

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 NYJAF1 200-00000-0000 341111 45
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T
01 L 605000333 7100782 8110882 9
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
02 During normal full power operation, a reactor scram occurred as the
03 result of a blockage of the 'D' Main Steam Line. Subsequent investi-
04 gation revealed the 'D' inboard Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) had
05 its disc separated from the stem. The reactor protective system
06 functioned normally and the event did not affect the health and safety
07 of the public. The MSIV is a primary containment isolation required
08 to be operable by TS 3.7.D.
7 8 9 80

09 HB 11 E 12 B 13 VALVE X 14 F 15 A 16
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20
17 LER RO REPORT NUMBER 82 23 047 27 03 28 29 X 30 1 32
ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPRD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
18 A 19 X 20 A 21 C 22 0266 23 Y 24 N 25 N 26 R340
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
10 The anti-rotation pin in the MSIV disc sheared allowing the pilot disc
11 to unscrew and part from the stem. The MSIVs are Rockwell-Edward Flite
12 Flow balanced stop valves, Type 1612Y. A new stem and pilot disc
13 assembly were installed with two anti-rotation pins installed 90
14 degrees apart with specific attention in ensuring an interference fit.
7 8 9 80

15 E 28 100 29 NA 30 A 31 Operator Observation 32
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80
16 Z 33 Z 34 NA 35 NA 36 NA 37
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80
17 000 37 Z 38 NA 39
7 8 9 11 12 13 80
18 000 40 NA 41
7 8 9 11 12 80
19 Z 42 NA S 43 8211230116 821108 PDR ADOCK 05000333 PDR
7 8 9 10 80
20 N 44 NA 45
7 8 9 10 80

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-333

ATTACHMENT TO LER 82-047/03X-1

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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

At 1143, on October 7, 1982, a reactor scram occurred as the result of high neutron flux on the power range monitors. Safeguard systems operated normally during and after the transient. The plant entered the cold shutdown condition at 0115 on October 8, 1982.

During the investigation for the cause of the scram, the following information was noted:

Reactor power as displayed on the recorders for the Power Range Monitors, spiked to 123 to 125 percent of rated on all six power range monitors. Reactor pressure as displayed on a control room narrow range recorder spiked from 1005 to a peak of about 1025 psig. Process computer post trip logs indicated reactor pressure increased to 1015 psig and remained constant for five seconds following the full scram signals. During the same time frame, steam flow and steam line pressure decreased.

The reactor pressure and power transients observed during the event are much less severe than either a generator load reject or MSIV closure, both analyzed abnormal operational transients. As such, the event did not degrade the health and safety of the public.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION

Based upon the above information, a blockage of the main steam line, probably at the MSIVs, was suspected of causing the scram. During the plant cool down using the main condenser, steam line and reactor pressure were monitored while closing three of the four outboard MSIVs. With the 'D' line as the only line in service, reactor pressure increased and steam line pressure decreased thereby indicating this line was blocked. Valve disassembly showed that the 'D' inboard MSIV had its stem separated from the pilot disc allowing the main disc to drop to the closed position. The stem disc pin, part 36 shown on Rockwell drawing PD-420097 RWD, an anti-rotation device, was sheared allowing the pilot disc to unscrew.

A new stem and pilot disc assembly were installed with two anti-rotation pins 90 degrees apart. Specific attention was paid to ensuring an interference fit of the pins. The valve was reassembled and leak tested satisfactorily.

During the next refueling outage the remaining MSIV anti-rotation devices will be inspected.