

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/C/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/2/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1/ (4) / / / (5)
LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT
/0/1/ REPORT SOURCE /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/9/ (7) /1/0/2/0/8/2/ (8) /1/1/1/5/8/2/ (9)
DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / On October 20, 1982, with Unit 2 in Mode 1, the generator field on the Unit 2 /
/0/3/ / "2J" Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) failed to flash during a post preventative /
/0/4/ / maintenance operability test. Emergency bus offsite power sources and EDG "2H" /
/0/5/ / remained operable throughout the event. The requirements of the Action State- /
/0/6/ / ment of the applicable LCO, T.S. 3.8.1.1, were met. The public health and safety/
/0/7/ / were not affected. /
/0/8/ / /

SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE
CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE

/0/9/ /E/E/ (11) /E/ (12) /A/ (13) /C/K/T/B/R/K/ (14) /B/ (15) /Z/ (16)
LER/RO EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION
NUMBER /8/2/ /-/ /0/6/9/ / / /0/3/ /L/ /-/ /0/
(17) REPORT TYPE NO.

ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT
TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER

/A/ (18) /Z/ (19) /Z/ (20) /Z/ (21) /0/0/0/0/ (22) /Y/ (23) /N/ (24) /A/ (25) /1/2/0/3/
(26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / A generator field contactor latch trip coil failed to energize during the "2J" /
/1/1/ / EDG starting sequence. The latch trip coil was replaced and the "2J" EDG was /
/1/2/ / returned to service after satisfactorily passing its operability test. /
/1/3/ / / /
/1/4/ / / /

FACILITY METHOD OF
STATUS %POWER OTHER STATUS (30) DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
/1/5/ /E/ (28) /1/0/0/ (29) / NA / /B/ (31) / Surveillance Test /

ACTIVITY CONTENT AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
RELEASED OF RELEASE
/1/6/ /Z/ (33) /Z/ (34) / NA / / NA /

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES DESCRIPTION (39)
NUMBER TYPE
/1/7/ /0/0/0/ (37) /Z/ (38) / NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES DESCRIPTION (41)
NUMBER
/1/8/ /0/0/0/ (40) / NA /

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
TYPE DESCRIPTION
/1/9/ /Z/ (42) / NA /

PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)
/2/6/ /N/ (44) / NA /

NRC USE ONLY
/ / / / / / / / / / / / /

NAME OF PREPARER W. R. CARTWRIGHT PHONE (703) 894-5151

Description of Event

On October 20, 1982, with Unit 2 in Mode 1, the generator field on the Unit 2 "2J" emergency diesel generator (EDG) failed to flash during a post preventative maintenance operability test. This event is reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

Both the 2J and 2H busses continued to be powered from their normal offsite sources throughout the event. The "2H" EDG was operable throughout the event. Because the "2J" EDG was being returned to service after preventative maintenance at the time of the event, increased surveillance of the offsite power source and increased "2H" EDG surveillance operability testing pursuant to the Action Statement of the applicable LCO, T.S. 3.8.1.1, was already being performed. The "2J" EDG was repaired and returned to service within 72 hours of being taken out of service for preventive maintenance as required by the Action Statement of the LCO. The public health and safety were not affected.

Cause of Event

The EDG does not have a conventional field breaker or contactor. To shut off excitation when the EDG is shutdown, a spring loaded latching type contactor latches to short circuit the exciter output to the generator field. When the EDG is restarted a latch trip coil (K1-OC) trips the spring loaded latch. A continuity test of the latch trip coil showed it was open. Failure of the latch trip coil prevented the "2J" EDG generator field from flashing.

Immediate Corrective Action

Increased surveillance of the offsite power sources for the emergency busses and increased surveillance testing of the "2H" EDG, already in progress as described above, were continued. The failed latch trip coil was replaced and the "2J" EDG was returned to service after satisfactorily passing its operability test. Since this start failure was the second start failure within the last 100 valid tests (See LER 82-007/03L-0), the "2J" EDG test frequency was changed from at least once per 31 days to at least once per 14 days pursuant to T.S. 4.8.1.1.2.a.

Scheduled Corrective Action

The "2J" EDG will continue to be tested on the increased 14 day frequency schedule until less than 2 valid test start failures have occurred in the last 100 valid tests.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

No further actions to prevent recurrence are required.

Generic Implications

There are no generic implications associated with this event.