NRC FORM 366 APPROVED BY OME U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3150-0011 EXPIRES 4-30-82 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) CONTROL BLOCK: (1 57 CAT 38 -1010 34 ASES 200 0 0 1 0 -0 0 0 0 0 CON'T SOURCE L 6 0 5 1 0 8 8 2 0 1 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) 0 2 While in a startup testing outage, during performance of a surveillance test, both Standby Gas Treatment System trains failed to perform their 0 3 intended function. This is reportable per 6.9.1.8.3. There were no 0 4 0 5 adverse consequences in that the plant was in Operational Condition 0 6 0 7 0 8 80 COMP. VALVE SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE CODE CODE (15) (16) (12) 13 (14) Z Z 0 9 X 1.2 REVISION LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 8 2 CODE SEQUENTIAL REPORT REPORT NO. 3 0 1 Т 0 (17) 0 28 30 31 32 24 COMPONENT 22 ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. 26 EFFECT FUTURE SHUTDOWN ACTION FORM SUB HOURS METHOD SUPPLIER Y 23 24 25 Z 9 91 21 Z 20 N Z 9 E (18) F (19) Z 01 0 0 0 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) The SGTS "A" train failed because during the simulated loss-of-offsite power 110 condition, a rad monitor failed high causing the lead SGTS fan to trip. The 1 "B" train tripped due to the delta temperature requirements across the heater 2 not being satisfied. The hi-rad trip and swap-over will be eliminated and the 3 4 delta-temp. time delay was extended. 1 90 METHOD OF FACILITY (30) (32) OTHER STATUS DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION S POWER B 28 0 0 0 29 (31) C n/a surveillance 5 temporary 80 44 45 12 . 10 ACTIVITY CONTENT (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) RELEASED AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 6 Z 33 Z 34 1 n/a 80 ... 10 11 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES DESCRIPTION (39) NUMBER TYPE 0037Z38 0 n/a 7 80 11 12 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 0 0 1 8 0 n/a 80 TYPE DESCRIPTION (43) Z @2 n/a 1 0 80 8211230238 821108 PUBLICITY D DESCRIPTION (45) NRC USE ONLY ISSUED PDR ADOCK 05000387 N 44 PDR 2 0 NAME OF PREPARER D.G. Mitchell PHONE: (717) 542-2181 X524

.

## Attachment

## Licensee Event Report 82-032/01T-0

During an outage from the startup testing program, a temporary surveillance was run, during which the Standby Gas Treatment System was to have actuated. Neither train of the SGTS operated as designed. The "A" train never started and the "B" train operated a short period of time, then tripped-off. This was determined reportable per 6.9.1.8.e.

Review of the event disclosed the following scenario. The lead SGTS fan (the "A" train) did not start because a loss of off-site power was simulated which caused the radiation monitor on the SGTS exhaust to fail high. The SGTS "B" train then started, but stopped after receiving a trip signal from the delta temperature sensor across the heater switch. The sensor assumed the heater had failed.

The station was in Operational Condition 4 at the time, therefore, neither SGTS was required, nor was any immediate corrective action taken.

To prevent recurrence, the high radiation trip and the swap-over logic will be eliminated. This will prevent loss of the "A" train in a similiar event. Further, the heater delta temperature trip switch was retimed to 200 seconds to prevent an early trip during cold weather.

DGM/cw

.