

ADDENDUM
TO
INDIVIDUAL SITE RATINGS
FROM THE
IE EMPLOYEE SURVEY ON
EVALUATION OF LICENSEES
APRIL 1978

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The narrative statements provided in connection with the sheet for each site in the preceding section of this report were based on comments made by the inspectors regarding those sites. The actual comments made by the inspectors with respect to individual sites are contained in this addendum.

Docket No.: 50-334
Site: Beaver Valley

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Plant is just completing startup testing and staff is more experienced.

QA controls slightly better.

Controls over explosive blow-out discs were established after identified by inspector.

Plant personnel are becoming more experienced, confident and competent. Bugs are gradually being worked out of equipment and administrative controls.

Plant management has improved.

Increased security requirements; i.e., additional guard force, increased surveillance, addition of mechanical search equipment (guard force doubled in last year).

New plant - only recently completed final testing - plant and management still learning of plant and design problems.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

New plant - recently completed full power testing.

Technical competence of management personnel.

Docket No.: 50-317
Site: Calvert Cliffs

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Management became more cognizant of plant operations following an enforcement meeting in early 1977.

Have a smaller "Q" list to which they apply their controls.

The (blank) is anti-NRC, anti-QA.

Improvements in security.

Completion of startup testing on Unit 2

Increased attention to procedural adherence and plant cleanliness due to escalated enforcement action by IE.

Both plants, each operating. New upgraded T/S at both plants.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?)

Management meeting held to impress President with our observations of the dedication of plant staff to "get the turbine on line" at the risk of not having assured that T/S requirements are met. Too early to determine the result of the meeting.

The operational philosophy of this plant is 2.5 and survive - they don't do anything above that which is required, towards plant safety.

This facility appears to place prime interest upon operating, to the extent of voluntary entrance into action statements. Its attitude toward safety appears to be that meeting literal NRC requirements is sufficient.

Docket No.: 50-213

Site: Connecticut Yankee

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Review of inspection findings, LERs, and operating record supports this judgment.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

Age of plant.

NRR is backfitting CY in several areas. When this is completed, the design requirements and license conditions will be upgraded, and therefore, overall safety should be improved.

Docket No.: 50-333
Site: Fitzpatrick

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Take over by PANSY appears to be an improvement.

More management attention to operations. Change in operating licensee.

New security procedures.

Change in operating license from Niagara Mohawk to PANSY increased technical level of management and administrative controls.

Design changes to install additional safety systems.

Corporate management change NM to PANSY.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

Has a new operator (PASNY) for the plant, including new plant management.

Later design provides better safety systems, such as rod sequence control system, etc., but emergency diesel generators are not reliable and radioactive waste systems are underdesigned and marginally operated. Excellent fire protection system, excellent security program.

Station management recently changed from Niagara Mohawk to PASNY. Improvements already noted - more anticipated.

Docket No.: 50-244

Site: Ginna

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

None.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

The plant is old, small, and run safely---the small aspect is important because of the relative lack of danger to the public.

Recent change in station superintendent - no significant change noted.

Docket No.: 50-003
Site: Indian Point

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Much recent IE and licensee management attention to IP 2 operations, health physics, safeguards, etc., has resulted in large overall licensee upgrading.

Improvements in radiation health controls.

Recently completed an intensive inspection program in rad protection - organizational changes were made, new procedures provided and a significant improvement in management control.

Inspection effort has improved management attention to factors affecting plant safety.

Applied considerable inspection effort and "talent" and convinced corporate management that they had to expand corporate resources.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

The ratings indicated are for Indian Point 2 in that Indian Point 3 is highly superior in all aspects as related to Unit 2 due primarily to management controls and personnel.

Facility operation is full power with question on calibration of nuclear instruments and resolution of read-out available to operators. Management is aware of problem and IE is following.

Do not have accepted QA plan meeting current requirements. Should be approved soon. Unit 3 would be better rated because PASNY does better than Con Ed.

Upper Management (corporate) attitudes continue to limit effectiveness of site management.

Continue to inspect and observe with highly competent and experienced inspectors. The trend toward more inspections with less competent inspectors is dangerous. Also, continue design reviews by highly competent NRR personnel - also tighten standards and codes, and operator license examinations.

Docket No.: 50-309
Site: Maine Yankee

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

None.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

The plant is very clean - it shows pride in ownership and is indicative of happy people working at a good plant.

Have recently approved QA plan - upgraded to current standards. Becomes effective 8/16/77.

Recent change in station superintendent - no significant changes in safety expected.

Docket No.: 50-245

Site: Millstone

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

More safety awareness.

New security fence and procedures.

Re-evaluations have been made and design changes implemented in plant power distribution and emergency power systems.

Review of inspection findings, LERs and operating record would support this judgment.

New QA organization seems to be slightly more effective.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

Large public interest in events taking place at this facility. Have a new plant superintendent.

Unit 1 is a BWR which is old - these items combine to cause a lower rating for Unit 1 than Unit 2.

Millstone site has three reactors, operating BWR, operating PWR, under construction PWR - all are by different vendors - all of different "era" - the operating reactors are, relatively, independent (as compared to a multiple unit site with the same generation of reactor from the same vendor) in their inherent safety characteristics.

Reliability of emergency has turbine, acceptance of the feedwater injection system as a high pressure ECCS system. Plant lacks a lot of separation and fire protection systems. Radwaste system undersized.

See answer to Question 28.

See p. 23.

Inter-relationship between diverse units at single site.

Docket No.: 50-224
Site: Nine Mile Point

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

None.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

There were some old fossil people managing and operating this plant - they don't have the nuclear ethic yet.

See question 69.

This is a plant of older design but the early engineering was of a high quality and excellent plant layout and construction. Onsite plant support (other than operations) lacking in numbers of people. Plant lacks system separation and a real high pressure injection system. Excellent security program.

Approach to operations of plant have been conservative. Plant staff has been stable.

Nine Mile also considerable operating experience, and a reservoir of experienced BWR operators (from Fitzpatrick which has until recently been operated by the Nine Mile licensee and which "leases" its operators from Niagara Mohawk until it trains its own).

Corporate engineering role in maintenance activities.

Docket No.: 50-219
Site: Oyster Creek

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Imposition of new operational procedures and facility record maintenance system has improved safety.

Installation of storage facility to house torus chromated water - and permit draining of torus.

QA program has been more fully implemented. New storage facilities, new document control center becomes operational.

Substantial upgrading of QA has been, and is, in progress.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

Security should be upgraded, i.e., increase capabilities of guard force and surveillance equipment.

Upgrading of requirements, imposition of environmental T.S.

See question 69.

An early generation BWR - its age and generation made it different in inherent safety from facilities - and facility management has been less than willing to endorse in principle a comprehensive management control system - they conform as required rather than aggressively prosecute.

This plant received a poor design review as demonstrated by logic system inadequacies, recently found. Plant was built at minimum cost. Radioactive waste and fire protection are inadequate. Plant lacks system separation.

Management at corporate level have a first-hand technical and working level knowledge of the plant.

Docket No.: 50-277
Site: Peach Bottom

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Plant radiation levels have been increasing with time. Design and staffing of plant appear to have not been capable of handling this change. Management has been slow to take large step changes to correct problems.

Back to back overhaul/upkeep periods for units 2 & 3 appear to have produced a tired operating group prone to error.

Careless operations and poor maintenance.

Corrective action taken to repair core spray line cracks, feedwater spargers and nozzles and control rod drive return nozzle.

Licensee made significant effort to reduce routine radioactive release from reactor building vents through equipment repairs.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

See question 69 and 28.

QA program not upgraded to current standards. Security not upgraded. Many repeat items of noncompliance. Least safe site in Region 2! Poorest management!

Quality of people (i.e., technical educational level) that are operating a plant and the type of organizational structure they are placed in can have a significant impact on safety.

Higher number of inspections due to proximity to regional office.

Recent management meeting with the President - expect to determine by scheduled inspections in the next 30 days if significant improvements were made.

Plant management exhibits an appearance of attempting to "control" NRC inspector access thru continual escort - general attitude appears to be one of compliance as required instead of an aggressive prosecution of management controls.

The problem with this plant is that it is a big BWR - by definition, they will have problems unless they have a good op. staff. PB does...

Upgrading of requirements upon this licensee, particularly in cases of security and QA.

Docket No.: 50-293

Site: Pilgrim

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Improved corporate management. Improved radiation management at site.

Due to instability in plant management. Drift due to lack of management direction.

Refueling outage.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

Generation of design may be the overriding factor for this early generation BWR.

Have experienced a number of station manager changes.

Recent change in corporate rad protection and all old fuel is being removed. Significant improvements in reducing effluents and worker exposure expected.

Several changes in upper level management, some instability because of changes.

The cleanest BWR in the country.

Docket No.: 50-272

Site: Salem

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Relatively new plant. Still has growing pains. Needs close attention (by IE) to assure appropriate improvements are made.

Power ascension testing revealed problems that were corrected by management, both in hardware and procedures.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

The plant control room was designed in-house - it is a disaster waiting to happen.

In startup phase. Have had a number of problems. This can be due either to poor system or poor management or the "normal" failures when new systems are placed into service.

Design of controls with back-lighted pushbuttons results in operator data assessment problems, especially when lights are burned out. Management is aware of problem and IE is following up.

New plant - recently completed full power testing - plant still in early operating phases.

Docket No.: 50-289
Site: Three Mile Island

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Increased security by addition of fence surveillance, guard force and search equipment.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

Pay close attention to performance of newly assigned station and unit superintendents.

This is the first designed B&W plant of this generation. Construction was largely accomplished without aggressive prosecution of nuclear management control. Operation is conducted under strong management control.

The licensing of Unit 2 in 10/77 will have an impact on the site/corporate staffs. In all probability the overall safety may become worse over the next year due to this increased workload.

2nd plant in startup placed some additional "drag" on operating facility equipment and manpower.

Docket No.: 50-271
Site: Vermont Yankee

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Management experience and depth is increasing.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

Have upgraded QA plan which becomes effective 8/16/77.

Frequent changes in plant superintendent - has resulted in slight degradation of management controls.

Very clean.

Public interest in events at site.

Docket No.: 50-029
Site: Yankee Rowe

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Issuance of standard Technical Specifications.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

Plant is very small and very isolated - virtually no health hazard to the public exists.

Old plant Tech Specs. New, upgraded QA program doesn't become effective until 8/16/77. See questions 67 & 69.

Docket No.: 50-259
Site: Browns Ferry

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Attention to QA principles seems somewhat less.

- a. More experience and exposure of plant personnel = improved safety and operation.
- b. More inspections by NRC.
- c. Plant management changes.

Improved response to alarms - enforcement meeting.

More safety awareness.

In fire protection.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

Core performance analysis, qualifications of technicians and mechanics who maintain safety equipment.

Docket No.: 50-325
Site: Brunswick

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Some improvement in administrative controls. More experience by operating staff.

New management and experience.

Management seemed to become more aware of events at plant.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

The training or experience of senior site management - none of the top three have had SRO training in BWRs. The plant has had a very high personnel turnover rate. Consequently, the staff is young for the responsibilities needed. Corporate management apparently still has not faced up to what this inexperience costs in safety and efficiency. They appear to believe they are being over-regulated.

Qualifications of technicians and mechanics that maintain safety equipment.

All pre-op testing must be completed prior to licensing.

Docket No.: 50-302
Site: Crystal River

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

More safety awareness.

Improved Adm. control. Improved Opera. awareness.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

None.

Docket No.: 50-261
Site: Robinson

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Licensee has made increased site commitment to QA/QC.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

Low number of LERs reflects attitude or reporting only items that are conspicuously reportable. Licensee impedes IE freedom of movement and access at site. No information freely given. Definite attitude of do only what is required.

Qualifications of technicians and mechanics that maintain safety systems.

Docket No.: 50-321
Site: Hatch

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Continued upgrading of Adm 8 QA control

Operating experience.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

Qualifications of technicians and mechanics that maintain safety equipment.

Docket No.: 50-269

Site: Oconee

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Change in Operating Superintendent should improve situation in next few months.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

Qualifications of technicians and mechanics that maintain safety equipment. Maintenance of test equipment.

Docket No.: 50-335

Site: Saint Lucie

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Improved due to increased operations, etc., experience of plant personnel over time period involved.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

This plant has more than average number of LER's. I believe this is due to Licensee's determination to report all possibly reportable items rather than poor performance.

Docket No.: 50-280

Site: Surry

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Due to degradation of steam generators.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

None.

Docket No.: 50-250
Site: Turkey Point

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Safety may be slightly worse due to steam generator degradation.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

Qualifications of technicians and mechanics that maintain safety equipment.

Docket No.: 50-331

Site: Arnold

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Improvement in administrative control and QA program.

New plant superintendent. Stronger enforcement action - increased inspection effort.

Management change.

More awareness regarding significance of personnel error.

Steady improvement in management controls and quality of onsite staff.
Increased attention by engineering and corporate office.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

See page 13.

Docket No.: 50-155
Site: Big Rock Point

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

QA program implementation continuing resulting in an improved plant safety level.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

An original BWR - Design, operation relatively uncomplicated. Closeness of opera.

General safety of older plants.

Plant personnel qualifications have improved (technical capability) recently.
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Docket No.: 50-315
Site: D. C. Cook

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Increased number of personnel errors and procedural violations occurred during 1977.

Demands placed upon personnel and management due to Unit 2 startup, fire protection and security have brought a decrease in attention and review unit 1 is given. Events are occurring that would not have a year ago.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

One plant in operation the other in startup. Plant using standardized Tech Specs.

Resident inspector stationed there 74-77.

Design, its newer with greater indepth protection.

Docket No.: 50-010

Site: Dresden

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Improved training program, and improved QA programs.

Better housekeeping, more attention to detail.

Poor operation, instrumentation problems.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

See page 13.

See Zion comments.

U-1 is a 200 MWe plant while U-2&3 are 800 MWe each - U-1 will never receive priority at the management level - One should also consider the manpower availability on site.

Locket No.: 50-505

Site: Kewanee

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

None.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

Resident inspector assigned 74-76.

Very stable and competent plant management; overall good operating performance; strong safety attitude.

Docket No.: 50-409

Site: LaCrosse

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Fuel degradation.

Improved QA program.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

See page 13.

Part 115 plant (AEC developmental reactor) small utility - limited technical staff with minimal corporate backup - difficult to absorb costly NRC regulations.

Docket No. : 563
Site: Monticello

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

None.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

None.

Docket Nr : 50-255
Site: Passades

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

QA program implementation continuing resulting in an improved plant and safety level.

Improved attention by management toward more timely correction of problems.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

Utility constantly confronted by intervention - legal challenge from the outside.

Effectiveness of management controls. Resident inspector assigned 74-77.

Docket No.: 50-266
Site: Point Beach

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

None.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

This plant is of older design with its management attitudes it would be above exceptional if designed like present day.

Disciplined staff, well motivated, pride which includes their ability to positively criticize the NRC in matters which distract from their ability to conduct their plant operations.

The exceptional strength of plant management in all areas. The total team effort in all matters - the excellence of all personnel attitude in regard to safe plant operation.

Docket No.: 50-282
Site: Prairie Island

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

None.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

The technical staff is closely integrated with operations and maintenance. This helps resolve problems before safety concerns develop and provides good information where failures have occurred.

Docket No.: 50-254
Site: Quad Cities

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Improvement in training program, improved QA program, improved radiological program.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

See Zion comments.

The licensee has been "overinspected" by NRC and state for the past 2 or 3 years. The plant cannot operate at design load because of an agreement with the state to operate with a closed cycle cooling canal, after the plant was built as designed for once thru cooling. This affects plant operation and also attitudes of operators.

See page 13.

Docket No.: 50-295

Site: Zion

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Apparent PWR attitude of personnel resulting from marginal management.

Safety reduced as evidenced by loss of DC power and by-passing all pressurizer level channels in 1977. Inadequate management controls.

Continued deterioration of management controls.

Nonconformance with technical specifications; failure to adhere to administrative procedure; failure to adhere to operating, emergency, and test procedure; inadequate procedure; operator error; poor overall operating performance; weak overall management.

Procedures improved; administrative procedures improved; better training.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

Lack of management. Ability to discipline employees for operator error/carelessness.

Management - union interface and its effect on selection of personnel and discipline. Attitude and support from support engineering and corporate management to resolve operating equipment problems. Corporate management involvement in plant operations. Corporate management attitudes and followup.

Part of a complex nuclear commitment which carries with it the management problems associated with "bigness". Stability of staff a continuous problem.

Overall attitude regarding safety is not strong. Lax operating performance and attitude.

Adequacy of training program; number of personnel errors resulting in significant problems.

Docket No.: 50-313

Site: Arkansas

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Cable penetration barriers and fire proofing of essential and safety cables. Improvement in procedural controls.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

Unit 2 which is soon to be operational will be managed by the same site management as that which controls Unit 1. I feel this practice considerably dilutes management control over these plants.

Upgrade technical specifications to standard T/S.

Docket No.: 50-298

Site: Cooper

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

None.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

None.

Docket No.: 50-285
Site: Fort Calhoun

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Site management at this plant is young and they are maturing and recognizing their safety responsibilities.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

Top management (Board of Directors) have an anti-nuclear attitude which is upsetting to site personnel and management. Since there is a correlation between morale and job satisfiers, I am concerned about this situation. This concern is due to the fact that morale affects employee safety practices more than production.

Docket No.: 50-267
Site: Fort St. Vrain

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Cable separation, training program, penetration fire barriers and flammable on essential and safety related cable. Experience of operating personnel as operation of plant continues.

Based on an IE inspection the licensee has recently had to review the setpoints of his safety systems to determine that instrument and calibration inaccuracies are adequately accounted for in the selected setpoints.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

First of a kind - fits the category of a demonstration site.

The basic design and configuration of the HTGR introduces a completely different set of parameters and accidents to be considered in plant safety.

This is a one of a kind HTGR. The existing Regulatory Guides, standards, etc., do not apply to this plant. The existing Technical Specifications need to be completely revised.

Docket No.: 50-133
Site: Humboldt Bay

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Seismic modifications completed during past year.

Seismic modifications have been performed, feedwater sparger has been replaced.

Upgrading structures to new seismic criteria.

The plant has undergone an extensive outage to upgrade the structural integrity of the facility to limit seismic damage.

Plant shutdown for extensive modification in July 1976.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

The other matters I feel are necessary to consider are being pursued by NRR - they include adequacy of ECCS, single failure design and gaseous effluent treatment.

The plant would be hard pressed to meet any of today's criteria for nuclear plant safety.

No opinion.

New Technical Specifications.

Adequacy of seismic design, ECCS and reactor protection system. Results of analyzing these safety questions could change (significantly) my rating of overall plant safety.

Docket No.: 50-312
Site: Rancho Seco

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Overall plant safety increasing with experience of operations organization and management's understanding and knowledge of nuclear plant operations.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

Not that I'm aware of.

Docket No.: 50-246
Site: San Onofre

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

QA program improvement.

Completed outage which improved their emergency power capability substantially.

Installed emergency diesel generator capacity to carry LOCA load coincident with loss of off-site power. Also, constructed concrete shield around containment vessel.

Extensive ECCS and seismic modifications have been completed.

Installation of onsite emergency power capability.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

This company should be studied to determine how and why their management has been so successful in instilling good safety attitudes and habits so uniformly thru their organization.

Docket No.: 50-344
Site: Trojan

Answers to Question 17 (If a change to safety level occurred, please describe it briefly):

Equipment improvements in engineered safety features brought about by operating experiences.

Improving with experience as operating organization and management matures and gains nuclear experience.

QA program implementation onsite has substantially improved by identifying problems before they became issues or items of noncompliance detected by NRC inspectors.

Fire protection program is being implemented.

Improved attitude toward value of QA auditing and initiating corrective measures to correct recurring deficiencies identified from operating experience.

Answers to Question 18 (Are there other things we should consider about the safety of this plant?):

Active role of State of Oregon in attempting to regulate this plant could have an effect on safety - possibility of contradictory requirements and demands by federal/state agencies.