

June 25, 1984

Memorandum For: File

From: ~~Edward J. McAlpine~~ Chief, Material Control and Accountability Section, Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Branch, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, Region II

Subject: RII-84-A-0029

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this memorandum is to document the review performed by the writer of this memorandum of documents prepared by the General Electric Company relative to allegations which they have received from ~~_____~~ (NRC Case RII-84-A-0029). This review was performed on the Wilmington plant site on June 15, 1984 and no copies of the reviewed documents were requested or received by the writer. The visit to General Electric was announced on June 14, 1984 to assure that all necessary documents could be assembled by General Electric thus providing for an efficient review. To announce the visit, the writer called ~~_____~~ Manager, Licensing and Nuclear Materials Management. Since ~~_____~~ was not available, the message was given to ~~_____~~ who reports to ~~_____~~. The message was that the writer would be at the Wilmington plant on June 15, 1984 to review the report prepared by ~~_____~~ concerning the allegations received by General Electric relative to measurement quality in the Chemet Laboratory. Additionally, ~~_____~~ was informed of the motel where the writer would be staying on the night of June 14 so ~~_____~~ could contact him in the event ~~_____~~ had any questions concerning the visit. There was apparently a miscommunication between ~~_____~~ and ~~_____~~ because at approximately 8:00 p.m. on June 14 ~~_____~~ arrived at the writer's motel with a copy of the ~~_____~~ Report" under the impression that the writer had requested to review it that evening. ~~_____~~ indicated that he did not want to leave the report with the writer since General Electric was very sensitive to what they provided in writing to the NRC. The reason for this sensitivity according to ~~_____~~ was that they wanted to minimize what was subject to disclosure by NRC in the event of a request under the Freedom of Information Act. The writer informed ~~_____~~ that there had been no request to review the report that evening and that the writer did not intend to request copies of any documents. The ~~_____~~ Report" was not reviewed by the writer that evening, but rather, the writer and ~~_____~~ discussed a number of other issues which were unrelated to this case until about 12:00.

7c

DOCUMENT REVIEW

On the morning of June 15, 1984 the writer arrived at the Wilmington plant and initiated a review of a number of relevant documents at approximately 8:30 a.m. The following documents were reviewed:

1. Quality Assurance Review of Employee Allegations of Violations to Company Practices and Procedures by ~~_____~~ which was

Information in this record was deleted in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, exemptions 4, 6, 7C
FOIA 57-88

Encl 1-#1

R.2 Portions deleted E4, 6, 7C & 4

P.12
~~_____~~

FOIA-57-88

9101280280 901012
PDR FOIA
BAUMAN87-88 PDR

- transmitted to [REDACTED] by memorandum dated April 26, 1984.
2. Memorandum dated March 15, 1984 from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] concerning a review of the microwave oven and the radio-frequency induction furnace in the Chemet Laboratory.
 3. Memorandum dated March 20, 1984 from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] concerning the industrial safety of the Chemet Laboratory.
 4. Memorandum dated March 15, 1984 from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] concerning a medical examination of [REDACTED] following an accident in the Chemet Laboratory on April 23, 1982. 7c
 5. Memorandum dated March 23, 1984 from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] concerning radiation safety in the Chemet Laboratory.
 6. Memorandum dated May 21, 1984 from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] concerning [her] allegations. 7c
 7. Memorandum dated May 17, 1984 from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] concerning additional information/allegations.
 8. Memorandum dated May 23, 1984 from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] responding to document 7 above.
 9. Memorandum to File dated June 15, 1984 from [REDACTED] concerning methods to improve communication between management and operators in the Chemet Laboratory.

In addition to reviewing the above documents, the writer interviewed [REDACTED] concerning the steps which are followed when a detector is changed in an Enrichment Analyzer and reviewed, very briefly, portions of General Electric procedure COI 411, Revision 3. In the following portions of this memorandum, the above documents are referred to by the numbers which precede them in the above list. Any opinion of the writer of this memorandum is clearly indicated in italic type.

DOCUMENT NUMBER 1

The purpose and scope of this document was stated to be to perform a review in response to a letter from [REDACTED] dated February 24, 1984 and document titled "Allegations of Violations of Company Practices and Procedures in Chemet Laboratory" dated February 21, 1984 by [REDACTED]. It should be noted that later in the document [REDACTED] indicates that only allegation concerning quality were addressed by the team. *Writer's Opinion: This means the quality of any measurement performed in the Chemet Laboratory.* 7c

The summary of conclusions section of the document indicates that four alleged violations relative to quality "were found, for the most part, to have substance".

The review team was composed of the following three individuals:

1. [REDACTED] Employee & Community Relations
2. [REDACTED] Quality Audits & Customer Service
3. [REDACTED] Consulting Engineer, Quality Assurance & Reliability Operation (Team Leader)

The review team interview the following individuals:



Pre-review and post-review meetings with the team were attended by the following General Electric individuals:

1. [REDACTED] Manager, Hourly Employee Relations
2. [REDACTED] Manager, Quality Audits & Customer Service (Acting)
3. [REDACTED] Manager, Employee & Community Relations
4. [REDACTED] Manager, Regulatory Compliance
5. [REDACTED] Manager, Fuel Quality
6. [REDACTED] Manager, Licensing & Nuclear Materials Management
7. [REDACTED] Manager, Chemet Laboratory

Allegation I.A: Analyzers are not properly calibrated following detector change.

The review team concluded that this allegation appeared true if one accepts the allegor's interpretation of the applicable procedure. Also the team pointed out that several interpretations of the procedure were obtained by the team from the various individuals interviewed. The team pointed out that differentiation between the terms "calibration" and "minimum-U-count" was not clear in COI 411 Rev. 2 & 3. Writer's Note: This is the procedure covering detector changes. The review team indicated that varied interpretations of the procedure could result in:


- inconsistencies in application
- possible violations of procedure
- possible questionable validity of results
- possible preceptive management countenance of operator deviation from procedure
- loss of time repeating work needlessly

Allegations I.A.i.d

&
I.A.2.c: Calibration and verification were not completed before samples were run and material released during 8/20/82 and 6/22/83.

The review team concluded that this allegation appeared to be correct. The report indicated that six calibration or verification standards were not measured as required by CQI 411 Revision 2 & 3. *Writer's Note: This is the one point of disagreement between the results of the General Electric internal review and the NRC review as documented in Inspection Report 70-1113/84-05 dated May 9, 1984. Writer's Opinion: If the findings of the review team are correct, there is no impact on the safe operation of any reactor containing General Electric fuel manufactured during this period for the following reasons:*

Ex 4
2,790 d



since these systems have been operational since the late 1970's,
- powder sent to [redacted] (a fuel facility in [redacted]) is measured different procedure. This powder is measured by [redacted] when received from General Electric.
- pellets sent to [redacted] are measured at the time of receipt by [redacted] and the shipment of pellets to [redacted] only started in late 1983.

Ex 4

Allegation I.B.1-4: Results from isotopics are accessible in computer and can be altered.

The review team found that all but one supervisor and one operator confirmed the statement.

Allegation (No number): Use of 902/903 computer transactions are condoned by supervisor.

The review team found that authorization was given on at least one occasion and operators continued to use 902/903 transactions because they thought that they had authorization. Access continued after 2/22/83 and 1/25/84 when re-emphasis to the contrary was issued by management.

Allegation I.C.: Supervisors input data under technician's password and create false data.

The document indicated that supervisors acknowledged using passwords but only with consent and in the presence of technicians. When the passwords were used, it was only to correct data. The review team concluded: "There was no falsification of data."

) indicated that it is the impression of several individuals in General Electric that the allegation document which bears the name

of [redacted] was not written entirely by [her] 7c
belief according to [redacted] is that the document is well written
and well organized and not at all like other examples of [redacted] 7c
writing and not representative of the manner in which [she] talks.

DOCUMENT NUMBER 2

This memorandum documented an audit of the Chemet Laboratory for sources of electromagnetic radiation and the safety aspect of such sources. The results of the audits were as follows:

- Operation of the microwave oven without the vent screen in place is dangerous.
- Screens were in place when the audit was performed on March 15, 1984.
- Periodic cleaning of the screen is necessary to remove buildup on the screen and permit adequate ventilation.
- Leaks of fumes around the door of the microwave oven is not an indication that microwaves are also leaking out. It indicates only poor ventilation.
- The induction furnace contains three dikes to prevent the spillage of mercury.
- Sulfur is available in the laboratory to aid in the cleanup of mercury should a spill occur.
- Radio-frequency radiation is hazardous only to the reception of local radio stations using a low quality radio receiver.

The memorandum indicated that "The microwave oven is the only potential source of dangerous electromagnetic radiation, and that potential is realized only in an equipment failure". The memorandum also indicated that "The detector equipment available for detecting leaks provides safety assurance beyond the level available to the general public". The memorandum indicated:

- equipment condition is good.
- the job hazard analysis requires testing but no interval is specified.
- testing is performed weekly.
- no unacceptable levels of leakage have been noted.
- it is recommended that the weekly testing requirement be placed in a procedure.

DOCUMENT NUMBER 3


This documented a review of the safety program in the Chemet Laboratory which occurred during the period March 8 to 21, 1984. The reviewer concluded that "...the safety program in the Chemet Lab is excellent". Major findings during the review are as follows:

- "Review of injury, incident and other records does not reveal any pattern or significant events that would indicate safety problems".

- [redacted] bumped [her] head in the laboratory and the injury was diagnosed on April 23, 1982 as a simple contusion. 7'
- Isotopic & O/U Preparation Area
- + No visible emission of chemical materials in the immediate work area.
- + Employees in the lab indicated that rarely are chemical odors noticed.
- + "Employees' overall preception of lab management's safety concern and safety emphasis is quite high. Comment like 'goes overboard' and 'safety conscious' were used to describe lab management's attitude toward safety".
- + "Employees indicated that they believe [redacted] has convinced [herself] that [her] concerns are legit and no amount of evidence to the contrary will change [her] mind". 7'
- + "The processes do not subject employees to significant safety or health risks".

DOCUMENT NUMBER 4

This memorandum documented the medical diagnoses applicable to the injuries suffered by [redacted] in an accident which occurred in the Chemet Laboratory on April 23, 1982. [redacted] is the Plant Medical Director. The following points were addressed in the memorandum: 7'



DOCUMENT NUMBER 5

This documents a detailed radiological safety review of the Chemet Laboratory performed by [redacted] Senior Nuclear Safety Engineer during the week ending March 23, 1984. The following points were contained in the memorandum:

- detailed radiological safety review was performed in Chemet Lab this week.
- Conclusion: Radiation safety programs as applied to the Chemet Lab are quite adequate to ensure worker safety and compliance.
- No significant changes are necessary at this time.
- Several minor recommendations for improvement may warrent consideration.
- Contamination Survey Program
 - + Survey is generally on Tuesday or Thursday mornings at no set time.
 - + Not preannounced and "precleaning" or other preparation were not performed.
 - + Review of smears from 1/3/83 to 3/13/84 indicated about 2% of smears (25 of 1071) were greater than the action limit of 220

- microcuries per 100 square centimeters.
- + Conclusion - Appears adequate
- + Recommendation - Consider adding the microwave oven area as a location for a random smear.
- Air Sampling and Bioassay
 - + Two stationary air samplers are changed on an 8 hour basis.
 - + Air samples for 1983 averaged less than 10^{-11} microcuries per cubic centimeter which is less than 10% of MPC.
 - + Whole body counting is provided annually.
 - + Weekly urinalysis samples are collected from ten (10) randomly selected people.
 - + Review showed no positive intakes for persons working in the lab.
 - + Conclusion - Airborne negligible.
 - + Recommendation - Consider adding an air sampler by the powder hood on east side of West Lab.
- Worker Training, Posting, and Safety Instructions.
 - + Chemet Lab workers receive the same formal Nuclear Safety training as other controlled area workers from Nuclear Safety Engineering.
 - + Chemet Lab supervisors hold monthly safety meetings.
 - + Conclusion - Worker training and posting for the Chemet Lab operations is appropriate.
 - + Conclusion - Instructions pertaining to nuclear safety are adequate, in general, but improvement in three areas may be warranted.
 - Revise or review if SOP 0.3.4 is current and/or applicable.
 - Provide more detailed information on how to clean powder spills.
 - Provide more information on where and how dissolved samples are dried.
 - + Recommendation - combine applicable portions of SOP 0.3.4 with NSR/R 6.1.0.
 - + Recommendation - provide written instructions on cleaning spills and drying dissolved samples in the appropriate procedures.
- Personnel Surveys and Change Room Audits.
 - + Conclusion - Adequate training
 - + Conclusion - Overchecks have not indicated that individuals are leaving the lab with measurable contamination.
 - + Recommendation - None

DOCUMENT NUMBER 6

This memorandum relayed to [REDACTED] the results of the "quality review" conducted by [REDACTED] and the "safety review" directed by [REDACTED]. Major points in this memorandum are as follows:

- the [REDACTED] review determined that some of your allegations had some substance.
- the safety concerns had no substance.
- the major problem appears to be one of communication.
- a program to improve communication through training or improved

procedures or both appears appropriate.

DOCUMENT NUMBER 7

This document was a memorandum from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] dated May 17, 1984 which transmitted two pages of handwritten comments submitted by [REDACTED] and copies of two "quick letters" from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED]. The two pages of handwritten comments concerned the enrichment analyzer during two periods--October 13-16, 1982 and June 22-24, 1983. The "quick letters" involved questions concerning volume and numbers on test tubes. The information was transmitted to [REDACTED] for evaluation.

DOCUMENT NUMBER 8

This document was a memorandum from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] dated May 23, 1984 which transmitted the results of the evaluation of the information supplied in Document Number 7. The results of the evaluation were as follows:

- the enrichment analyzer concern during the period October 13-16, 1982 had no basis.
- the enrichment analyzer concern during the period June 22-24, 1983 was not addressed in that it had been the subject of a previous memorandum from [REDACTED] dated April 10, 1984. Writer's Note: The writer of this memorandum did not review the April 10, 1984 memorandum.
- the volume problem had been addressed and corrected by [REDACTED] when it had been brought to his attention by [REDACTED]
- the test tube numbering problem had also been addressed and corrected by [REDACTED] when it had been brought to his attention by [REDACTED]

DOCUMENT NUMBER 9

This was a memorandum to File from [REDACTED] Manager, Fuel Quality which documented some ideas concerning improvement of communications in the Chemet Laboratory. The concept of improved communications was surfaced in Document Number 6. This was not a final document and the writer was informed by [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] wanted some modifications and refinements made to the concept before a program was initiated.


CONVERSATION WITH [REDACTED]

The writer interviewed [REDACTED], Control Programs Engineer for the Chemet Laboratory to better understand the sequence of events which surround the changing of a detector in an enrichment analyzer. The following is a summary of the writer's understanding which resulted from that interview:

[REDACTED]

413

Positive



WRITER'S CONCLUSIONS

Except for the disagreement in the findings of the General Electric review team and the NRC inspection documented in inspection report 70-1113/84-05, the allegations of [redacted] do not appear to be accurate. The writer of this memorandum questions the validity of the General Electric review team's finding since it is the writer's understanding that the computer which controls the enrichment analyzers would not have permitted that situation to occur. It is the writer's recommendation that except for the minor follow-up action specified below, this case should be closed. If [redacted] presents new information, that information should be evaluated and reopening of the case should be considered.

7c
7c

RECOMMENDED FOLLOW-UP ACTION

The only follow-up action which appears appropriate is to resolve the differences between the findings of the General Electric review team and the NRC inspection team. It is recommended that the writer of this memorandum contact [redacted] and determine whether his review team reached its conclusion based on the raw data (as the NRC inspection team did) or on the log books that are used in the laboratory on an intermittent basis. If the General Electric review team looked only at the log books, no further action by NRC is recommended. If, however, the General Electric review team reached its conclusion on the basis of the raw data (computer tapes), an additional review of the raw data by NRC is necessary.

EJMcAlpine
Edward J. McAlpine

Friday 12/30/83 - Used by []
@ 2119 Swing Shift

16 Superv. on
at that time -
Christmas Eve.
+ Holiday

903 Trans.

1. Tronics 1674 Sample # 540914

2. Did 360 Trans. - Showed ISO Fe 9/4

3. This presented a "print-off" from LMCS

I brought it to the attention of [] just for matter of
connection but stated we would have to wait until
Sun for supervisor to change ^{shift from to leave taps to off-duty} & I had walked away to look
for taps + come back to where he was sitting at his terminal -
and he spoke, handing me the paper, saying "he had
taken care of it! Asked: what did you do? He replied
the 360 & it showed the added Chem. of Fe on it. So he
did the 903 trans. He told me, he was not to use it
as he used Supervisor's Password (that the supervisor told
him it was alright & that he could use it during the week.
Also stated that other H-18 ([]) etc used it) ([])

asked for me not to say anything concerning it or
talk about it. (if asked he would deny it.) Also made
statement, that when he could figure out [] he had to
used [] password - but [] changed his man. frequent
When using [] password, he would do it at shift change.
so there were a choice of 6 people who could have used it!
It would be hard to find out that way. He laughed then.
He stated, this Trans. 903 and all supervisor's trans. print
out on the "23" - I asked him, "what about the 114". He
said, "No, only that of supervisor".

Again asked me not to say anything, so that []
will get into trouble!

...deletion in this record was deleted
in accordance with Freedom of Information
Act, exemption 97-88
FOIA

Look for ^{ISO} ~~Trans~~ Report released to be distrib. Sample # 540914 12/30/83
Time 2121
"Supersedes all Previous Reports"

Date 24 - Apr 82 (Sat... I was on the 15-2310 shift)

Time 22:22 Sample # 230640

I had left out that evening leaving a print-out from HMCS of wrong % value 1.191 (when trans. from H87) I had posted it to the office door. When I came in on Sun (Ship 1500) ^{4/25/82} I found this "print out" with the message on it from () at my work station.

Note: The "Doc. Work Sheet" will show correct value as of H 87.

This again shows that back in 1982. Supervisors had allow some one to his password. I was well aware that () were using it. () said, he wouldn't use it - as it was falsifying records or altering such. Did not know () was using it - but began to watch the Doc written in Spec Lab of () brought it to my attention. Other were using it, etc.

() that I know of, were not using such!

We all had been informed from the very first that only Supervisors were to use the 903. Our passwords were given - so that we were responsible for our own mistakes or what went into the system. But found out that () could correct these mistakes - but I couldn't. I had to take my mistakes to a supervisor. Why were we all told we could use it!?

2/10/64 after New Data in installed 2/1/61 @ 10:55 AM

2/10 @ 0821 AM

2/10 @ 1009

2/10 @ 1035

2/10 @ 1127

2/10 @ 1324

2/10 @ 1814 .709 (2.206) 3962

1943 252579 - 60766 2.0428

2/10 @ 2222 (.697) - 2.220.3986

60557 - 2.0636 250645

60564 - 2.1032 251418

60772 - 2.0120 251786

.704 - 2.222 - 3.975 - 251527 OK

.709 2.211 - 3.977 - 251638 OK

1324 - Released 2 samples 7 09 - 2.211 3.977

cts out of Range

3G Slope

OK

OK

OK

3 Calc

3 Verify

Why were not verify after each Calc
Should have done so automatically!

Information in this record was deleted
in accordance with the Freedom of Information
Act, exemptions 6
FOIA: 87-88

MA 2401 301/16 bullet in
2/12/84
SEARCH



REQUESTED BY: 16488

TUBE	SAMPLE	TRAY
6121	441282	
6283	441285	
6334	552306	
6348	441282	
6360	441285	
6389	552348	
6394	441294	
6398	441271	
6405	441271	

Tu # 3 T1 240 (set up by [redacted])
Did Not show TT # -
I input the [redacted] for him &
Password.


ALLEGATION REPORT


of 87-88F

NAME:  7a	ALLEGATION: - IMPROPERLY PERFORMED TESTS ON	FACILITY: GE
ADDRESS:	NUCLEAR MATERIAL	FILE NO: RII-84-A-0029
		DATE: 2-15-84
		TIME: 9:40 a
PHONE:  7c	CONFIDENTIALITY REQUESTED: <input checked="" type="radio"/> YES <input type="radio"/> NO	DOC NO: 70-1113

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION:

* had been identified by another alge that * had concerns which he wanted to provide to the NRC. A call was placed to * by J. Lankford and E. McAlpine. * provided the following:

* discussed the generally poor working environment at GE. He explained how if an individual brings up a problem to management, the individual of O-H's made the culprit.  7c
are only concerned with production.

* described the lab organization to be as follows. The lab technicians work for the 3 lab supervisors. 

* has indications that other lab technicians may be performing analyse incorrectly. 


PREPARED BY: JEFF LANKFORD	Information in this record was deleted in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, exemptions 6 & 7D FOIA 87-88	DATE: 2-15-84
-------------------------------	---	------------------

ACTION REQUIRED:	
------------------	--

REVIEWED BY: 7A 6-24-85	DATE:
----------------------------	-------

MEMORANDUM TO CASE FILE CONTINUATION SHEET

7d



048

008


FILE NO. RI-84-A-0029	DATE 2-15-84	TITLE	PAGE 2 OF 3
--------------------------	-----------------	-------	-------------

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DO NOT DISCLOSE

MEMORANDUM TO CASE FILE CONTINUATION SHEET

7d



031

FILE NO RI-84-A-0029	DATE 2-15-84	TIME	PAGE 3 OF 3
-------------------------	-----------------	------	-------------

7c

ALLEGATIONS OF VIOLATIONS TO
COMPANY PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES
IN CHEMET LABORATORY

by

()

February 21, 1984

Information in this record was deleted
in accordance with the Freedom of Information
Act, exemptions b1 + 7c
FDIA 87-88

P-4

Exemptions b1 + 7c

1-5

I. Chemet Lab Isotopic Data Is Inaccurate.

A. Analyzers are not properly calibrated following "detector" change.

1. On 8/20/82, analyzer #4 was not recalibrated after detector change.

a. Detector was changed on 8/19/82 at 1000.

b. Six (6) calibrations were to be run starting at 1000 on 8/20/82, following a 24-hour burn-off.

c. According to the calibration/verification log, only four (4) calibrations were run; the first at 1121, the second at 1558, the third at 2145, and the fourth at 2328 on 8/20/82.

d. When I reported to work at 0700 on Sat., 8/21/82, I noticed that two (2) sets of samples had been released at 0243 and 0524 on 8/21/82. In checking log, I found calibrations had not been completed. () a level 9 technician, verified tape and enrichment log and stated analyzer wasn't qualified for release of samples. At his suggestion, I telephoned () and his response was "Tag out the analyzer - it was to be tagged out for the weekend." () tagged it out at 0900. The analyzer remained tagged out on Sun., 8/22/82 with no activity shown on this date. 6

e. When I returned to work on Mon. morning, 8/23/82, () my supervisor, approached me and said "The analyzer is all right. () just didn't know what we were doing." 6

f. Shortly thereafter, I noticed the tag had been removed from the analyzer - a violation of procedure - and I brought this to () attention (level 9 technician). After verifying that calibrations for minimum U count had not been completed, he re-tagged analyzer at 1030 and noted on tag "Needs new slope and intercept data. Not to be used for production." (See p. 4, IIA1 for further details on this incident.)

g. See "Table for SCP-401 (Station Control Plan), please note date issued - 8/20/82 by () - and date that new minimum U counts were established - 8/23/82 by (). But, please note calibration/verification log that on dates 8/21, 8/22, and 8/23, there were no calibrations run.

h. [] approached me at approximately 1300 that same day in my area and said ' [] tells me you're worried about the standards. I wouldn't worry if I were you. I would forget about the standards. It would do you well to forget the standards!' and then abruptly left me. Shortly afterwards, [] told me that [] a supervisor, approached him and told him "Don't get mixed up in this - it would be better that you stay out of it."

2. On 6/22/83, a new detector was installed in analyzer #3 and no calibrations were run.
 - a. Detector was installed at 1300 on 6/22/83 and the 24-hour burn-off was started.
 - b. At end of the 24-hour period, no calibration standards were run.
 - c. Calibration standards were first run at 0125 on 6/24/83. After only two (2) calibration standards and one (1) verification standard, samples were run and material released at 0640 on 6/24/83.
- B. Results from isotopics are accessible in computer and can be altered.
 1. 902/903 transactions allow for changing of data.
 2. All lab personnel were told in round-table meetings that 902/903 transactions could be performed only by supervisors.
 3. 902/903 transactions were carried out by certain technicians and not by supervisors only, as prescribed by procedure.
 - a. Many 902/903 transactions occurred on weekends when no supervisors were present.
 - (1.) For instance, on weekend of 1/15-16, 1983, 902/903 transactions were used seven (7) times by # [] and # [] (technicians' clock numbers).
 4. Use of 902/903 transactions are condoned by supervisors.
 - a. Supervisors must give password for these transactions to be carried out.

b. Supervisors randomly gave out and condoned use of these transactions admittedly on 12/30/83 at 2121.

5. Abuse of 902/903 transaction, when brought to the attention of middle and upper management, was ignored.

a. In early January, 1983, I brought weekend 902/903 transaction to the attention of my supervisor, (), who said "You can't prove it." I told him there was a printer in the lab that carried this data to prove use of 902/903's. That afternoon, I checked this printer and found it had been turned off and paperwork, representing two or three months' work, was removed. No action was ever taken by () to correct the misuse of the 902/903's.

b. On December 14, 1983, I met with () at 0800 and with () at 0900 to present them with paperwork showing the possibility of misuse of passwords. () refused to look at the paperwork and said he would investigate the problem. () looked at the paperwork and copied some of the data from it. We discussed my doubts about the indiscriminate use of the 902/903's. On 1/12/84, () set up a meeting with me at 0200. We discussed changes in the use of the 902/903 transactions and passwords and, on 1/19/84, he sent me a letter stating the corrective action he was going to take per our 1/12/84 meeting. (See contents of letter and note that he just took a good run around Robin Hood's barn and then left the barn door wide open!)

C. Supervisors input data under technician's password and create false data.

1. On 12/17/82, () inputted data under my password and released false data.

a. () called to ask about pellet-handling procedure because he had wrong data from the lab.

b. Wrong data carried my clock number, but I had not released any results into LMCS system that day!

c. Investigation showed that () had released this data using my password.

2. On 4/22/83, () used () word and shut down the LMCS system by inputting false data.

a. In presence of () (GAD inspector) and me, () stated that () had put wrong standards in LMCS using her password which resulted in shutting down the system.

II. Lab Supervisor Is Aware Of and Condone Inaccurate Procedures.

A. Supervisors were informed of data problems.

1. In direct defiance of () order on Sat., 8/21/82 that analyzer #4 be tagged out, () on Mon. morning, 8/23/82, condoned use of the analyzer when he implied in a statement to me "The analyzer is all right, () just doesn't know what we are doing." At that point, I returned to the isotopic lab and, to my surprise, found that the tag which () had ordered to be put on analyzer #4 had been removed! I was getting ready to re-calibrate the analyzer when () appeared with a paper in his hand. I asked if he was planning to put in the minimum U counts and he answered "Yes." At my request, he verified my findings that calibrations had not been done and thus minimum U counts could not be entered. I asked him that if he had put the minimum U counts in, what would he be doing? His answer was "I would be falsifying." I then asked "What are you going to do with those counts?" He answered "I'm going to take them back to ()". At that point, he re-tagged the analyzer.

B. Measurement control engineer, () allowed wrong calibration data into 9825 software.

1. On 8/23/82, () put minimum U count data into 9825 software for analyzer #4 while log sheet revealed that analyzer was down and tagged out for that date.

2. False minimum U count data was obtained from () although no log record existed to support the fact that any calibrations had been run.

C. Supervisors condone use of non-standardized analyzers.

- 720
1. On 6/24/83, I [redacted] was upset because he was aware of a new detector having been installed in analyzer #3 on 6/22/83 and asked [redacted] if the analyzer was O. K. [redacted] assured him that "everything is fine - It's all yours."
 2. ([redacted]) ran two (2) calibrations and one (1) verification followed by two (2) G218 samples at 0640.
 3. I was not informed that this analyzer had not been calibrated and proceeded to put samples on at 0900 and 1204. The verification standard failed at 1446. It was only the following day that I found that I had run and released samples on an unqualified analyzer -
 4. Calibration was done at 1546 and minimum U counts were calculated with only two (2) standards and one (1) verification standard with supervisor's knowledge and consent. Procedure called for six (6) or more calibration standards to be run.

III. Supervisors Have Ignored Safety Hazards In Lab

A. Microwave oven leaked radiation through vent.

1. Lead shield within microwave was removed at [redacted] order to prevent clogging of vacuum duct.
 - a. On 4/27/82, while cleaning our microwave, I noticed no lead shield screen over vent to duct within the microwave.
 - b. Microwaves were leaking into lab which affected Metler balance six (6) feet from oven and this was brought to [redacted] attention who then reported this fact to [redacted] on 5/4/82.
 - c. Shield was replaced after it was called to [redacted] attention.
2. Door on microwave was shown to be leaking.
 - a. Technicians complained of uranyl nitrate fumes leaking into lab while microwave was in use in April, 1982.
 - b. This was brought to [redacted] attention

and he was shown crystallization at the bottom of door on two (2) occasions.

- c. I checked microwave on 7/1/82 for safety inspection seal and found no seal of approval.
- d. On 7/2/82, I checked microwave for leaking door with a clothes monitor and found leaks.
- e. On 7/14/82, a professional inspected the microwave, found three (3) leaks, and suggested that the oven be tagged out. It was tagged out by supervisor.
- f. Immediately ordered the tag removed and the oven was put back into use with no repairs being made at that time.

B. Uranium-enriched powder was being dumped in areas other than those located under hoods provided in the lab for that purpose (in ISO area and CAD area).

- 1. From June, 1980 until May, 1982, U₂₃₅ powder was dumped in plastic containers in areas other than under hoods with supervisors' consent. I repeatedly brought this to the attention of the supervisor and Rad Safety. I also mentioned safety hazard to Supervisors ignored the safety hazard prior to May, 1982.


C. Supervision ignored safety hazard of lever on high-temperature oven.

- 1. Location of lever as safety hazard was brought to the attention of the supervisors on several occasions following minor "bumpings" of heads on lever.
- 2. On April 23, 1983 at 1450, I suffered a concussion after having hit my head on the oven handle which projected out from the front of oven.
- 3. Following my concussion, management padded the handle and labelled it a safety hazard.
- 4. Supervisor, () told M18 operators to accept into the lab contaminated paperwork with samples from a "controlled" area, after the M18 operators complained to him about this hazard.
- 5. Chewing gum, eating candy, not wearing safety shoes by some of lab personnel and not monitoring themselves (including supervisors) takes place on a daily basis, seemingly overlooked or ignored.
- 6. Uranyl liquid spills on counters, carts, etc., often and this is ignored by supervisors.

STATEMENT CONTINUATION

END OF STATEMENT

I further state that I have read this entire statement, consisting of 9 pages, initialed all pages and corrections, and signed this statement, and that it is correct and true as written.

 7c
Signature
Date 2/23/84 Time 0941

Subscribed and sworn to before me at WILMINGTON, N. CAROLINA this 23RD day of FEBRUARY, 1984.

WITNESS [Signature]

[Signature]
Investigator

GENERAL ELECTRIC

DIAL CODE 5320

DATE March 15, 1984

COPIES

DEPT. R&UD - EBCR

ADDRESS M/C 806

SUBJECT TO



6

CJS:dr

Information in this record was deleted
in accordance with the Freedom of Information
Act, exemptions 6
FOIA- 87-88

E46

P-5
~~FOIA~~

GENERAL ELECTRIC

DIAL CODE: 8*292-5950 DATE: March 23, 1984 COPIES: [REDACTED]

DEPT: WILMINGTON MANUFACTURING DEPARTMENT

ADDRESS: M/C J-26

SUBJECT: RADIATION SAFETY REVIEW OF CHEMET LABORATORY

[REDACTED]

Per your request, a detailed radiological safety review of the Chemet Laboratory was performed this week. The goal was to evaluate the effectiveness of radiation safety programs by reviewing applicable procedures, nuclear safety records, and interview Chemet and Radiation Protection personnel.

Areas reviewed included:

- 1) Contamination Survey Program
- 2) Air Sampling and Bioassay Programs
- 3) Worker Training, Posting, and Safety Instructions
- 4) Personnel Surveys and Changeroom Audits

[REDACTED] 6

Attached are findings and conclusions for each area. Recommendations are also suggested where appropriate. Reviewed documents and additional backup information is available upon your request.

I have concluded from my review that the radiation safety programs as applied to the Chemet Laboratory are quite adequate to ensure worker safety and compliance. No significant changes are necessary at this time. Several minor recommendations for improvements may warrant consideration.

Information in this record was deleted in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, exemptions 6
FOIA- 87-88

Attachment
SPK/rr

[REDACTED]

P-6
~~FOIA~~

ATTACHMENT

1. CONTAMINATION SURVEY PROGRAM

Findings

Routine swipes of the Chemet Lab work areas are collected on a weekly basis per NSI 0.6.0. Between 15 and 20 smears are taken; typically 10-12 are from the floors below the hoods, the rest are random from work spaces (countertops). Occasionally, Chemet personnel will request a smear of a particular area. Smears are not normally taken around the microwave work area in the Spectrometer Lab.

The surveys are generally taken on Tues. or Thurs. mornings, although there is no set time. Both Rad Safety and Chemet personnel confirmed that the surveys were not pre-announced and that "pre-cleaning" or other special preparations just prior to a survey were not performed.

Each smear location is documented on a Chemet Lab floor plan. Results are recorded alpha disintegrations per minute (dpm) per 100 cm². The action limit for the Chemet Lab is 220 dpm/100 cm² which is the same criteria for unrestricted release from other controlled areas.

Results greater than 220 dpm/100 cm² are circled and pointed out to Lab Supervisor for immediate cleanup action. Both Chemet and Radiation Protection supervisors review and sign the survey results.

A review of the smear results from 1/3/83 through 3/13/84 indicates that the Chemet Lab areas remain relatively free of contamination. (About 2% of the smears (25 of 1071) were greater than the action guide. Most smears greater than the action guide ranged from 200 to 400 dpm/100 cm².)

Conclusions

Based on the low frequency of smears indicating contamination, and relatively low levels of contamination reported, the survey program appears adequate for contamination control and reporting.

Recommendations

Consider adding the microwave oven work area as a location for a random smear.

This implies that these were properly pointed out and documented.

2. AIR SAMPLING AND BIOASSAY

Findings

Two stationary air samplers are located in the Chemet Lab, one in the Wet Lab near the isotopic balance and one in the spectrometer Lab near the metal impurities hood. Both are general work area samples and are changed on an 8 hour frequency per standard practice.

A review of the air sample results for 1983 showed average air concentrations of less than 1×10^{-11} $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$. This is less than 0.1 of the maximum permissible concentration (MPC) for uranium. Because of this, the Chemet Labs need not be designated an airborne controlled area per 10 CFR 20.

An annual whole body count is provided to Chemet personnel per the manager's request. It is not required under established criteria specified in REMTRAC due to the negligible air sample results. Weekly urinalysis samples are collected from ten randomly selected Chemet personnel. A review of bioassay data for 1983 showed no positive intakes for persons working in the Lab.

Open containers of powder are routinely handled in a hood on the east wall at the Wet Lab. Lab personnel referred to this hood as the "powder hood". It is located approximately 30 feet from the existing air sampler.

Conclusions

Airborne concentrations in the lab are negligible. Whole body count and urinalysis results confirm the absence of airborne material in the Lab.

Recommendations

Consider providing an additional air sampler location by the powder hood on the east side of the Wet Lab.

3. WORKER TRAINING, POSTING AND SAFETY INSTRUCTIONS

Findings

Chemet Lab workers receive the same formal nuclear safety training as other controlled area workers from Nuclear Safety Engineering. Topics include criticality and radiological safety rules, potential biological effects of radiation, purposes and functions of protective devices, response to warning signals and applicable NRC requirements. Retraining is performed annually with emphasis placed on selected topics such as radiation risks, criticality safety and personal survey requirements and techniques.

In addition to NSR training, Chemet supervisors hold monthly safety meetings (roundtables) to discuss current safety issues and allow questions and answers from workers. A review of meeting documentation from 1/83 to 3/84 indicated that specific nuclear safety topics were discussed on several occasions. These topics included cleaning of radioactive spills, personal survey practices, housekeeping, nuclear safety procedural changes, and precautions when handling contaminated articles.

Posting at the Lab included "Caution-Radioactive Materials" and "Authorized Entry Only" signs. Also included are signs regarding the wearing of lab coats and safety glasses. A red line on the floor demarkates the boundary between "cold" & "hot". Posting at the personnel survey station includes memos and signs re-stating the survey requirements, where and how to survey, and disciplinary actions for failure to survey.

Instructions to lab personnel pertaining to nuclear safety include Nuclear Safety Release/Requirement (NSR/R) 6.1.0 "General Requirements", Job Hazard Analysis CL-JHA-01 "Nuclear Materials" and Standard Operating Procedure 0.3.4 "Radiation Safety - Lab Operating Procedure". Persons working in the lab are familiarized with each procedure and sign an Implementation Acknowledgement Sheet prior to the implementation of a new or changed procedure.

NSR 6.1.0 lists requirements for handling radioactive samples and limiting the spread of contamination. It also prohibits eating and smoking in the Lab and requires personnel surveys for persons exiting the Lab. There are no specific instructions on how to clean powder spills. Lab personnel indicated most spills are cleaned using "troubleshooter" and a chem wipe. Larger spills are normally cleaned using a vacuum, although occasionally a dust pan and brush is used.

Conclusions

Worker training and posting for the Chemet Lab operations is appropriate. The formal nuclear safety training, although not specific for the Chemet Lab, provides fundamental information on radiation protection which is applicable to all nuclear material handling operations. Round tables, at which nuclear safety issues are discussed, allow workers to raise specific concerns. Discussions with lab workers indicated they felt comfortable with the level of training provided.

Instructions pertaining to nuclear safety are adequate in general, but improvements in three areas may be warranted:

- 1) Revise or review if SOP 0.3.4 is current and/or applicable
- 2) Provide more detailed information on how to clean powder spills.
- 3) Provide more information on where and how dissolved samples are dried.

Recommendations

- 1) Combine applicable portions of SOP 0.3.4 with NSR/R 6.1.0
- 2) Provide written instructions on cleaning spills and the drying of dissolved samples in the appropriate procedure.

4. PERSONNEL SURVEYS AND CHANGE ROOM AUDITS

Findings

As stated in NSR 6.1.0, all persons exiting the lab must monitor themselves for radioactive contamination. A survey meter is provided for this purpose at the lab exit. Persons must monitor their hands and feet as a minimum.

As a part of a Rad Safety Committee project, training on exit survey techniques and re-emphasis of its importance was provided on several occasions during the past four years. In 1980, all controlled area workers were shown the proper survey technique and asked to individually demonstrate they understood how to survey themselves. A videotape was prepared and shown as a part of annual retraining of controlled area workers in December 1982. In addition, proper survey techniques were discussed on several occasions during routine Chemet rountable discussions.

Special change room audits were initiated during the fourth quarter 1982 through April, 1983. The audit consisted of Rad Protection supervisors observing individuals performing an exit survey. A review of these audits indicated that on three occasions persons were documented for not surveying when leaving the Chemet Lab.

The change room audits were replaced in 4/83 with spot contamination overchecks of hands and shoes by Rad Protection. Overcheck locations are randomly selected. During 1983, Chemet Lab personnel were overchecked 13 times and on 7 occasions to date in 1984. One individual was found contaminated in early 1983. Routine overchecks are still being performed.

During an NRC audit on 2/21/84, a license violation was received after the inspector observed two individuals failing to survey upon leaving the Chemet Lab. As a result, Rad Protection was requested to perform special contamination spot checks on lab personnel. (Over a two week period, 131 individuals were re-surveyed upon exiting the lab. Of these, three individuals showed slight contamination (500-600 dpm).)

Another follow up to the license violation was to provide additional refresher training on personnel survey practices. The training was provided by NSE to all Chemet personnel 3/21 - 3/23/84.

Conclusions

Adequate personnel contamination survey training has been provided and its importance re-emphasized on many occasions. The overchecks performed to date of Chemet personnel have not indicated that individuals are leaving the lab with measurable contamination.

Recommendations

None

In summary, the Radiation Safety Programs applied to the Chemet Laboratory are adequate to insure worker safety and no significant changes are necessary at this time. Several minor recommendations for improvements (addition of a stationary air sampler, additional smear location, and procedural improvements) may warrant consideration.

3/23/84

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MEMORANDUM TO CASE FILE *7C*

TYPE ACTION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RECORD OF CONVERSATION <input type="checkbox"/> CASE REVIEW / STATUS <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER	PARTICIPANTS [REDACTED] JEFF LANXFORD	FILE NO. RD-84-A-0029
	CONFIDENTIALITY REQUESTED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	DATE MAY 01 1984
		TIME 8:00 am

SUMMARY [REDACTED] had called John BATES on 04-30-84. John told her that I would return her call this morning.

[REDACTED] explained that she was to attend a hearing this morning to discuss a contamination incident in the lab which she was being held responsible for. She said she could be dismissed.

She wanted to know if we had been able to substantiate any of her allegations. I told her that we were still in the process of reviewing her allegations and I did not have any inspection results at this time.

[REDACTED] said a discrepancy occurred on analyzer #2 about February 20, 1984. She said the Enrichment Calibration Log will show that the required calibrations were not done within the required 24 hours. The following day she noticed that [REDACTED] had written "calibrations not done" in the log book. [REDACTED] said she had released data to production the previous day not knowing that the calibrations had not been done. She said the calibrations would have been done using the old MU counts that were in the software, thus the data would be invalid.

PREPARED BY JEFF LANXFORD	DATE MAY 01 1984
------------------------------	---------------------

ACTION REQUIRED

Information in this record was deleted in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, exemptions *b1, 7C*
 FOIA *87-88*

REVIEWED BY	DATE <i>P-7</i>
-------------	--------------------

Partono 10-7C

MEMORANDUM TO CASE FILE CONTINUATION SHEET

[REDACTED] suggested that we call [REDACTED] is a lab technician and can give us information on standards in other areas.

[REDACTED] said that another employee told her that [REDACTED] had been overheard saying that he had a personal file of standards data and he wished [REDACTED] could get access to it because there were a lot of goodies.

[REDACTED] is going to mail us some data which will show where GULG values in the software were changed. She assumes the data was changed because the calculations in the software were not correct.

She described how a [REDACTED] comes into the lab and changes the computer disc - he just comes in and exchanges the disc without saying anything. She said it appears that he's changing the software and she indicated that this was not proper. She said she may have some documentation of this - I told her to mail the data to us.

[REDACTED] said the results of her hearing today will decide what her next move will be. She has a lawyer and would consider going to court.

FILE NO. 82-84-A-0029

DATE MAY 01 1984

TIME

PAGE 2 OF 2

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DO NOT DISCLOSE

MEMORANDUM TO CASE FILE

TYPE ACTION <input type="checkbox"/> RECORD OF CONVERSATION <input type="checkbox"/> CASE REVIEW / STATUS <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER	PARTICIPANTS	FILE NO. RJ-84-A-0029
		DATE MAY 03 1984
	CONFIDENTIALITY REQUESTED YES NO	TIME

SUMMARY

In a discussion with ALGR on 05/01/84, she said that she would be mailing us some information. The attached notes from the ALGR were received today.

Package 5

PREPARED BY	JEFFREY B. LANKFORD INVESTIGATIVE COORDINATOR	DATE MAY 03 1984
-------------	--	---------------------

ACTION REQUIRED

Information in this record was deleted in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, exemptions b + 7C
FOIA 87-88

REVIEWED BY 1-27 Portman G. 6 + 7C	DATE P-8
---------------------------------------	-------------

OFFICIAL USE ONLY — DO NOT DISCLOSE

3/27/84
INVEST
why

ask for Work Sheet - Traces # 294 first set of stds set up.
Traces # 298 second set " " "

(3/28/84 - In refer. to conversation 3/27/84 in [] office

On 2/23/84 in lab on Swine Shift @ 1500. (In. off from long wk End.)

Interfaced with [] who explained to me that all 4 analysers were down. Went out of Control. That we were to run [] Stds on all analysers but not release information to LMCS. Just write the measured result on work sheet and give to him.

at 1700 (5PM), M [] still in lab - very aware and non-committal to me. Shortly after this hour, noticed him setting at H 87, typing information into the software of H 87. He tried to cover paperwork with his arm, but not before I noticed SCP-401 with red inked numbers written in and over the paper. It appeared as if he had redressed new "men 4 cts", intercept and scope. I was told by supervisor that he had to have at least 30 results from each analyser.

Also at this time if an analyser was available we were to continue to run Prod and G218 samples, BUT NOT to release results to LMCS.

2/24/84

On this day I notice something - that Lvs Reports of series (in Lvs Report log)

3892 - 93 - 94 - 95 - (Could not find 3896 Lvs Report)

3899 ~~had~~ had "after corrected" "7" (rec) on each sheet.

2/23/84

→ # 3901 and 3906 in - but # 3902 - 3903 - 3905 and 3909 had no release sheet to show information was released to LMCS. Why?

3/20/84

Page 2

Gene Copy To 2/27/84

This paper work will show actual correction made on TRAM
 Why? Was a different Slope and Intercept used? (Sldo? as
 corrections made in software?)
 This is during the time [redacted] was told to
 "stay in sldo until corrected," by [redacted]
 Also, at this time, results from our lab were being
 compared with other labs

Date on this paper work was 84053 - following are the
 Iso Report numbers. Ask for
 # 3880 - 81-82 - 83-84-85
 # 3886 (Bad) 3887-88-89-90
 * 3891 (Bad)

Ask for ~~the~~ Iso Reports of prior dates

2/19/84 - # 3840
 2/20/84 - # 3847-48
 2/21/84 - # 3851-53-54-55-56-57-58-59-60-61-62-63-64-65-66
 3871-72-73-74-75 [Bad → 3878 and 3876]

Please - CR The Call/Ven ENR Log in ISO Rm. Right side on table at H87
 This is what the Log looks like. But February Paper work
 is under lock + key in file. They are filed on a monthly basis.
Ask For ISO Report sheets for the month of February, for
 they are also in the file. In upper left corner of paper
 work is ISO Report number.

From hastily written notes - I copy information of Travel # 298
 Date - 84053

Sample # 555201
 555202
 555203
 555204
 548688 } all set up in Dupli.

Test Tube #'s should show on tape
 at ca. Analy
 20 → 6221 6464
 6200 6411
 6353 6224
 6456 6282
 6321 6496

3/29/84

Page 3

Gen Copy To
3/27/84

In refer. to conversation on 3/26/84 in [redacted] office

Why?? When Iso report would show that G 218 results were out of parameters - do the H87 software except - ("Yes") and to release to FMCS

I had several times approach supervisors who in turn said to release such (Except [redacted])

Ask to see Iso Report # 3884 Date 83063

As Examples

Iso Report # 3918 Date 83065

Note: Ask to talk with [redacted] concerning letter of [redacted] concerning "Following of Lab Procedures"

Also, about the destroying of tapes, that were to be attached to work sheet. Knowing that one could go to the H87 and change or reverse original data, that no longer showed on original work sheet is this a good practice? Where does traceability start and stop when even the crucible is not marked and could be interchanged by an individual if mind to do so? Is this good practice? This has been done to me.

3/24/84

Falsifying

(Dec 18 1982
Time 12:16:21)

* (Transition) - T # 114
(used manually)

Tech Name ([redacted])
Proc ISO ANA # 2
Std 2 778

6

Shield Tank # 22066 ([redacted]) Certif Std 20003
Range CK Feature (2.223) Wm, STD

[redacted] was on 0700-1510 shift 12/16/82
[redacted] was NOT on Plant Site until 1981 ([redacted])

6

This was reported by ([redacted])

6

Can Copy To
3/27/84

Check ~~the~~ ISO Report # 3884 - G-218 - Date - 83063

ENR

Why did the H87 except first sample when

(3.950/3.713) out of spec or param? It rejected such
before.

D.I. - 83065 ISO Report # 3718 (3.950/3.837) ENR

TO

DATE

B/9/83

CC

SUBJECT

Following of lab procedures.

1. CM+S Method 5.2.9.5 SCP# 401 section 5.0 states "Worksheets are to be completely filled out showing pertinent data." This is not being done. We stopped filling out data on worksheets for isotopes and attached printout tapes to worksheets, however, we no longer keep printout tapes on all our worksheets. (see example #1 & 2). See CM+S Method 5.2.9.5 SCP# 400 section 4.0 also.
2. CM+S Method 5.2.9.5 SCP# 400 section 22.0 states "For GULG isotopic preparations, review final results against COI # 403 and report as applicable." Where is a copy of COI # 403? (see example # 3)
3. COI # 003 ("Chemet Laboratories Berun Outlier Criteria") is not being followed. The Berun log is not being filled out for samples that we rerun, which includes isotopes, to the best of my knowledge. We may need to review this COI to define exactly what analysis we want it to cover. We either need to follow it, or, eliminate it. (see example # 4)

→ Copied from my notes 3/29/84 & given to Mr. [redacted]

8/20/82 - I have returned to lab after 2 da "SDO".

I found by checking Calib/Verif. ENR log that a new detector installed on 8/19/82 into Area #4

a. Tagged out for 24" period of burn off.

b. Approached by [redacted] & asked to burn

(6) The Std Calib's 8/20/82 approx at 1010.

	Time	Calib	M	K
First Calib	@ 11:21	Calib →	69761	1.894 (1)
	@ 1456	.708 2.212 3.974		
Incubator	@ 1300	Calib →	Results did not print off on tape	
	@ 1406	.710 2.207 3.9.		
	@ 1523	Calib →	68649	2.000 (2)
		.709 2.249 3.987		
	@ 2145	Calib →	10545	1.778 (3)
		.709 2.664 7.012		
	@ 2329	Calib →	70933	1.752 (4)
		.721 2.218 3.974		
	@ 0243	12/12 Prod released Verif. .709 2.212 3.974		
	@ 0524	12/12 Prod released Verif. .716 2.231 3.96		

Shift 7-1510 # [redacted]
 15-2310 # [redacted]
 23-0710 # [redacted]

Note: - Please ask to see 2/7/84 thru 2/11/84 - Analyser # 3
 Note how the analyser was requalified & brought back on line after a new detector was installed.

Ask to see COI # 411 of 2/19/83

Please note - 3.0 (3.2) and 3.3

Please note - under limit Bedeviation 5.0 (5.1) (5.2) and (5.3)

Note: - Please ask to see 10-16-82 Analyser # 3 10/13/82 thru

I have just come back from 2500 (12th, 14th, 15th) until 10:30 AM. I told of new detector when interfacing in some units. 7.0-7.3

POSTAGE SERVICE
MAY 1 1984
0-28

POSTAGE SERVICE
MAY 1 1984
0-28

POSTAGE SERVICE
MAY 1 1984
0-28

R II / IAC

PO Box 2208

Atlanta, Georgia

30301

MEMORANDUM TO CASE FILE

01001 -

7C

 (x) Telecon | Participants: [redacted] | File: RII-84-A-0029
 () Mtg | | Date: 5/31 & 6/2 84
 () Review | | Time: 5/31 5:15 pm
 Confidentiality Req: Yes 6/2 11:00 am

Algr was called to obtain additional information regarding her concerns. She provided the following:

UNAUTHORIZED USE OF PASSWORDS - ALGR stated that two of her co-workers had used her computer password to release laboratory results. ALGR feels that these two technicians, [redacted] and [redacted] did this to make her look bad and to try to get her fired. These two technicians have also used [redacted] password to make him look bad. She feels they used [redacted] password because a promotion was eminent and they were all competing for it. ALGR explained that the information released by these two technicians was erroneous information and caused the standards to be 'out of control'.

6666

902/903 TRANSACTIONS - ALGR stated that these transactions are to be used by supervisors only. She stated that some of the lab technicians have used these transactions without authorization. She had heard that these technicians had been allowed to use these transactions on weekends but she does not buy this explanation. She said there are other technicians who worked on weekends including herself who were not allowed to use these transactions. She feels the motive for not allowing all technicians to use the transactions was discrimination, because the women were not allowed to use them. [redacted] and herself are the women employees in the lab and they were not allowed to use these transactions.

6

MGT MEETING - On 12/14/83, ALGR met with [redacted] to discuss the unauthorized use of passwords and to provide him documentation of this. He did not accept the documentation but said he would initiate an investigation. The same day she met with [redacted] the Manager of the Lab. [redacted] copied some information from the documentation she provided to him. [redacted] said he would look into her concerns. In mid-January 1984 she received a letter from [redacted] documenting the results of his investigation. ALGR felt the investigation was inadequate. She did not discuss the report with [redacted]. On January 20, 1984 ALGR met with [redacted]. She took a tape recorder to the meeting but he told her to cut it off. Nothing of substance was discussed at this meeting. On January 21 [redacted] called her at home to set up a meeting with himself and Mr. [redacted] the Plant Manager on January 23. ALGR would not attend this meeting because they would not allow her to have a witness or tape recorder. On February 16, ALGR was escorted to [redacted] office by

Information in this record was deleted
 in accordance with the Freedom of Information
 Act, exemptions 6 + 7C

FD-1

87-88

Parton's 6 + 7C

P-9
 [redacted]
 [redacted]

1-16

[REDACTED] a lab supervisor. [REDACTED] gave her a letter requiring her to provide any documentation she had to him by 5:00 Feb 25. She provided him with her documentation on Feb 24. Apparently this information consisted only of her handwritten notes and not copies of lab records. He asked her where the documentation was. She told him the information was part of the lab records and could be obtained.

MICROWAVE LEAKING - On March 7, 1984, ALGR noticed the microwave oven used in the labs to prepare sample appeared to be leaking fumes. She noticed the window was fogging and saw crystallization which had formed around the vent. She said she had a headache and believed it was caused from the Nitrous Oxide leading from the oven. She brought this to the attention of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. ALGR took a piece of paper and checked the seal around the door. She found that the bottom of the door and both ends of the top of the door to be loose. The door seemed loose and out of alignment. She said there is a warning label inside the door that says not to use the oven if the door is loose.

[REDACTED] said he would take care of it. ALGR said [REDACTED] then came into the lab and wiped off cloudiness around the door seal. She said he was deliberately destroying evidence which showed the door was leaking. ALGR said different individuals worked on the oven all day. A maintenance man came but he didn't know anything about the oven. Another man came and used a smoke pencil to see if the door was drawing air in. ALGR went home at 3:00 pm that day.

DISCIPLINARY ACTION - On March 15 (ALGR was home) [REDACTED] called her about 3 hours before she was to report to work. He told her not to report to work that night but to report on March 16 at 8:00 am, and to meet him in the lobby of the machine shop. On March 16 she met [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and they took her to [REDACTED] office. They told her that disciplinary action was being taken for her knowingly contaminating a table in the lab and refusing to clean it up. They gave her a disciplinary action letter which stated that she had removed a survey instrument from an area unauthorized, had contaminated a table, and distracted other employees. She was given 5 days off without pay and was placed on 1 year probation, and was removed from her current assignment. The 5 days off without pay was waived. She was then escorted to get a bioassay and to turn in her security badge. They told her she would not be allowed to reenter the FMOX building (where fuel is manufactured) but would be escorted by a guard to pick up her personal belongings, which she refused to do. She was told to report to work on March 19 and she would be given a new job. A guard then escorted her off the plant site.

ALGR explained that on March 7 she had cleaned a table in the lab except for the legs of the table. She said she always had to clean the table for others and she got sick of having to do it. She said she put red caution tape around the table legs and told [REDACTED] that she was refusing to clean it up. She also explained that during the morning of March 7 a radiation safety auditor came to the lab. She asked him to check her work area and he found it to be clean. This was the area around the balance where she was working. 6

ALGR reported to work on Monday March 19 and was met by [REDACTED] who was to be her new supervisor. She explained that she is now working in plant stores (supply) doing menial tasks. 6

DISCUSSIONS WITH GE REPRESENTATIVES - An auditor from GE San Jose, [REDACTED] came to GE to followup on ALGR's concerns. She was introduced to him on March 19, 1984. On March 20, she met with him and discussed her concerns. She explained to him that she had first provided her concerns to [REDACTED] in December 1983. [REDACTED] told her that he would be following up on her concerns. On March 22, ALGR wrote a letter to [REDACTED] and stated in the letter that she would be willing to talk to [REDACTED] if a representative of the NRC were present. On March 22 [REDACTED] wrote her a letter back denying her request and instructed her to talk to [REDACTED]. The letter said that she may take her concerns to the NRC if she wanted to and referenced her to the form on the bulletin board which explains employees rights to contact the NRC. During the week of March 19 she also met with a [REDACTED] from San Jose and [REDACTED] from GE WMD. [REDACTED] seemed to be only interested in the problems with the microwave. She also met again with [REDACTED] on March 27, 28, and 29. The meeting on the 29th was conducted offsite. During this meeting [REDACTED] told her that he had substantiated some of her allegations. He told her that she was to be commended and said she should appeal the charges against her. He told her that the men at the plant make a lot of money and could probably get more witnesses than she could. She thinks these comments were to get her to appeal the charges locally and not go to court. She also said he may have been planting seeds just to see what she was planning to do. On March 30, ALGR talked to [REDACTED] Mgr., Employee & Community Relations regarding the charges against her. She requested that he talk to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] about the incident. 6

FALSIFICATION OF LAB DATA - ALGR then began discussing how standards data is changed and parameters increased which results in erroneous lab sample results. It was decided that this discussion should be delayed until an inspector knowledgeable in this area was able to participate in the discussion. The possibility of a meeting was discussed. She stated that herself, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] wanted to have a meeting with the NRC. 6
It was suggested that she contact these two individuals and have

them call us to see about setting up a meeting. She said that these two lab technicians have information to show that the parameters have been falsified.

These telephone conversations were tape recorded by the ALGR. She was requested to provide the NRC with a copy of the recordings, which she agreed to do.

Prepared by: J. *JK* Lanford / B. Uryc

Date: 06/02/84

05.31.89

5:20 pm

[Redacted]

7C.

Very anxious to get some help from NRC.
BATES encouraged \$ to go to NRC.

1980

sex discr
suit

would not

give rows of
her lawyer he
she said her
lawyer told
her not to give
out his name.

On 12/14/83, \$ had appointment w/ [Redacted] to discuss
the use of her password - 2 coworkers used her
password to put in the computer -
tampering w/ analyzer and her work

these 2 workers

were in sympathy w/ management

\$ showed documentation to [Redacted] to
substantiate.

these individuals also used password of

[Redacted]
to put in false information into computer
and alter the results of his work which had to do
with the standard. They put in a wrong standard
which caused the analyzer to go out of control.
\$ thinks they were using [Redacted] password
because a job promotion was coming up and they
may have wanted promotion.

Any change made in the LMS system (Chemet Co
has to be made by a supervisor. A 902/903 transaction
was made to [Redacted] data. \$ believes [Redacted] did it.
[Redacted] was not even on the job site. [Redacted] was
working - change made in [Redacted] area and it was
found by [Redacted] (a Level 9 tech,
a supervisor). \$ believes this matter has been
ignored.

Supervisors permitted techs to use their password.
The alleged reason because of weekend shift.
Two shifts on weekend shifts used supervisor's
passwords, but 2 shifts could not use the super-
visors password. 1-\$ the other was [Redacted].
\$ says motive was discrimination - two old women
\$ + [Redacted] and [Redacted]. Both
and now employed in lab. Patricia - E-6

Information in this record was deleted
in accordance with the Freedom of Information
Act, exemptions 6 & 7C

FOIA 87-88

1-15

1/24/89

P-10

Chemist Lab.

\$ presented info to [redacted]. \$ said [redacted] did not want to accept \$ documentation and said he would initiate investigation. [redacted] never touched, looked, or accepted the documents. [redacted] is #2 at plant. \$ told [redacted] that she had mtg w/ [redacted] re the say thing.

\$ met w/ [redacted] w saw paperwork and asked if it was Company documents. \$ had copies of info where [redacted] made changes. W asked where the log (actual) was and she said it was in lab. \$ made hand copied facsimile of the log. W copied info from docs \$ had. W copied #s from \$ docs. \$ explained everything and W said he would look into it.

\$ received a letter ± mid January 84, explaining W actions. \$ felt investigation was inadequate and a cover up.

\$ had several mtgs to discuss letters but they were cancelled. \$ told W she was not satisfied and why not satisfied - \$ did not tell W he did not cover issue - i.e. she felt it was useless.

and that cost was too costly - personal grief/har.

\$ had not heard anything from [redacted] so \$ wanted to go see plant manager. [redacted] could never get an appointment to see him.

Jan 20 - [redacted] meets w/ [redacted]

On Jan 21, 84 \$ receives call from [redacted] and that he wanted to meet w/ [redacted] on Monday Jan 23 at 10: \$ asked if she could have a tape recorder or witness and [redacted] said no. \$ did not go.

\$ had a mtg scheduled for Jan 20 at 7:30 am - \$ had recorder - recorded first part of 45 min mtg then [redacted] asked her to turn off recorder which she did. During the 45 min - confrontation re. tape/witne

6:25 pm
\$ advises that she is taping call. when we asked her.

Another mtg

Feb 12-17, 84 \$ on midnight shift. On Feb 16, 84 at 6:30 am, [redacted] called [redacted] to escort \$ to [redacted] office. \$ asked [redacted] what its about, [redacted] did not know what it was about.

\$ arrived [redacted] office at ± 7:00 am. [redacted] wanted to talk, \$ wanted a witness - [redacted] highly agitated. [redacted] finally agrees to have [redacted] as witness. [redacted] highly agitated - "flailing his arms" (Re not wanting a witness - \$ feels it was due to harassment that was going on.

(\$ feels tampering w/ equipment was sabotage)

[redacted] told \$ to bring every document, pounding on desk, and handed her letter ordering her to turn in documents. \$ asked [redacted] what he found in his investigation and [redacted] said he found nothing wrong. [redacted] told her to bring in all documents to prove her claims by Feb 24, at 5:30 pm for all documents. mtg ended.

Both \$ and [redacted] commented that they had never seen [redacted] so excited. (\$ "frightened to death") [redacted] told \$ to be careful about what she gives them.

\$ delivered report/documents on FEB 24, 84 at ± 2:45 pm to [redacted]. [redacted] quickly thumbed through pages and screamed where the documentation - \$ gave [redacted] copy of Stmt. \$ found out [redacted] flew to San Jose the very weekend - \$ thinks [redacted] took package to

[redacted] wanted to write a letter (

filed EEOC report in Raleigh, NC in 1980/1981

DOL " [redacted] filed 6 grievance re falsification of info.

In March 84, ^{at} 03/07/84 \$ put some trays in microwave and noticed some fumes, took trays and put them under hood. \$ noticed microwave was clouding up on door window. This had been happening for several days prior to 03/07. Everyday she noticed fumes. Got a headache from uranium gases (nitrous oxide) from hot crucibles w/ boiling Sulfuric acid.

\$ took this to the attention of [redacted] and to [redacted] Level 9 tech. \$ wanted them to see formation of clouding around door. This indicated gas leaking from door. \$ found bottom not tight. Top sides of door loose also. Door was out of alignment. They both confirmed it. Door warning label says do not use if latch or door loose. Breathing of hot uranium fumes is very dangerous. [redacted] said he would get it fixed. On 3/8, not fixed \$ told [redacted] that she would not use microwave. [redacted] said microwave should be tagged out and he went to see someone.

[redacted] walks in and wipes off cloudy dust from microwave with his bare fingers. [redacted] then tries to convince [redacted] to check it out. [redacted] does not know anything about microwave. A man came in (a black man) with a smoke device to check the door.

Later [redacted] come in and supposedly [redacted] told them to take it out. At 3:00 pm \$ leaves - does not know if it was repaired.

\$ cleaned area, but did not clean legs of table. \$ put red caution tape on the legs and [redacted] that she was refusing to clean up because of the previous day (lasted for months).

N/A

On 03/15/84, [redacted] calls \$ and told her not to come in. He didn't say why. He told her to come in on 03/16/84 at 8:00am to meet him in the lobby of machine bldg.

\$ met [redacted] (shop rep for compo) and he told \$ that she had deliberately contaminated a table in her work area and that she refused to clean it up. Moves to [redacted] office and [redacted] tells \$ that she was being charged with contaminating an area and he asked if it was true. \$ denied it. SH & TH are writing and asking her about the matter of the contaminated which occurred on (March 7) SH gave her a letter dated 3/15 - citing charges and disciplinary action. 12 months probation - reprimand

She doesn't
what date.

On 3/7/84, \$ had microwave problem - \$ working w/samples sees auditor and calls him over auditor from rad safety came in and does spot check at request of \$ - auditor checked area where she was working and found it to be clean.

TERM
8:00pm

MEMORANDUM TO CASE FILE

TYPE ACTION <input type="checkbox"/> RECORD OF CONVERSATION <input type="checkbox"/> CASE REVIEW / STATUS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OTHER	PARTICIPANTS	FILE NO. RII-84-A-0029
		DATE 06/22/84
	CONFIDENTIALITY REQUESTED (YES) NO	TIME

SUMMARY

The attached documents were received from the ALGR in this case on 06/22/84.
 The following were received:

1. Disciplinary action letter
2. Handwritten memo to [] from ALGR - Requesting NRC representation at mtg
3. Memo from [] to ALGR - Denying request for NRC representative during discussions with GE auditor
4. Memo from [] to ALGR - Instructing ALGR to provide allegations to GE mgt
5. Memo from [] to ALGR - Results of GE review of allegations
6. Handwritten memo from [] to []
7. GE Memo re: Personal Surveys
8. Rerun log
9. Handwritten letter from ALGR requesting hearing with Appeals Procedure Report Form
10. Memo from [] to ALGR - Granting hearing
11. Memo from [] to ALGR - Hearing conclusions
12. Memo from ALGR to [] - Submittal of allegations
13. GE Newsletter

Package 4

PAGE 1 OF 1

PREPARED BY J Lankford	DATE 06/22/84
---------------------------	------------------

ACTION REQUIRED

Information in this record was deleted
 in accordance with the Freedom of Information
 Act, exemptions b6 + 7C
 FOIA- 87-88

REVIEWED BY <i>Patricia E. 6 + 7C</i>	DATE
--	------

GENERAL ELECTRIC

DIAL COMM# 5781

DATE# March 15, 1984

COPIES#

DEPT# WMD-QA-Fuel Quality

ADDRESS# M/C K-10

SUBJECT# DISCIPLINARY ACTION

 7C
Chemet Test Operator - A

It has been brought to my attention that your recent conduct has been in serious violation of WMD radiological health and industrial safety rules and conduct standards. Your actions have included; 1) the unauthorized removal of the personal survey instrument from the entrance to the laboratory, 2) the deliberate contamination of a table, 3) failure to clean-up the contamination knowing it existed, 4) the continued distraction of other laboratory employees and 5) disruption of normal laboratory activities. *Two charges that management did not want to talk about; Why?*

Radiological surveys are the responsibility of the Radiation Safety organization which is trained and equipped for these evaluations. The deliberate contamination and failure to clean-up promptly is detrimental to the safety of you and your fellow workers in the laboratory. In addition, this sort of conduct is a serious violation of plant rules and standards; disciplinary action is in order.

Violation of work and conduct standards such as that which you have committed as described herein is considered to be a serious offense of a magnitude that a mere warning is not sufficient. Willful, deliberate disregard of specific standards set in the interest of both employee and employer and of which the employer has the right to expect compliance from the employee will not be tolerated. Disciplinary action for this offense will be five days of disciplinary time off without pay and a period of 12 months probation, during which time any additional violation serious enough to warrant disciplinary action will result in discharge. In this case, actual time off without pay is being waived. However, it is to be understood by all parties involved that this notice, even without disciplinary time off, will still carry the significance that would make discharge appropriate should a second offense of this magnitude occur within the next 12 months.


As a GE employee, you are expected to conduct yourself, while on Company premises, in accordance with acceptable industrial behavior and in such a way that your acts, behavior or work habits are not disruptive with respect to the work of other employees nor infringe upon the rights of any employee.

March 15, 1984

In light of these recent incidents, you are being removed from your current assignment. Your unprecedented disregard of safety rules demand that you will no longer be allowed to work in a controlled area. Effective 03/16/84, you will be temporarily assigned to other work.

During this temporary assignment, you will continue to be paid at your current hourly rate (H-22) and will normally work on Day Shift, Monday through Friday. The duration of this temporary assignment is indefinite. If you should choose not to accept this assignment, this act will be considered your voluntary resignation and paperwork will be processed accordingly.

In the future, you are instructed not to attempt to re-enter the FMO complex unless escorted by a member of management.



Fuel Quality

rwd

Dear [redacted]

Copy written 3/22/84
@ 06Am

I will be willing to talk to [redacted] if an NRC Representative is the only person present during the discussion. I request this arrangement because I trust that an NRC representative will be impartial since I can no longer trust laboratory to be fair in their treatment of me. I have received nothing from them but repression and disrespect and can count on them to "water down" or nullify anything I reveal to [redacted]

Sincerely

[redacted] 7

GENERAL  ELECTRIC

DIAL COMM#

8*292-5747

DATE#

March 22, 1984

COPIES#

DEPT#

WILMINGTON MANUFACTURING DEPARTMENT

ADDRESS#

M/C J-02

SUBJECT#

Ref. Your memo of 3/22/84 to me

() ✓
Your request to have an NRC representative present during interview discussions with [redacted] is denied. As I have told you, [redacted] is leading a team investigation of your allegations of violation of practices and procedures in the Chemet Laboratory. [redacted] is an independent auditor and expert in management of both chemical and metallurgical facilities.

As a GE employee you are expected to participate fully in this investigation and you are required to discuss your allegations with [redacted] during his review next week.

Should you decide to independently notify the NRC of your concerns, you have the right to do so. If you have any questions as to how you can go about this, please review NRC Form 3, Notice to Employees, posted on official bulletin boards throughout the facility.

[redacted] Manager
Quality Assurance

GENERAL  ELECTRIC

STRICTLY PRIVATE

DIAL COMM# 8*292-5747

DATE# February 15, 1984

COPIES#

DEPT# WILMINGTON MANUFACTURING DEPARTMENT

ADDRESS# M/C J-02

SUBJECT# ALLEGATION OF VIOLATIONS TO COMPANY PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES

17 ✓
Chemet Laboratory
M/C H-92

You recently indicated having knowledge and proof of co-workers and supervisory personnel violating established work practices and procedures within the Chemet Laboratory. On January 20, 1984 you stated you would be taking your information to authority other than General Electric. Moreover, you have specifically refused to share this information with me as the responsible management representative of the Company.


only because he would not allow me to use a recorder/ to have a mt with me.

You, as an employee of the General Electric Company, have a responsibility to fully apprise management of any such problems of which you become aware. You are expected to comply with that obligation. Therefore, you are hereby directed to discuss with me, in full detail, your concerns relative to Laboratory and Company practices and procedures by 5:00 P.M., Friday, February 24, 1984. This meeting is to be held in my office and all evidence that you have supporting your allegations must be presented.

there was no way to give him all evidence if I could not have had permission to get from under lock & key.

Failure to comply with this instruction will be considered insubordination and will result in severe disciplinary action, up to and including discharge.

I wonder if this is why I am removed from the lab!


Manager
Quality Assurance

TO

DATE

8/9/83

CC

SUBJECT

Following of lab procedures.

1. CM+S Method 5.2.9.5 SCP#401 section 5.0 states "Worksheets are to be completely filled out showing pertinent data. This is not being done. We stopped filling out data on worksheet for isotopes and attached printout tapes to worksheets, however, we no longer keep printout tapes on all our worksheets (see example #1 & #2). See CM+S Method 5.2.9.5 SCP#400 section 4.0 also.
2. CM+S Method 5.2.9.5 SCP#400 section 22.0 states "For GULG isotopic separations, review final results against COI #403 and report as applicable." Where is a copy of COI #403? (see example #3)
3. COI #003 ("Chemical Laboratories Berum Outlier Criteria") is not being followed. The Berum log is not being filled out for samples that we return, which includes isotopes, to the best of my knowledge. We may need to review this COI to define exactly what analysis we want it to cover. We either need to follow it, or, eliminate it. (see example #4)

GENERAL  ELECTRIC

DIAL COMM: 8*292-5461

DATE: February 24, 1984

COPIES: CL-84-133

Handwritten notes: "Rec'd from [unclear] file" and "file" with arrows pointing to the top right corner.

DEPT: WILMINGTON MANUFACTURING DEPARTMENT

ADDR: Mail Code H-92, Wilmington, NC

SUBJECT: PERSONAL SURVEYS

TO: All Chemet Lab Personnel
Mail Code H-92

Recently, two individuals were observed exiting from the Chemet Lab control area without properly surveying. This incident resulted in a level 9 violation citation being issued to the Company by the NRC.

Our compliance to radiation safety regulations must be improved by strict adherence from all personnel. Due to the semi-controlled nature of the Lab and unrestricted entry, your assistance in enforcing the survey requirements is needed. For anyone observed exiting without properly surveying, you should call their attention to the survey requirements and, if they fail to survey properly, notify your supervisor of the occurrence.

Survey instructions, as well as disciplinary guidelines which will be enforced, are posted on the bulletin board at the survey station.

[unclear], Manager
Chemet Laboratories, H-92

[unclear]

4/13/84

[]

[]
[]
[]

Could you arrange an appointment with
for a hearing into the presence
of [] (also was included

I send the attached - other and Appeals Report
form to be given to [] It is in the presence
of these people, named above. do I want them to
hear my statements

I would like to make a request for permission
also to bring my tape recorder - knowing how
statements can be distorted as taken out of context I
do not mind if they do like me.

I will wait graciously for how long it
takes to make this possible. Thank you kindly

Sincerely

() 7c

This paperwork
is from
Plant Managers

6/2/84

APPEALS PROCEDURE REPORT FORM

WILMINGTON PLANT

() 7C
Employee's Name

Section Level
Step of Procedure

Statement of Grievance and Date

As noted in the attached letter, I have been accused of and disciplined for violating several (5) VMD Radiological health and industrial safety rules and conduct standards. I categorically deny these accusations and request that facts pertaining to these accusations on which management based their decision to discipline me be discussed with me. I maintain that my comments on such information will show that the disciplinary action taken was not appropriate when all facts are considered.

4/12/84 7C

Answer and Date

Additional Information (If needed)

I do not know my accusers and representative of Employee and Community Representative (ECCR) refused to give me any information but openly accused me of deliberately contaminating an area! All I can say is these people have trumped up charges to be vindicated ^{in the} from making waves - and also, that they may cover their tracks!

Immediate Manager Replying To Appeal

GENERAL  ELECTRIC

DIAL COMM# 8*292-5666 DATE# April 25, 1984 COPIES#




DEPT# WILMINGTON MANUFACTURING DEPARTMENT

ADDRESS# M/C J20, Wilmington, N. C.

SUBJECT# APPEALS PROCEDURE REPORT FORM

M/C J12 


I have received a copy of your letter dated April 13, 1984, and the accompanying appeals procedure report form by which you have requested a hearing to review the discipline you recently received. I would like to proceed in the following manner:


Your appeal will be considered and ultimately judged by me, and . You should bring with you any and all documents or other evidence which you feel support your point of view. To the extent  and  can offer testimony which would help us in evaluating your position, they may be invited in for the purposes of responding to our questions and then withdraw. Because of my desire to conduct this meeting in an open and informal setting, I will not allow the use of any tape recorders.

Please call my secretary at your earliest convenience to set up an appointment for all of us to meet and discuss your appeal.

Very truly yours,





This was controlled completely by 

Rec'd
5/17/84

GENERAL ELECTRIC

DIAL COMM. 5*292-5666 DATE: May 15, 1984 COPIES:

DEPT. WILMINGTON MANUFACTURING DEPARTMENT

ADDRESS: M/C J20, Wilmington, N. C.

SUBJECT: APPEAL

(17 ✓

This is to document the conclusions of the final step of your appeal conducted by me on May 1, 1984, with [redacted] and [redacted] in attendance. In order to insure full and complete information, we invited [redacted] and [redacted] individually for a part of the meeting.

I indicated to you that we would concentrate our review on the three principal elements of your appeal: (1) the unauthorized removal of the personal survey instrument from the entrance to the laboratory, (2) the deliberate contamination of a table, and (3) the intentional failure to clean up the contamination knowing that it existed. With respect to item (1) above, I am setting aside this infraction since the removal of the personal survey instrument may have actually been authorized by [redacted]. As for items (2) and (3), we have determined that, while the contamination of your lab table may or may not have been deliberate, you knowingly and intentionally failed to clean up this spill of radioactive material. Your knowledge of the contamination coupled with your decision not to clean it up constitutes a very serious and significant violation of the Wilmington plant's health and safety standards and procedures.

Based on the foregoing, you will not be allowed to return to work in the controlled access areas of our plant site, or to any position that would require your involvement with, or access to, nuclear material. Your probation period will be reduced from one year to six months.

Your current placement in a temporary assignment will be continued for a period of up to ninety (90) days from May 1, 1984 at the same pay rate as the job that you left in the laboratory. Shift differential payments are applicable only as they might be earned by working other than day shift. During this ninety (90) day period, Employee & Community Relations will review open

May 15, 1984

positions for you meet minimum requirements and offer you placement according to established practices and procedures. Hopefully, by July 30, 1984, you will have found permanent, suitable work through the use of the job posting system and assistance from Employee & Community Relations. If you desire, you may contact Rita Merritt, Employment Administrator, for details of our placement routines and for a precise definition of "suitable work." If you have not secured permanent placement by July 30, 1984, you will be considered as involuntarily placed on lack of suitable work as defined in our personnel practices.

I deeply regret that this action is necessary. I hope that subsequent placement opportunities occur and that your new job will be fulfilling.

Best regards,

6/18/84

This is the reply after the "Kanyaroo Court" 5/1/84. Notice that #4 and #5 changes are not mentioned at all. [] occurred me of "pleading" him in the past and I agreed with him. For it was about falsifying, harassment etc. All. I request that if you could verify that there was no contamination on the day shift for Mar 5, 6, 7, 8, 1984 I would appreciate it so very much! In fact, I would get my job back! Somewhere there must be a HCG kept as some kind of records kept in Rad Saffy in FMC Bldg. That can give such evidence, also the person's name, who monitored the lab on one of those days. (Wed. 7th the day my table was monitored by Rad Saffy) I do know that they have an office + partial lab for their own testing on second floor of FMC Bldg. All I can say, that Rad Saffy checked my area and said it was fine. No time on my ^{because of} shift was the lab shut down for "clean up" after contamination! Please if you can help me I would be indebted to you all. I need my job! - Thank you

February 24, 1984

To: { Mgr., Quality Assurance
General Electric

Re: Allegations of Violations to Company Practices and
Procedures

Dear { ;

In reference to your February 15th letter to me concerning the above subject, I have enclosed a copy of my "Allegations of Violations to Company Practices and Procedures in Chemet Laboratory."

In it, I refer to dated documents available in the Chemet Lab for your inspection. They confirm the violations I have listed. You will note that, over a period of a year, I have brought these violations to the attention of my supervisors to no avail.

In our December 14th meeting, you said you would investigate my verbal allegations of falsification of records. When I questioned you on the outcome of your investigation, you stated that you found nothing. Had you personally followed up on these allegations, you would have found them to be valid, just as I stated them.

Since I am a concerned employee of General Electric and, up to this point, have been unable to get any recognition or resolution of this problem, I hereby present to you my allegations of violations in written form.

I sincerely hope that your investigation of these allegations will eventually insure that the Chemet Lab's practices and procedures will be above repute which, in turn, will enable the lab technicians to regain their sense of self esteem.

Yours truly, 7c

ALLEGATIONS OF VIOLATIONS TO
COMPANY PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES
IN CHEMET LABORATORY

by

([REDACTED])

70

February 21, 1984

I. Chemet Lab Isotopic Data Is Inaccurate.

A. Analyzers are not properly calibrated following detector change.

1. On 8/20/82, analyzer #4 was not recalibrated after detector change.

a. Detector was changed on 8/19/82 at 1000.

b. Six (6) calibrations were to be run starting at 1000 on 8/20/82, following a 24-hour burn-off.

c. According to the calibration/verification log, only four (4) calibrations were run; the first at 1121, the second at 1558, the third at 2145, and the fourth at 2328 on 8/20/82.

d. When I reported to work at 0700 on Sat., 8/21/82, I noticed that two (2) sets of samples had been released at 0243 and 0524 on 8/21/82. In checking log, I found calibrations had not been completed. (

a level 9 technician, verified tape and enrichment log and stated analyzer wasn't qualified for release of samples. At his suggestion, I telephoned () and his response was "Tag out the analyzer - it was to be tagged out for the weekend." () tagged it out at 0900. The analyzer remained tagged out on Sun., 8/22/82 with no activity shown on this date.

e. When I returned to work on Mon. morning, 8/23/82, () my supervisor, approached me and said "The analyzer is all right. () just didn't know what we were doing."

f. Shortly thereafter, I noticed the tag had been removed from the analyzer - a violation of procedure - and I brought this to () attention (a level 9 technician). After verifying that calibrations for minimum U count had not been completed, he re-tagged analyzer at 1030 and noted on tag "Needs new slope and intercept data. Not to be used for production." (See p. 4, IIA1 for further details on this incident.)

g. Our station control plan chart (Table for SCP-401), issued 3/20/82 by () lists new minimum U count established on 8/21/82 by () But, on calibration/verification logs, no calibrations were run on dates 8/21, 8/22, and 8/23.

-2-

h. () approached me at approximately 1300 that same day in my area and said () tells me you're worried about the standards. I wouldn't worry if I were you. I would forget about the standards. It would do you well to forget the standards! and then abruptly left me. Shortly afterwards, () told me that () a supervisor, approached him and told him "Don't get mixed up in this - it would be better that you stay out of it."

6
6
6

2. On 6/22/83, a new detector was installed in analyzer #3 and no calibrations were run.

- a. Detector was installed at 1300 on 6/22/83 and the 24-hour burn-off was started.
- b. At end of the 24-hour period, no calibration standards were run.
- c. Calibration standards were first run at 0125 on 6/24/83. After only two (2) calibration standards and one (1) verification standard, samples were run and material released at 0640 on 6/24/83.

B. Results from isotopics are accessible in computer and can be altered.

1. 902/903 transactions allow for changing of data.
2. All lab personnel were told in round-table meetings that 902/903 transactions could be performed only by supervisors.
3. 902/903 transactions were carried out by certain technicians and not by supervisors only, as prescribed by procedure.
 - a. Many 902/903 transactions occurred on weekends when no supervisors were present.
 - (1.) For instance, on weekend of 1/15-16, 1983, 902/903 transactions were used seven (7) times by () and () (technicians' clock numbers).
4. Use of 902/903 transactions are condoned by supervisors.
 - a. Supervisors must give password for these transactions to be carried out.

- b. Supervisors randomly gave out and condoned use of these transactions admittedly on 12/30/83 at 2121.
5. Abuse of 902/903 transaction, when brought to the attention of middle and upper management, was ignored.

a. In early January, 1983, I brought a weekend 902/903 transaction to the attention of my supervisor, () who said, "You can't prove it." I told him there was a printer in the lab that carried this data to prove use of 902/903's. That afternoon, I checked this printer and found it had been turned off and paperwork, representing two or three months' work, was removed. No action was ever taken by () to correct the misuse of the 902/903's. 6

b. On December 14, 1983, I met with () at 0800 and with () at 0900 to present them with paperwork showing the possibility of misuse of passwords. () refused to look at the paperwork and said he would investigate the problem. () looked at the paperwork and copied some of the data from it. We discussed my doubts about the indiscriminate use of the 902/903's. On 1/12/84, () set up a meeting with me at 0200. We discussed changes in the use of the 902/903 transactions and passwords and, on 1/19/84, he sent me a letter stating the corrective action he was going to take per our 1/12/84 meeting. (See contents of letter and note that he just took a good run around Robin Hood's barn and then left the barn door wide open!)

C. Supervisors input data under technician's password and create false data.

1. On 12/17/82, () inputted data under my password and released false data. 6

a. () called to ask about pellet-handling procedure because he had wrong data from the lab. 6

b. Wrong data carried my clock number, but I had not released any results into LMCS system that day!

- c. Investigation showed that [redacted] had released this data using my password.
2. On 4/22/93, [redacted] used [redacted] password and shut down the LMCS system by inputting false data.
 - a. In presence of [redacted] (GAD inspector) and me, [redacted] stated that [redacted] had put wrong standards in LMCS using her password which resulted in shutting down the system.

II. Lab Supervision Is Aware of and Condone Inaccurate Procedures.

A. Supervisors were informed of data problems.

1. In direct defiance of [redacted] order on Sat., 8/21/82 that analyzer #4 be tagged out, [redacted] on Mon. morning, 8/23/82, condoned use of the analyzer when he implied in a statement to me "The analyzer is all right. [redacted] just doesn't know what we are doing." At that point, I returned to the isotopic lab and, to my surprise, found that the tag which [redacted] had ordered to be put on analyzer #4 had been removed! I was getting ready to re-calibrate the analyzer when [redacted] appeared with a paper in his hand. I asked if he was planning to put in the minimum U counts and he answered "Yes." At my request, he verified my findings that calibrations had not been done and thus minimum U counts could not be entered. I asked him that if he had put the minimum U counts in, what would he be doing? His answer was "I would be falsifying." I then asked "What are you going to do with those counts?" He answered "I'm going to take them back to [redacted]" At that point, he re-tagged the analyzer.

B. Measurement control engineer, [redacted] allowed wrong calibration data into 9825 software.

1. On 8/23/82, [redacted] put minimum U count data into 9825 software for analyzer #4 while log sheet revealed that analyzer was down and tagged out for that date.
2. False minimum U count data was obtained from [redacted] although no log record existed to support the fact that any calibrations had been run.

C. Supervisors condone use of non-standardized analyzers.

1. On 6/24/83, () was upset because he was aware of a new detector having been installed in analyzer #3 on 6/22/83 and asked () if the analyzer was O. K. () assured him that "everything is fine - it's all yours."
2. () ran two (2) calibrations and one (1) verification followed by two (2) G218 samples at 0640.
3. I was not informed that this analyzer had not been calibrated and proceeded to put samples on at 0999 and 1204. The verification standard failed at 1446. It was only the following day that I found that I had run and released samples on an unqualified analyzer
4. Calibration was done at 1546 and minimum U counts were calculated with only two (2) standards and one (1) verification standard with supervisor's knowledge and consent. Procedure called for six (6) or more calibration standards to be run.


III. Supervisors Have Ignored Safety Hazards In Lab

A. Microwave oven leaked radiation through vent.

1. Lead shield within microwave was removed at () order to prevent clogging of vacuum duct.
 - a. On 4/27/82, while cleaning our microwave, I noticed no lead shield screen over vent to duct within the microwave.
 - b. Microwaves were leaking into lab which affected Metler balance six (6) feet from oven and this was brought to () attention who then reported this fact to () on 5/4/82.
 - c. Shield was replaced after it was called to () attention.
2. Door on microwave was shown to be leaking.
 - a. Technicians complained of uranyl nitrate fumes leaking into lab while microwave was in use in April, 1982.
 - b. This was brought to () attention

and he was shown crystallization at the bottom of door on two (2) occasions.

- c. I checked microwave on 7/1/82 for safety inspection seal and found no seal of approval.
 - d. On 7/2/82, I checked microwave for leaking door with a clothes monitor and found leaks.
 - e. On 7/14/82, a professional inspected the microwave, found three (3) leaks, and suggested that the oven be tagged out. It was tagged out by supervisor.
 - f. () immediately ordered the tag removed and the oven was put back into use with no repairs being made at that time.
- B. Uranium-enriched powder was being dumped in areas other than those located under hoods provided in the lab for that purpose (in ISO area and GAD area).
1. From June, 1980 until May, 1982, U₂₃₅ powder was dumped in plastic containers in areas other than under hoods with supervisors' consent. I repeatedly brought this to the attention of the supervisor and Rad Safety. I also mentioned safety hazard to (). Supervisors ignored the safety hazard prior to May, 1982.
- C. Supervision ignored safety hazard of lever on high-temperature oven.
1. Location of lever as safety hazard was brought to the attention of the supervisors on several occasions following minor "bumpings" of heads on lever.
 2. On April 23, 1983 at 1450. I suffered a concussion after having hit my head on the oven handle which projected out from the front of oven.
 3. Following my concussion, management padded the handle and labelled it a safety hazard.
 4. Supervisor, () told H18 operators to accept into the lab contaminated paperwork with samples from a "controlled" area, after the H18 operators complained to him about this hazard.
 5. Chewing gum, eating candy, not wearing safety shoes by some of lab personnel and not monitoring themselves (including supervisors) takes place on a daily basis, seemingly overlooked or ignored.
 6. Uranyl liquid spills on counters, carts, etc., often and this is ignored by supervisors.




NEWS NOTES



Volume 17, Number 7

February 16, 1984

Posters illustrate safe acts



WORKING safely is Sam Horne (l), photo of Sam to be used on their group's "Let's Be Careful Out There" election in Site Maintenance. J. C.

Improved relations object of HR month

"Open Hearts - Open Doors" is the theme of this year's Human Relations Month, and the thrust of the inter-faith service which will be held this Sunday, February 19, 3:30 pm, at the First Baptist Church, Fifth & Campbell Streets. The Outstanding Citizen Award will be presented at the service.

Additional events which may be of interest are the display of Human Relations Contest entries at Independence Mall from February 22 to 24; a banquet at which Congressman Charlie Rose will speak, and a reception at Saint John's Art Gallery. The banquet will be at the Hilton Inn on February 24, beginning at 5:00 pm; admission is \$10. The reception is open to the public and

Real People



MEET.....
Glenn Barfield, material control operator in FMO. A family man, Glenn joined GE in December, 1978 as a UO in Fuel Manufacturing. He participates in basketball and tennis.

all around our site, each carrying the photos of all people in that group at work, and some carrying additional personalized slogans and pledges. Take a look around as you go thru the day. If you see an unsafe condition or act, report it to your supervisor. We all have a stake in safety.

Well advertised - but if reported in (benet) lab - one met a vindictive Supervisor or Manager!

on February 25.

For additional information on these and other events, contact the Chamber of Commerce, 762-2611, or the New Hanover Human Relations Commission, 341-7171.

UPMP updates to highlight National Engineers Week Feb. 19-25

Around the world, GE engineers are working to ensure our company will be able to compete in the global marketplace. To exceed world wide competition, GE engineers are developing and implementing new ideas to improve technology and product quality.

At GE-Wilmington, the engineer has played a vital part in the success of our operation. The channel heat treat process, barrier tubing and the serial number reader are all examples of ideas developed and implemented by GE know-how.

Another such project is the Uranium Process Management Project (UPMP). A \$25 million project, UPMP

has generated a lot of plant wide employee interest. Many employees are eager to learn more about the project and the affects it will have on our operation.

Therefore, as a means to kickoff National Engineers Week (Feb. 19-25) a series of roundtable meetings have been scheduled to give employees the opportunity to learn more about UPMP. Merv Faris, manager of Major Projects, has volunteered his time to explain the project, up-date construction progress and address any questions regarding the project.

Ask your supervisor if your shift or unit is participating in these scheduled meetings.



RECEIVED
JUN 21 1994
A.M.
NATIONAL
QUALITY CENTER
ATLANTA, GA 30303

1st
2nd
Return

RII/USA

PO Box 2103

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

SPECIAL
DELIVERY

CERTIFIED

0 511 777 179

MEMORANDUM TO CASE FILE

TYPE ACTION () RECORD OF CONVERSATION () CASE REVIEW / STATUS (x) OTHER	PARTICIPANTS DO NOT DISCLOSE Contains Identity Confidential Source	FILE NO. RII-84-A-0029
	CONFIDENTIALITY REQUESTED (YES) NO	DATE 08/13/84
		TIME

SUMMARY

A package was received in the mail today from [redacted] 7C The package contained:

- (1) Copies of laboratory documentation:
 - 4 pages from Rerun Log with entries during October/November 1983
 - 6 Chemet Laboratories Sample Reports

(2) Pictures of Laboratory

(3) Travel Voucher

Package 3

PREPARED BY J Linkford	DATE 8/13/84
---------------------------	-----------------

ACTION REQUIRED

~~DO NOT DISCLOSE~~
~~Contains Identity~~
~~Confidential Source~~

Information in this record was deleted in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, exemptions 7C FOIA 87-88

REVIEWED BY Portions 7C	DATE P-13
----------------------------	--------------

1-25

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DO NOT DISCLOSE

MEMORANDUM TO CASE FILE

(x) Telecon : Participants: [redacted] File: 811-82 A-0015
 () Mtg : JERRY LANEFORD Date: 02/13/84
 () Review : Time: 10:13 am
 Confidentiality Req: Yes

7c

[redacted] called to ask if the NRC would have [redacted] a copy of her airborne exposure records. She said she had requested [redacted] copies of her exposure records from 1971, but the information she received did not include all the years she was employed. She said she would send us a copy of her report.

She also asked if she had earlier given us information regarding the calibration of analyzer 2 on 2 in February, 1984. I told her I would check and if we didn't have it I would give her a call. She said she had given this information to [redacted] and [redacted] previously but didn't know what they did with it.

[redacted] said she would be working with her lawyer [redacted]

7c
6

Note: ALGR has provided information concerning the calibration of analyzer no. 3 in February 1984.
 Reference: · Memo to Case File, 02/13/84
 · Memo to Case File, 05/01/84
 · ALGRs notes received 05/03/84

Information in this record was deleted
 in accordance with the Freedom of Information
 Act, exemptions b7c
 FOIA- 87-88

JERRY LANEFORD
 INVESTIGATOR

Portions of b7c

P-14

MEMORANDUM TO CASE FILE

TYPE ACTION <input type="checkbox"/> RECORD OF CONVERSATION <input type="checkbox"/> CASE REVIEW / STATUS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OTHER	PARTICIPANTS	DO NOT DISCLOSE Contains identity of CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE	FILE NO. RI 84-A-0029
			DATE 08/27/84
	CONFIDENTIALITY REQUESTED YES NO		TIME

SUMMARY

The attached documents were received from the ALGR in this case on 08/27/84.
 The following were received:

1. Radiation Exposure History provided to [redacted] by GE
2. [redacted] Resume
3. Newspaper clipping
4. LMCS - Standard Out of Limits Notice dated 02/12/84

Package 2

PREPARED BY J Linkford	PAGE OF
	DATE 08/27/84

ACTION REQUIRED

~~DO NOT DISCLOSE~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE~~

Information in this record was deleted in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, exemptions 6 + 7C
 FOIA- 87-88

REVIEWED BY Portons 6+7C	DATE P-15
-----------------------------	--------------

1-19

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DO NOT DISCLOSE

GENERAL ELECTRIC

WILMINGTON DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE

GENE:

Here's my life -

Thought you would be interested!

TO:

SUBJECT:

Notice some "periods" are unaccountable for. But according to [redacted], it is complete Picture - Believe it or Not!

Per your request listing during Department. Of the specified:

I sure would like to have another opinion on this paper work.

Name:
SS Number:
Birth Date:
Period of Emplo

[redacted]

[redacted] 7C

7C

External Whole

Bueno - When I was there in ATLANTA 8/23/84 05 AM
could it had been [redacted] that you had asked me about? If so -

Critical Organ

[redacted] The young woman who wanted to come with me, could give you some information about him.

6

Extremity Dose

*Fifty year dose commitment calculated on basis of exposure to uranium airborne concentrations of 2.2% U-235 nominal plant enrichment

These exposures you need add! not hesitate!


Thank You -

for so much help - I am doing much better - and I can and will. for I know you are there if I need it.


WCP/rr


[redacted]


7C




6













0























6










6




7

6



6



NGTON

g Star

Saturday, August 18, 1984



GE workers investigated by deputies

From staff reports

General Electric Co.'s plant on Castle Hayne Road has been under investigation since early this summer by the New Hanover County Sheriff's Department, officials confirmed Friday.

Investigators refused to reveal the nature of the investigation, but said no charges have been filed.

Jeff Faucette, manager of employee and community relations for the GE plant, would not answer questions about the inquiry.

"I am declining comment," Faucette said Friday afternoon.

Capt. George Vallender, chief of

detectives, said the sheriff's department is investigating at the request of General Electric and the district attorney's office.

"It's going to be a long, drawn-out thing," Vallender said. "It involves more than just material taken off the plant."

Assistant District Attorney John Smith said, "I can confirm that there is an investigation. The sheriff's department is making an investigation of GE at our request." Smith said, "We were contacted by GE and our assistance was requested."

Please see GE, 7A

turns

Jaycees let

women join

Defendant gets life

1B A convicted rapist was sentenced Friday to three life terms in prison for sex crimes involving a 4-year-old girl and her 6-year-old cousin.

Reviewing the 'sting'

2A Although defense lawyers and one of the jurors who acquitted John Z. De Lorean say the case should have an impact on future government undercover operations, some prosecutors say the "sting" is too valuable a tool to be abandoned.

De Loreans now popular

6B Demand for the car created by John Z. De Lorean "is going right through the roof" after his acquittal on drug charges, the nation's only distributor of the automobile said Friday.

24



George Vallender



John Smith



Bill Smith

GE

Continued from 1A

Smith would not comment on the specific nature of the investigation. The investigation does not include other GE plants, Smith said. "As far as I know, it's entirely local."

"I don't know that I can say any more than I have told you about the matter," Smith said. "It's in the early stages and it would be irresponsible to imply anything on the basis of what's been done. I don't think anybody's in too much of a position to make too much of a comment."

Bob Thomas, the sheriff's department detective assigned to the case, said the investigation began in the early part of the summer and has involved interviews with GE employees, but he said he could not disclose the nature of the questioning.

No charges have been filed as a result of the investigation, Thomas said.

"It's not in the stage, certainly, that we wanted it to go public," Thomas said.

GE's Wilmington plant has two independent divisions, one producing nuclear power plant components and one manufacturing parts for jet engines.

Wilmington lawyer William G.

Smith telephoned the *Morning Star* about 5:30 p.m. Friday to say that the reassignment of plant manager James A. Long, announced Thursday, had no connection with "an alleged investigation" at the plant. William Smith said he would not confirm or deny that an investigation was occurring.

Faucette also said Long's reassignment was not related to any investigation.

Long, who has been general manager of the nuclear fuels and components portion of GE's Wilmington plant since April of 1980, has been reassigned to a special project to investigate new business possibilities in the nuclear division.

Long said in a telephone interview from William Smith's office that he will work from a Wilmington temporary office, but added that he would be in Wilmington periodically.

Long said he will remain as president of the Greater Wilmington Chamber of Commerce. His term expires in December.

William Smith would not confirm or deny that an investigation is going on at the plant, but he said he was contacting all news organizations in Wilmington to notify them. There was no connection between the investigation and Long's reassignment.

Eugene A. Lees will take over

Aug. 30 as the new general manager of nuclear products portion of the plant.

Lees, who has been with the plant since 1972, was the manager of the quality assurance department.

He holds a bachelor's degree in metallurgical engineering from the University of Idaho and a master's degree in materials science from Stanford. He joined GE in 1958 and has worked in various areas of the nuclear business since that time.

Long said his new job will involve finding ways to expand the company's nuclear servicing division, based in San Jose, Calif.

He said he also will be looking for additional work for the Wilmington plant and investigating possible takeovers and joint ventures with both domestic and foreign companies.

"What we're trying to do is ensure the long-term viability of the nuclear business for General Electric," Long said. The plant produces fuel assemblies for nuclear electric generating plants.

The aircraft engine division of GE's Wilmington plant is directed by Charles L. Chadwell, who reports to the Aircraft Engine Group in Evendale, Ohio, a suburb of Cincinnati.

Staff Writers Ray Belew, Debbie Norton and Merton Vance compiled this report.

W

Continued

accept state bestowed membership organized.

In Column of the Ohio rightshaven, other women international from the n

Judy Roducted into ter on Friday verse point. ficial to the good mem thoughts m had," she sa

After the ruled last m could not ex mington Ja; against accep

"Our cha unanimous women," Bo

None of t attended the ering.

Until now

F
Hall
for the
Alco
Dro

All
Adult
Cl
J B

RII/IAC


PO Box 2203

ATLANTA, GEORGIA


30301

AUG 27 1964

Att. Personnel



6



6

ATTN: Lab Supervisor

LMCS - STANDARD OUT OF LIMITS NOTICE, SEQUENCE # 944
INPUT VERIFICATION RESULTS
OUT-OF-ALARM

DATE: 7-FEB-84
TIME: 06:58:14

TECH PAY # :
METHOD CODE: 6000
ANALYZER # : 17 #2 ANA
STD TYPE # : 901
UNIT CODE : 60
TECH NAME :
METHOD NAME : Prod Isotopic
ANALYZER NAME : AMU ENRICHMENT #2
STANDARD BATCH NAME : .715 ISO, VERIF.
UNIT NAME : % U-235

UPPER CTI : 0.73100
UPPER ALRM : 0.72400
NOMINAL : 0.71500
LOWER ALRM : 0.70600
LOWER CTI : 0.69900
PDF SIGMA : 0.00480

VERIF STD #: 200011 RESULT: 0.72500

Was value input properly? YES NO
If answer is NO, attach Transaction 820 report.

What do control chart and trend data show?

Have there been any changes or unusual events?
YES NO
If YES, what?

Are there any distinctions with this analysis? (In other standards show same
Analysis different? Preparation? Tech? Calibration?) Yes NO
If YES, what?

Did investigation show a most likely cause? YES NO
If YES, what?

What corrective action was taken?

Chemist approval: _____ Date: _____

Closed out on #790 _____ DATE: _____

*Why did this H87 occur
As tape @ 9825' will show
↓ released the
Material 3
70AMCS
2/12/84*

We were asked by Supervisor (redacted) to
destroy ^{all} these reports. This could be a vital question for
(redacted) to answer. Apparently "Soft" was calculations different
than LMCS? 6

R II / IAC

PO Box 2003

ATLANTA, GEORGIA

30301

AUG 7 1964

Att: Bruno Uruc

MEMORANDUM TO CASE FILE

TYPE ACTION <input type="checkbox"/> RECORD OF CONVERSATION <input type="checkbox"/> CASE REVIEW / STATUS <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER	PARTICIPANTS _____ _____ _____	FILE NO. R11-84-A-0029
		DATE 07/12/84
		TIME
CONFIDENTIALITY REQUESTED (YES) NO		

SUMMARY

The documents in this folder were provided by the ALGR in this case during the interview conducted July 11-12, 1984. Some of these documents were discussed during the interview of the ALGR and will be identified in the transcript.

Package 6

PREPARED BY J Linkford	PAGE OF
	DATE 07/12/84

ACTION REQUIRED

REVIEWED BY	DATE

OFFICIAL USE ONLY — DO NOT DISCLOSE

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MEMORANDUM TO CASE FILE

TYPE ACTION <input type="checkbox"/> RECORD OF CONVERSATION <input type="checkbox"/> CASE REVIEW / STATUS <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER	PARTICIPANTS	FILE NO.
	[REDACTED] 70 B. URYC	84-0029
	CONFIDENTIALITY REQUESTED YES NO	DATE SEP 05 1984
		TIME 8:40 - 8:57 AM

SUMMARY ALGR called to advise me that she gave my name to a Mr. Doryll Johnson, NC Employment Security Commission, to verify that she should be keeping a low profile and not actively looking for a job. ALGR said law requires she make 2 job contacts per week on different days. I advised ALGR that I could only refer the caller to the local police. I would verify NRC is conducting an investigation. ALGR said she had 3 other items:

1) ALGR stated that [REDACTED] called her last night and wanted her to tell me that when we contact [REDACTED] we should tell him that [REDACTED] recommended that he talk to the NRC.

2) ALGR stated she had a document dated Dec 1, 1983 from GE that discussed changing the passwords on H87 computers in the wet lab. She said she would send the document.

3) ALGR stated that when she was working in the J Bldg she found a Store Requisition dated 3/5/84, invoice no. 112172, Component no. 987-126, which was filed with the J-26 weekly cost summary report dtd 3/12/84 as page 45. This document had some yellowed fingerprints in the lower right hand corner and she suspected the document was contaminated. She questioned how the document got there and whether it indicated that

PREPARED BY BRUNO URYC, JR. DATE SEP 05 1984

ACTION REQUIRED

Information in this record was deleted in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, exemptions 6 & 7C FOIA 87-88

P-16
[REDACTED]

REVIEWED BY [Signature] DATE [REDACTED]

MEMORANDUM TO CASE FILE CONTINUATION SHEET

workers may be getting exposed to radiation contamination unknowingly. AIGR advised that the document is filed in the Swiss System department and [redacted] is the foreman of that department. AIGR stated the requisition was signed by [redacted] and his supervisor [redacted].

RECORD BY () CASE REVIEW () OTHER	CONFIDENTIALITY REQUESTED YES NO	DATE 09-08-84 TIME 11:00-12:00 AM
---	----------------------------------	--------------------------------------

SUMMARY ALGR called my residence collect. (Change to 1:6)
 ALGR stated that her lawyer has talked to Mr. Hertzfel Plaine HQ NRC and Mr. Plaine has told him that some changes need to be made in NRC regs. because of ALGR's case. Mr. Plaine has said he is excited about the case and he has taken a personal interest in the case and that the case will challenge the NRC regulations and perhaps some changes will be made because of the weakness in the regulatory requirements. ALGR stated she feels that some great strides have been made because of the cooperation being given by NRC. ALGR said that she is very proud of what NRC Region II has done in her case and she feels RII has been very responsive to her concerns.

ALGR said she has again began to feel some reservations re because of his prior affiliation with I told her that I thought that issue was over and she replied that it was after our first conversation. She said that she has been thinking about the matter lately and again she said she has some reservations about I asked her what her reservations were and she replied that there is something that is bothering her but she does know exactly what is causing her concern. I asked her to try and

PREPARED BY BRUNO URYC, JR.	DATE 09-08-84
--------------------------------	------------------

ACTION REQUIRED
 REVIEW FOR ADDITIONAL ACGTNS or additional information on known allegations.

Information in this record was deleted in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act exemptions 4, 6 & 7C

REVIEWED BY 87-88	DATE P-17
----------------------	--------------

6/19/88 OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MEMORANDUM TO CASE FILE CONTINUATION SHEET

explain and she said that [redacted] tends to be opinionated and she based this on the first call with him and the subsequent interview. She said that because of his prior employment with [redacted] he does not seem to be dealing with her situation as everyone else has been doing. She stated that she has been made aware of some changes in the labs which she understands to be a direct result of her concerns. I asked her if she was saying that [redacted] was providing information to GE about her case and she replied that she has no evidence to support that. She mentioned several times that her concern was based only on intuition and gut feelings. She said she was having a difficult time letting "it" rest. I again reassured her that [redacted] was a trustworthy individual and there was no reason for her concern. She then replied that "maybe his background is showing" and because her former supervisors acted in a certain way that she was picking this attitude up from [redacted] also. I told her that [redacted] worked for [redacted] a long time ago and there was no reason for her to be concerned. She agreed and dropped the matter.

ALGR stated that two sets of records were being kept by GE in the isotopic lab and she was told by [redacted] that [redacted] he had heard from [redacted] who was told by [redacted] that the lab was not keeping records of when the standards were run and the detectors were changed. There was some other area of the plant that was keeping records but these records were not complete. She said that [redacted] did not use the proper test tube numbers and he specifically requested that the information on standards from these test tubes not be entered into the LMCS. She said that [redacted] had used a different set of standards and this could possibly be used to document quality of powder that in fact was substandard. ALGR said she had documentation to show the difference in standards used on her

FILE NO 84-0029

DATE 09-08-84

TIME

PAGE 2 OF 3

MEMORANDUM TO CASE FILE CONTINUATION SHEET

shift. ALGR stated this was demonstrated by the difference in G_uG calculations. ALGR stated that the G_uG calc was changed on isotopic reports and that some of these changes were not in the log book. ALGR stated that a lot of the documentation she has in her possession has to do with [redacted] material. She said that she is aware that [redacted] has questioned GE on their documentation and techniques.

Ex 4

FILE NO 84-0029

DATE 09.08.84

TIME

PAGE 3 OF 3

§ 7D

In depth interview of [redacted] (03/08 int by OI)
poor working environment
lab analysis may be incorrectly done
material destroyed during testing - no accountability
parameters for testing
technicians admitted fudging on tests
management aware of fudging, but not doing anything
parameters widened so techs would not have to find
903 concerns not really addressed
Contamination monitoring a joke - no one does it
a lab tech was forced to w/contaminated sample
lab has contamination problems

[redacted] 7C

problem w/ calibration of analyzer #3
[redacted] has documentation to prove her coworkers misconstructed
her data to make her look bad.

Improper use of 903 data

Techs using Supr password to use 903 transactions

[redacted]


Incident w/ [redacted] [redacted]
Tapes from H-87 system
changes to COI A09

OI inquiry completed - Areas of concern.
Recommended resp efforts 03/14/84

Information in this record was deleted
in accordance with the Freedom of Information
Act, exemptions b6 + 7C + 7D
FOIA- § 7.88

Partners Ex b6 + 7C

P-18
[redacted]
[redacted]



GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
 NUCLEAR ENERGY OPERATIONS
 QUALITY ASSURANCE &
 RELIABILITY OPERATION
 175 CURTNER AVENUE, MC 800
 SAN JOSE, CA 95125

CONSULTING ENGINEER
 ANALYTICAL &
 TEST METHODS
 (408) 925-6243

Information in this record was deleted
 in accordance with the Freedom of Information
 Act, exemptions 6
 FOIA: 87-88

6

P-19
~~20~~

mtg 2/2/81 [redacted] b

[redacted] requested the mtg and also requested b
topic of mtg be documented.

[redacted] requested title of incident in that lab when [redacted] b
what was determined to be contaminated. [redacted] b
[redacted] is job involved use of the cut off wheel and stated he
was instructed to use the wheel even though it was known
that contamination existed. He felt as though he was
contaminated. Proper precautionary measures were not taken.

[redacted] requested copy of report & stated that at present he
has no intention of using document against GE.

Requested that mtg between [redacted] and himself
subject was Conversation Doc, be documented.

Requested a follow up to this mtg be held & persons to
include [redacted] b

[redacted] stated that everything being discussed and that he
intends to discuss relative to unfair treatment.

[redacted] requested that topic of today's mtg be confidential. b
Options are b

Information in this record was deleted
in accordance with the Freedom of Information
Act, exemptions 8-7-88
FOIA

Discussion then turned to a letter concerning

[redacted] work performance that [redacted] had received 2/18. 6

[redacted] felt letter was unfair and did not state all facts. 6

[redacted] 6
5/18/84

1) Why did the contaminated areas, never

2) Grinding + Polishing were contaminated at some time! 6
See [redacted]

3. Lab personnel were never instructed about radioactive control on these tables.

The supervisor [redacted] denied ^{knowing of the} contain. [redacted] when in reality, he had personally requested [redacted] to ^{cut} process the sintered pellets in the Metallurgical lab which was not a controlled or semi controlled area.

This activity was continued over a period several months before [redacted] ^{conferred} ~~revealed~~ it.

It was revealed to Red Softy by personnel in Wet Lab.

As a result [redacted] job was threatened by [redacted]