

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

Attachment to AECM-82/553

Page 1 of 6

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (1)

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	M	S	G	G	S	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4				5						
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35							
LICENSEE CODE														LICENSE NUMBER												LICENSE TYPE						CAT			

CONT

0	1	L	6	0	5	0	0	0	4	1	6	7	1	0	1	7	8	2	8	1	1	1	6	8	2	9
7	8	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84
REPORT SOURCE		DOCKET NUMBER										EVENT DATE						REPORT DATE								

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

(0 2) On October 17, 1982, reactor operators discovered the Containment Main Steam Tunnel

(0 3) temperature in excess of the allowable value of 125°F as specified under T.S.3.7.8. An

(0 4) LCO was entered and corrective action taken. Subsequent investigation revealed this

(0 5) situation had existed for at least 24.5 hours but not more than 36 hours. A special

(0 6) report is required under T.S.3.7.8. This had no effect on the health and safety of

(0 7) the public and did not constitute a threat to plant safety.

0	8																	80
7	8																	80

0	9	S	B	11	A	12	A	13	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	14	Z	15	Z	16
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26
SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE						COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE					
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		SHUTDOWN METHOD		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.							
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER							
COMPONENT MANUFACTURER																			

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

(1 0) High steam tunnel temperature was due to low cooling water flow to the tunnel cooler

(1 1) as a result of a partially open valve. When the problem was reported to the shift

(1 2) supervisor, the valve line-up was checked and the correct valve fully opened. An

(1 3) analysis as required by T.S.3.7.8 is attached. This is intended as a final report.

1	4																	80
7	8																	80

1	5	B	28	0	0	0	29	NA	30	B	31	Operator Observation	32
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	
FACILITY STATUS		% POWER		OTHER STATUS		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION					

1	6	Z	33	Z	34	NA	35	NA	36
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
ACTIVITY CONTENT		RELEASED OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY		LOCATION OF RELEASE			

1	7	0	0	0	37	Z	38	NA	39
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES		NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION			

1	8	0	0	0	40	NA	41
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION			

1	9	Z	42	NA	43
7	8	9	10	11	12
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		DESCRIPTION			

2	0	N	44	NA	45
7	8	9	10	11	12
PUBLICITY		ISSUED DESCRIPTION			

8211230362 821116
PDR ADOCK 05000416
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER Original signed by Ken L. Walker

PHONE: _____

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION TO
LER 82-111/99 X-0

Mississippi Power & Light Company
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station - Unit 1
Docket No. 50-416

Technical Specification Involved: 3.7.8
Reported Under Technical Specification: 6.9.2

Event Narrative:

The attached memos document the required analysis pursuant to action statement (a) under T.S.3.7.8. The following information is presented as a result of high Main Steam Tunnel temperature discovered on October 17, 1982.

1. Maximum amount by which 125^o temperature limit of Table 3.7.8-1 was exceeded was 10^oF on one instrument and 6^oF averaged over all instruments
2. The cumulative time in excess of the limit was at least 24.5 hours, but not more than 36 hours according to readings taken once per shift.
3. Engineering analysis to demonstrate the continued operability of affected equipment - attached memos.

Previous Similar Events:

None

MEMO TO: C. W. Angle

FROM: S. P. Hutchins


SUBJECT: Response to Incident Reports 82-10-27 and 82-10-32 Involving
Excessive Area Temperatures - Unit 1

REF: 1) AECM 81/231
2) AECM 81/335
3) AECM 81/502

DATE: November 8, 1982

Per the Three (3) references above, equipment located in the affected areas (ie Steam Tunnel and Drywell) have been either fully qualified or interim operation justified to the requirements of NUREG-0588 Revision 1. As such, the Class 1E equipment has met Thermal Aging requirements as specified in NUREG-0588. The increase in temperature as referenced in the subject incident reports is well below the protected temperature profiles for both areas.

Although a reduction in qualified life may be the end result no immediate disqualification of effected components has been determined. NPE Electrical will take action to recalculate qualified lives based on the increased temperature.



S. P. Hutchins
Electrical Principal Engineer

SPH:flm

MEMO TO: C. W. Angle
FROM: R. C. Fron
SUBJECT: Civil Evaluation of Incident
Report 82/10/27
FILE NO: 0290/0294/2860.0
ONPE: 82/2608
DATE: November 10, 1982

BACKGROUND: NPE Civil was asked to evaluate the effect if the 130°F temperature on the Main Steam Tunnel as documented on subject Incident Report.

DISCUSSION: Upon investigation, it was discovered that the original Bechtel calculations have been revised to include an environment of a 150°F in the Main Steam Tunnel. Thus the 130°F temperature as documented on subject Incident Report had no detrimental effect on the Main Steam Tunnel.



R. C. Fron
Principal Civil Engineer
Nuclear Plant Engineering

RCF:srr

cc: NPE (FILE)

MEMO TO: C. W. Angle
FROM: W. F. Adcock
SUBJECT: Incident Report 82-10-27
REFERENCE: PMI 82/7206 (10-27-82)
DATE: November 10, 1982

BACKGROUND: PMI 82/7206 identifies that temperatures in excess of 125°F existed in the Containment Main Steam Tunnel for a period of at least 24 hours. This is documented via Incident Report 82-10-27. We are asked, in the memo, to perform an analysis by November 10, 1982.

DISCUSSION: We have performed an analysis as requested. The results are as follows:

1. Safety related mechanical equipment in the Containment Steam Tunnel is limited to motor-operated valves and expansion bellows.
 - a. The motor-operated valves were furnished under Specification 9645-M-242.0.
 - b. The expansion bellows were furnished under Specification 9645-M-318.0.
2. Specification 9645-M-242.0 identifies the environmental conditions as:
 - a. Normal temperature in Containment - 140°F.
 - b. Accident temperature in Containment - 330°F.


Considering the above and that the lowest design temperature of any of the system piping involved is 150°F, the temperatures documented in Incident Report 82-10-27 will not adversely affect either the operation or longevity of these valves mechanically.
3. Specification 9645-M-318.0, for the expansion bellows, identifies the environmental conditions as:
 - a. Normal temperature in Containment - 80°F.
 - b. Accident (LOCA) temperature in Containment - 185°F.

Considering these design criteria and that the expansion bellows consist of two (2) flexible (bellows) sections made of thin wall stainless steel with a section of steel pipe between and at each end. The temperatures identified in the Incident Report will have no adverse effect on either the stainless flexible sections or the pipe sections.

Page -2-

MEMO TO: C. W. Angle
FROM: W. F. Adcock
SUBJECT: Incident Report 82-10-27
DATE: November 10, 1982

ACTION: No further action should be required by Nuclear Plant
Engineering Mechanical.



W. F. Adcock
Principal Mechanical Engineer
Nuclear Plant Engineering

REP:gaf