

GPU Nuclear

P.O. Box 388 Forked River, New Jersey 08731 609-693-6000 Writer's Direct Dial Number:

TEZZ

November 3, 1982

Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Administrator Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-47/03L

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-47/03L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.2 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

Alu

Vice President and Director Oyster Creek

PBF:1se Enclosures

cc: Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Director (3) Office of Management Information and Program Control U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Forked River, NJ 08731

8211230072 821103 PDR ADOCK 05000219 S

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-47/03L

Report Date

November 3, 1982

Occurrence Date

October 4, 1982

Identification of Occurrence

A plant shutdown was initiated as required by a limiting condition for operation (Technical Specification 3.7.B) when, at approximately 1635 hours on the occurrence date, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Motor Generator (MG) Set No. 1 failed and could not supply power to RPS Panel No. 1.

Loss of RPS Panel No. 1 is a configuration which is not allowed by Technical Specification 3.7.A.1.d and is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined by Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.2.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was in steady state operation.

Reactor Power: 1150 MWt Generator Power: 368 MWe Mode Switch Position: Run

Note: RPS MG Set No. 2 was tagged out of service for maintenance with power supplied to RPS Panel No. 2 by Motor Control Center (MCC) 1A2 through its alternative power supply (transformer).

Description of Occurrence

During normal plant operation, RPS No. 1 MG set stopped supplying power to RPS Panel No. 1. This was identified by annunciators in the the control room and de-energization of Reactor Protection System I. An orderly plant shutdown was commenced and subsequently terminated upon correction of the deficiency.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The apparent cause of the event was the failure of a relay in RPS No. 1 MG set controls, and the inability of RPS Panel No. 1 to be powered by the alternate source transformer PS-1. The switching of power supplies for RPS Panel No. 1 (via contactor transfer relay GT-1) could not be performed because RPS Panel No. 2 was being powered by the alternate source transformer (via contactor transfer relay GT-2) at the time of the occurrence due to maintenance on RPS MG Set No. 2. An interlock between transfer relays GT-1 and GT-2 prevents both RPS systems from being powered on the PS-1 transformer simultaneously,

RPS MG Set No. 1 failed to provide power due to excessive wear (contact "splash") and pitting on the Kl relay contacts. This relay senses main contact and motor overload conditions.

Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-47/03L

Analysis of Occurrence

The Reactor Protection System (RPS) is designed to protect plant equipment and personnel by initiating the rapid insertion of control rods and primary containment isolation in the event of a potentially unsafe condition. RPS is a two channel logic system. In order to cause reactor scram and isolation, both logic channels must sense a trip signal. Each channel is further divided into two trip systems. A trip condition must exist in both logic channels in order for a full scram or isolation to occur. With the loss of RPS No. 1, we had in effect, a half scram.

The safety significance of the occurrence was minimized due to RPS No. 2 having been failed in a tripped condition, thereby performing its intended function.

Corrective Action

The failed Kl relay in RPS MG Set No. 1 was replaced with an identical relay from RPS MG Set No. 2. As spares for this relay were not in stock, additional spares were ordered.

Since the failure was found due to wear in service (approximately 14 years), no further corrective action is planned other than replacing the Kl relay in MG set No. 2 prior to putting that unit back in service.

Failure Data

Manufacturer: G.E. CR120J Relay 120 Volts, 10 Amps