

NORTHEAST UTILITIES



THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY
HOLYOKE WATER POWER COMPANY
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

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December 3, 1990

Docket No. 50-336
A09123

Mr. E. C. Wenzinger, Chief
Projects Branch No. 4
Division of Reactor Projects
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
478 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Wenzinger:

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2
RI-90-A-137

We have completed our review of an allegation concerning activities at Millstone Unit 2 (RI-90-A-137). As requested in your transmittal letter, our response does not contain any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information. The material contained in this response may be released to the public and placed in the NRC Public Document Room at your discretion. The NRC letter and our response have received controlled and limited distribution on a "need to know" basis during the preparation of this response.

Issue 1

During work under AWO-M2-90-08697, the wrong fuses were tagged when tagging 2-MS-190B. Please explain.

Response

When 2-MS-190B was tagged for the work order referenced, the appropriate operations procedure was used to identify and tag out of service the power supply listed for this valve operator. When the electrician assigned to this job began working on the valve operator, he found that another circuit supplying the valve operator was energized. The Operations Department was informed of this and investigated this situation. They found that another power supply, which previously had not been identified as supplying power to this valve operator, was indeed energized. This power supply (which controls the valve operator in the proportional control mode) was subsequently tagged, and the work authorized by the work order completed.

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Unit 2 Engineering then performed an investigation to ensure that all power supplies to these particular valve operators were identified in the appropriate procedures. The affected procedures have been revised to reflect the existence of the second power supply.

Issue 2

A tagout of the "G" Demineralizer Inlet Motor-Operated Valve failed to remove 125V from the limit switch contacts. P&ID 25213-3281C, Sheet 20, does not show 125V to the limit switch contacts. The Maintenance Supervisor for Millstone Unit 2 was informed of this discrepancy by the NRC Resident Inspector on August 23, 1990. Please discuss the alleged weakness of the plant drawings and the resulting tagout inadequacy. No response to the implied personnel safety issue is requested.

Response

The power supply for the motor on the "G" CPF Demineralizer inlet motor-operated valve operator was tagged by Operations to support a work order. The problem identified on the work order stated that the "valve does not close." The work to be performed was "adjust or replace torque switch." Breaker 2-CND-V72 was the only power supply listed in documents located in the control room.

The work was completed with the original tagouts. The tagout was proper for the work to be performed. No additional tagging was requested or needed to deenergize the 125V supply to the limit switch contacts in order to safely complete the troubleshooting and repair procedure.

The valve in question is part of a vendor supplied package associated with the condensate polisher on Millstone Unit 2. The circuit in question has been located on vendor drawings for this equipment. The circuit is part of the control system for the demineralizers and was not identified during the original development of the tag out list for these valves. The Unit 2 Engineering Department will be reviewing the wiring diagrams for each of the demineralizer motor-operated valves installed with this backfit to determine if any other anomalies exist. When this work is completed, control room drawings will be revised as needed to identify the existence of other sources of 125V supplies to the valves, and the Operations Department will make any necessary changes to valve tagging procedures. Consideration will also be given to labeling fuses which supply these circuits. In the interim, Operations personnel are aware of the potential for a 125V supply to be energized in these valves and will confer with Maintenance personnel to ensure that the power supplies are located and deenergized prior to the conduct of any work on these valves. This concern has pointed out a potential personnel safety issue which has been addressed.

Issue 3

Lights in the turbine building 45 ft. level have no P&ID. (No response to this issue is required).

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Response

In order to provide a clarification to this issue, the following discussion is provided for your information.

The lighting circuit for these lights is indeed not shown on any electrical wiring schematic drawing. There is a series of lighting distribution drawings (25203-350XX) which reflect the approximate physical locations of lamp fixtures and the circuits which supply them. These drawings provide sufficient detail regarding the source of power to the lights to allow safety tagging of the power supply for these circuits when these lights are deenergized for relamping and other maintenance activities. For the lights in the turbine building at elev. 45', Drawing 25203-35038, Sheet 6, indicates that lighting panel L10 supplies these lights from several circuits. No further action is considered necessary, and none is planned.

Issue 4

The on-call electrician on August 27, 1990 could not be contacted at 2:30 a.m. because the phone list in the control room was out of date. Please review and update your on-call phone list.


Response

The on-call phone list has been updated. In this particular situation, the on-call electrician had recently moved and changed telephone numbers. The phone list was in the process of being updated at the time of this event. The on-call electrician was carrying a radiopager and could have been contacted via this device. Control Room personnel did not attempt to contact the on-call individual in this manner, but rather contacted another electrician who was not on-call via the telephone.

After our review and evaluation, we find that none of these issues taken either singularly or collectively present any indication of a compromise of nuclear safety. Nonetheless, we are pleased that the issues requiring attention on our part have been identified so that they can be corrected. Please contact my staff if there are further questions on any of these matters.

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY



E. J. Mróczka
Senior Vice President

cc: W. J. Raymond, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit Nos, 1, 2, and 3