of the design flow specified in the process diagrams. The licensee stated that the RHR system capacity was limited by the 6 inch valves installed in the 10 inch steam headers feeding each RHR heat exchanger. The failure to meet acceptance criteria is considered an open item (373/82-46-02) pending further inspector review.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

4. Review of Startup Test Results

The inspectors reviewed the results of the following startup tests, performed during the identified test condition, and have determined that all test changes were processed in accordance with the Technical Specifications; test deficiencies were processed and corrected as required; data sheets were complete and deficiencies noted; results were evaluated and met the acceptance criteria; and the results were reviewed and approved by station and corporate management as required; unless otherwise noted:

- a. STP-3, Fuel Load (Test Condition, Open Vessel)
- b. STP-4, Shutdown Margin (Test Condition, Open Vessel)
- c. STP-5, CRD (Test Condition No. 1)
- d. STP-19, Core Performance (Test Condition No. 1)
- e. STP-25, MSIV (Test Condition No. 1)
- f. STP-28, Shutdown From Outside Control Room (Test Condition No. 1)

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

5. Review of Licensee's Evaluation of Test Results

The inspectors reviewed the results of the following startup tests, performed during the identified test conditions, and have determined that the results were evaluated and met the acceptance criteria; and that the results were reviewed and approved by station and corporate management as required, unless otherwise noted:

- a. STP-6, SRM and CRD Sequence (Test Conditions Open Vessel, Heatup and No. 1)
- b. STP-11, LPRM Calibration (Test Condition No. 1) STP-11 did not meet the Level 2 acceptance criteria requiring LPRM readings to be within $\pm 10\%$ of their calculated values. After three iterations 58 of 172 LPRMs did not meet this criteria. This deficiency was evaluated by the General Electric Company and in a letter to G. J. Diederich (CECo) dated September 30, 1982 concluded that it is acceptable to proceed to Test Condition No. 2. The licensee has determined that the LPRM calibrations have been satisfactorily completed for Test Condition No. 1.
- c. STP-12, APRM Calibration (Test Condition No. 1)

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6. Weld Rod Control

On the morning of October 6, 1982 at approximately 1110 hours the inspector was notified that the NRC had received an allegation from an unidentified individual claiming that, "welders at LaSalle have been taking welding rod and placing them in their tool boxes." As one of the many examples he was aware of the individual stated a box bearing the symbol J-42 and containing uncontrolled weld rods, had been, or could be found, in the location of structural line J-N-18 at elevation 710. The inspector and two licensee representatives searched the indicated area and were unable to identify any box or container with a J-42 marking. However on a platform at elevation 687 near beam R-20 the inspector and licensee representatives found a bucket containing approximately one dozen 7018 and two dozen 6010 weld rods. The only personnel in the area were insulators who stated that the equipment belonged to Morrison Construction Company. The licensee's construction QA was notified. Later the inspector met with construction QA personnel who stated they had looked into the matter and had reached the conclusion everything was satisfactory. They stated the Morrison welders had been away from the job for approximately two hours on another assignment, but that it was permitted to keep weld rod 7018 in the rod bucket for up to four hours. In response to the inspector's inquiry they stated that QA auditing of the four hour limit in the case of Morrison's welders is extremely difficult to audit. The inspector obtained a copy of Morrisons Construction Company Standard Operating Procedure No. PC-2, Welding Materials Control Procedure, Revision 8, dated February 1982. A review of Procedure PC-2 shows that Sections 8.9 and 8.10 require that covered electrodes 7018 be maintained in portable rod ovens and that the portable ovens be energized when the electrodes are exposed to ambient temperatures for a period of more than five hours. The fact that approximately a dozen 7018 weld rods were found in a bucket is contrary to Morrison Construction Company procedure PC-2 and is considered to be a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V and is an item of noncompliance (374/82-19-01). During an interview with Morrison's welding engineer on October 18, the following positions were obtained:

- a. That while PC-2 does not allow for weld rod 7018 to be outside of the portable oven it is impractical to require the welder to make numerous trips from the welding location to the oven location just to get one electrode. Therefore, it has been normal practice to allow the welder to take a few rods, in the order of 4 to 6 with him.
- b. That our finding of October was not an allowable practice in that approximately 12 weld rods had been found out of the oven and the rods had been left unattended for over two hours.
- c. That the welding engineer does not want to modify the procedure to conform with present practice, because the more latitude you give the welders the more it is abused. The inspector pointed out that as presently written the procedure does not conform with present practice, based on practicability, and therefore, the welders were in noncompliance with PC-2 even if the procedure was to be interpreted as stated by the welding engineer.

During an interview with a Morrison QC individual it became apparent that QC has been giving the welders greater flexibility in interpreting PC-2 than the author of the procedure (welding engineer) would. The QC individual stated that 12 electrodes 7018 in a bucket (out of the oven) is not uncommon and is considered satisfactory.

7. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection (October 8 for the Startup Test Program, October 18 for the allegation investigation). The licensee acknowledged the statements by the inspector with respect to the item of noncompliance (Paragraph 6). One member of the licensee staff disagreed with the item of noncompliance.