



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

JUN 11 1985

Information in this record was deleted
in accordance with the Freedom of Information
Act, exemptions 3
FOIA-90-269

SGPR:RBM
50-410

MEMORANDUM FOR: Cecil O. Thomas, Chief
Standardization and Special Projects Branch
Division of Licensing, NRR

FROM: George W. McCorkle, Chief
Power Reactor SG Licensing Branch
Division of Safeguards, NMSS

SUBJECT: NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION
NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 2
SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT

Based on our review of the applicant's submittal dated May 15, 1985,
we have prepared a revised page to the SER statement for the Nine Mile Point
Nuclear Station. A proposed implementing license condition and listing of
revisions are enclosed. This completes our review of this application.

~~UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION~~
~~Unauthorized disclosure subject to~~
~~Administrative and Criminal sanctions.~~

George W. McCorkle
George W. McCorkle, Chief
Power Reactor SG Licensing Branch
Division of Safeguards, NMSS

Enclosures:
2, as stated

cc: J. Joyner, RI
M. Haughey, NRR

CONTACT:
R. B. Manili, NMSS
42-74709

When separated from enclosures, handle this document
as decontrolled
(insert proper classification)

[Handwritten initials/signature]

9102190091 901213
PDR FOIA
PERSON90-269 PDR

4pp

PROPOSED LICENSE CONDITION

The licensee shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, guard training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans, including all amendments and revisions made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p), which are part of the license. These plans, which contain Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, are entitled: "Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 2 Physical Security Plan," "Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 2 Security Training and Qualification Plan," and "Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Safeguards Contingency Plan" (Chapter 8 of the Security Plan).

ENCLOSURE 2

Docket: 50-410

May 21, 1985

NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 2

The approved security plans for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 2 consist of the following submittals.

"Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Physical Security Plan"


- Submittal 1, undated (by letter dated January 26, 1983) as revised by:
- Submittal 2, dated September 9, 1983 (by letter dated September 12, 1983)
- Submittal 3, dated June 19, 1984 (by letter dated June 19, 1984)
- Submittal 4, dated September 26, 1984 (by letter dated September 26, 1984)
- Submittal 5, dated May 15, 1985 (by letter dated May 15, 1985)

"Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Safeguards Contingency Plan" (Chapter 8 of the Security Plan)

- Submittal 1, undated (by letter dated March 27, 1979) as revised by:
- Submittal 2, dated February 21, 1980 (by letter dated February 25, 1980)
- Submittal 3, dated March 4, 1980 (by letter dated March 11, 1980)

"Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Security Training and Qualification Plan"

- Submittal 1, undated (by letter dated August 17, 1979) as revised by:
- Submittal 2, dated April 20, 1981 (by letter dated June 26, 1981)
- Submittal 3, undated, (by letter dated December 28, 1981)



JAN 15 1986

Docket No. 50-410

License No. CPPR-112

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
ATTN: Mr. Joseph J. Sunser
Manager, System Security
300 Erie Boulevard, West
Syracuse, New York 13202

Gentlemen:

Subject: Inspection No. 50-410/85-38

This refers to the preoperational security program review conducted by Jack M. Dunlap of this office on October 28 - November 1, 1985, at Nine Mile Point Unit 2, Scriba, New York, of activities authorized by NRC License No. CPPR-112 and to the discussions of our findings held by Mr. Dunlap with Mr. Robert F. Orr and others of your staff at the conclusion of the review.

Areas examined during this review are described in the NRC Region I Inspection Report which is enclosed with this letter. Within these areas, the review consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observations by the inspector. Our review indicates that the development and implementation of your physical security program are progressing as scheduled.

~~Certain paragraphs in Attachment A to the enclosed inspection report contain details of your security program that have been determined to be exempt from public disclosure in accordance with 10 CFR 9.5(a)(4) (Commercial or Financial Information). Therefore, those paragraphs will not be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room and will receive limited distribution. This letter and the remainder of the enclosure will be placed in the Public Document Room, in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 (a).~~

No reply to this letter is required. Your cooperation with us is appreciated.

Sincerely,

Original Signed By:
Joseph M. [Signature]

Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Radiation Safety
and Safeguards

Information in this record was deleted
in accordance with the Freedom of Information
Act, exemptions b7D
FOIA- 90-269

Enclosure: NRC Region I Inspection Report No. 50-410/85-38 (~~Inspection Report Paragraph 11 and Attachment A, Paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 13, 15 and 16 contain Commercial or Financial Information (COFI).~~)

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY IR NM2 8538 - 0001.0.0
11/27/85


865/290034


K/2


2 AP


cc w/encl: (w/o COFI)
Connor & Wetterhahn
John W. Keib, Esquire
D. Quanme, NMP-2 Project Director
C. Beckham, NMPC QA Manager
T. J. Perkins, General Superintendent
R. B. Abbott, Station Superintendent
Department of Public Service, State of New York
Public Document Room (PDR)
Local Public Document Room (LPDR)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
NRC Resident Inspector (w/COFI)
State of New York

bcc w/encl: (w/o COFI)
Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
Management Assistant, DRMA (w/o encl)
DRP Section Chief
J. Grant, DRP
Region I SLO
R. B. Manili, NMSS (w/COFI)


~~DRSS:RI~~
Dunlop/ca
1/10/86


~~DRSS:RI~~
Kerling
1/10/86


~~DRSS:RI~~
Joyner
1/15/86


~~DRSS:RI~~
Martin
1/1/86

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I

Report No. 50-410/85-38

Docket No. 50-410

License No. CPPR-112

Licensee: Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation

300 Erie Boulevard West

Syracuse, New York 13202

Facility Name: Nine Mile Point, Unit 2

Inspection At: Scriba, New York

Inspection Conducted: October 28 - November 1, 1985

Date of Last Physical Security Inspection: May 21 - 24, 1984

Type of Inspection: Preoperational Security Program Review

Inspector: Jack M. Dunlap
Jack M. Dunlap, Physical Security Inspector

1-10-86
date

Approved by: Richard R. Keating
Richard R. Keating, Chief,
Safeguards Section BRSS

1-10-85
date

Inspection Summary: Review of Physical Security Plan and Implementing Pro-
cedures for Receipt of Special Nuclear Material of Low Strategic Significance,
and Pre-operational Security Program Review on October 28 - November 1, 1985
(Report No. 50-410/85-38)

Areas Reviewed: Security plan and implementing procedures for receipt of special nuclear material of low strategic significance; Pre-operational review of the security program development and implementation; Follow-up on previously identified Inspector Follow-up Items; Licensee consideration and actions on previously issued Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins, Circulars and Notices; and, Independent Inspection Effort. The review involved 32 hours onsite during regular hours by one NRC region-based inspector.

Results: The licensee was found capable of implementing the security plan for receipt of fuel which was approved by NRC on September 18, 1985. Development and implementation of the plant's physical security program is progressing satisfactorily in accordance with the licensee's schedule.

~~8601290050~~

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

R. F. Orr, Supervisor, Nuclear Security
J. P. Beratta, Assistant Supervisor, Nuclear Security
H. G. Christiansen, Supervisor, Nuclear Security Clearances
D. K. MacVittie, Nuclear Security Specialist
J. T. Christmas, Nuclear Security Sergeant
D. A. Rath, Security Investigator
D. R. Keeney, Assistant Nuclear Security Specialist
J. Dilk, Training Instructor, Nuclear Security

The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel, including members of the guard force.

2. MC 30703 Exit Interview

The inspector met with the licensee representatives listed in paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the review on November 1, 1985, discussed the purpose and scope, and presented the findings.

Written material was not provided to the licensee by the inspector at anytime during this review.

3. MC 93701 - Status of Inspector Follow-up Items

The following Inspector Follow-up Items (IFI's), identified during the initial preoperational security program review (NRC Region 1 Inspection Report 50-410/84-10), were reviewed during this inspection: IFI 84-10-01, -02, -03, -06, -07, -10, -11, -14, -17, -22, and -25. Licensee actions regarding IFI 84-10-22 was found acceptable and this item was closed. The status of the remaining IFI's is as discussed in the applicable paragraphs of this report.

4. MC 81018 - Security Plan and Implementing Procedures

The inspector reviewed the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Security Plan for Special Nuclear Material (SNM) of Low Strategic Significance, dated May 29, 1984, and Revision 1 dated August 8, 1985, and Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) Security Directive-34, dated October 23, 1985, entitled Receipt of New Fuel Assemblies. The Plan was approved by NRC letter dated September 18, 1985. NMPC Security Directive-34 consisted of the following procedures:

- a. Fuel Receipt
- b. Access Control Fuel Receipt Area (CAA-1)

- c. Access Control Fuel Receipt Area (CAA-2)
- d. Civil Disturbance
- e. Strike or Work Action
- f. Internal Disturbance
- g. Loss of On-Site Power/Lighting
- h. Fire, Explosion, or other Catastrophe
- i. Breach of CAA
- j. Theft of SNM
- k. Threat to Steal SNM of LSS

The procedures were adequate and appropriate to implement the NRC approved Plan and the requirements of 10 CFR 73.67.

Inspector Follow-up Item 84-10-01 remains open pending review of the site physical security plan and implementing procedures.

5. MC 81022 - Security Organization (Management)

The licensee has not yet identified all of the additional supervisory personnel to manage the expanded proprietary guard force when implementation of the Unit 2 program is required. One captain has been appointed and additional positions for four lieutenants and three sergeants have been approved. The licensee anticipates that these positions will be filled in November 1985. Inspector Follow-up Item 84-10-02 remains open pending finalization of staffing and subsequent NRC review.

6. MC 81026 - Security Organization (Personnel)

The licensee stated that approximately 70 additional security personnel will be required to staff the combined Unit 1 and Unit 2 security force. Approximately three-fourths of this number have been fully qualified and the remainder were scheduled to begin training on November 4, 1985. By mid-December 1985, the licensee expects to have all the new guards fully trained and qualified. Inspector Followup Item 84-10-03 remains open pending completion of training and subsequent NRC review.

7. MC 81038 - Records and Reports

The licensee stated that all records and reports are expected to be modified to include the addition of Unit 2 security facilities and equipment by the end of December, 1985. Inspector Follow-up Item 84-10-06 remains open pending completion of modifications and subsequent NRC review.

8. MC 81042 - Testing and Maintenance

The licensee stated that the security equipment at Unit 2, with a few exceptions (e.g. high mast lighting), is compatible with the equipment currently in use at Unit 1. Therefore, maintenance procedures will require only minor changes and should be completed by the end of December 1985. Administrative procedures are sufficiently encompassing to be applied without revision. Inspector Follow-up Item 84-10-07 remains open pending revision of necessary procedures and subsequent NRC review.

9. MC 81052 - Physical Barriers (Protected Area)

The physical barrier surrounding the protected area (PA) was examined by the inspector. The licensee stated that a preliminary survey of water drains and tunnels was begun but could not be completed until construction was finished. Inspector Followup Item 84-10-10 remains open pending completion of the PA barrier and subsequent NRC review.

10. MC 81154 - Physical Barriers (Vital Areas)

The inspector observed that the construction of vital areas was progressing as scheduled, however, there were numerous pipe and cable openings in the walls, floors and ceilings of these areas that require additional work. Inspection Follow-up Item 84-10-11 remains open pending completion of necessary work in all vital areas and subsequent NRC review.

11. MC 81066 - Assessment Aids

(SGI)
(FOUO) The inspector observed that the [REDACTED] was installed but not connected into the alarm stations. With test equipment, the inspector was able to view each [REDACTED] area of coverage. The inspector determined that additional adjustment to the [REDACTED] are necessary. (FOUO)(SGI)

Inspector Follow-up Item 84-10-14 remains open.

12. MC 81074 - Access Control (Vehicles)

The inspector determined that the licensee reviewed NRC IE Information Notice No. 84-07, Design Basis Threat and Review of Vehicular Access Controls, dated February 3, 1984, and had considered the Information Notice. (See also Attachment A, Paragraph 16.) Inspector Follow-up Item 84-10-17 remains open pending subsequent NRC review of procedures for vehicle access control.

13. NC 81501 - Training and Qualification Plan

The inspector reviewed the status of guard force training and qualifications. Although the existing training staff is sufficient to train the additional personnel needed for the combined Nine Mile Point Unit 1 and Unit 2 security force, the licensee stated that an additional training instructor has been hired and will complete the training and qualification program in December 1985. By mid-December 1985, the combined Nine Mile Point security force will be at its desired strength level, according to the licensee.

As a result of IF1 84-10-22 which involved training in bomb search techniques, the licensee advised the inspector that all members of the construction guard force were trained in bomb search techniques. Subsequently, these guard force members have been converted to temporary

watchmen. A review by the inspector of about 60% of the training and qualification records of the temporary watchmen disclosed that all were fully trained and qualified, except for firearms training. Based upon completion of training in bomb search techniques, Inspector Follow-up Item 84-10-22 is closed.

14. MC 92703 - Follow-up on NRC Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins, Circulars and Notices

Attachment A contains information concerning the licensee's consideration of previously issued NRC security related bulletins, circulars and information notices. These notifications were forwarded by the NRC's Office of Inspection and Enforcement to all NRC nuclear power reactor licensees for their information and/or action. With the exception of IE Information Notices 84-08, 84-69, and 85-28, the inspector found that the licensee had considered those documents in developing the Unit 2 security program as described in Attachment A. Inspector Follow-up Item 84-10-25 remains open pending NRC review of the licensee's actions regarding the remaining IE Notices.

15. MC 92706 - Independent Inspection Effort

On October 18, 1985, Switch Gear Cabinet No. 16 exploded, injuring three craftworkers, one seriously. The licensee's Supervisor, Nuclear Security Clearances, informed the inspector that he had observed electricians inspect the equipment right after the explosion and that the cause of the explosion appeared to have been an electrical fault. A security guard was posted at the equipment until the manufacturer's representatives arrived on the scene to inspect the equipment. The inspector also interviewed the Superintendent of Maintenance, who confirmed the suspicion that the explosion was caused by an electrical fault.

~~PART 2.790(d) INFORMATION~~

ATTACHMENT A

Licensee Action Relative to Pertinent, Previously Issued
IE Bulletins, Circulars and Information Notices

1. IE CIRCULAR NO. 77-04: INADEQUATE LOCK ASSEMBLIES, DATED MARCH 18, 1977

NMPC Action:

The Circular was reviewed by the licensee. The following actions were taken:

- a. (COFI) Vital area doors at Unit 2 are secured with [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (COFI)
- b. (COFI) Outswinging doors and inswinging double-doors [REDACTED] (COFI) are equipped [REDACTED] (COFI)
- c. (COFI) [REDACTED] (COFI)
- d. (COFI) All vital area doors, lock sets, and associated hardware are periodically inspected and tested to ensure that they are effective and have not been degraded through use. (COFI)

2. IE BULLETIN NO. 77-08: ASSURANCE OF SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS DURING AN
EMERGENCY LOCKING SYSTEMS, DATED DECEMBER 28, 1977

NMPC Action:

- a. (COFI) Security related doors at Unit 2 are normally locked and equipped with key card readers. In the event of a computer failure or an electrical problem, all doors may be opened by [REDACTED] (COFI)
- b. (COFI) Operations personnel, with emergency plan duties or who require immediate access to plant areas out of operational necessity, are issued and carry [REDACTED] while on duty which permit such access. (COFI)
- c. (COFI) All emergency exits are equipped with operable panic hardware. (COFI)

~~PART 2.790(d) INFORMATION~~

~~PART 2.790(d) INFORMATION~~

Attachment A

2

3. IE CIRCULAR NOS. 78-17 AND 79-03: INADEQUATE GUARD TRAINING/QUALIFICATION AND FALSIFIED TRAINING RECORDS, DATED OCTOBER 13, 1978 AND FEBRUARY 23, 1979

NMPC Action:

The Circular was reviewed by the licensee when issued, and was considered in the preparation of the Unit 1 Training and Qualification Plan, which has since been reviewed and approved by NRR. Unit 2 security personnel will become part of the existing organization and the approved Training and Qualification Plan will continue to be used. Personnel and training records, certifications, and supporting documentation are reviewed by members of security management charged with the responsibility of conducting intra-departmental audits. Guard performance is continually evaluated to ensure that training is adequate and that procedures are being properly implemented. Weaknesses are corrected by spot retraining of individuals or by increasing the training in deficient areas. Classroom and range training is observed by security management personnel. All training is conducted by security training instructors who are Niagara Mohawk supervisory personnel.

4. IE CIRCULAR NO. 79-08: ATTEMPTED EXTORTION-LOW ENRICHED URANIUM, DATED MAY 18, 1979

NMPC Action:

The Circular was reviewed and considered in the preparation of the Security Plans for Units 1 and 2 to preclude a similar occurrence at Nine Mile Point. Special nuclear material (SNM), on site, is not readily accessible for the following reasons:

- a. ~~(COFI)~~ All vehicles are searched and escorted, if they are ~~(COFI)~~
- b. ~~(COFI)~~ SNM is in the form of fuel assemblies which are too large to be moved by ~~(COFI)~~
- c. ~~(COFI)~~ Available SNM is stored within a Vital Area which must be ~~(COFI)~~
- d. ~~(COFI)~~ Photo-ID badges are not taken off site and are only issued to individuals after confirming their identity, prior to entry into the plant. ~~(COFI)~~
- e. ~~(COFI)~~ A continual audit and review of procedures and their implementation are conducted by the licensee and any perceived or actual weaknesses are corrected. ~~(COFI)~~

~~PART 2.790(d) INFORMATION~~

5. IE BULLETIN NO. 79-16: VITAL AREA ACCESS CONTROLS, DATED JULY 30, 1979

NMPC Action:

The Bulletin was reviewed for its applicability to Unit 2, as previously described for Unit 1 in the licensee's letter to NRC dated September 13, 1979.

All commitments will apply to Unit 2. Details of the vital area access control are found in the licensee's submitted Security and Safeguards Contingency Plan, which was written using the guidance found in NUREG-0908, Acceptance Criteria for the Evaluation of Nuclear Power Reactor Security Plans.

6. IE CIRCULAR NO. 80-09: PROBLEMS WITH PLANT INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, DATED MARCH 28, 1980

NMPC Action:

(COPI) The Circular was reviewed by the Nine Mile Point security organization. Security communication systems are supplied with [REDACTED] thus ensuring continued operation in the event of a loss of primary power, as stated in the Security and Safeguards Contingency Plan which was submitted to NRC. (COPI)

RFI problems and concerns are addressed under IE Notice 83-83. (See paragraph 15, below.)

7. IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 80-18: POSSIBLE WEAPONS SMUGGLING POUCH, DATED MAY 5, 1980

NMPC Action:

The Notice was reviewed by Nuclear Security Management and is disseminated to members of the nuclear security organization, who are responsible for using the x-ray machine and for conducting package searches, in their training program.

8. IE NOTICE NO. 82-05: INCREASING FREQUENCY OF DRUG-RELATED INCIDENTS, DATED MARCH 10, 1982

NMPC Action:

The Notice was reviewed for applicability to Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2. The licensee has an established drug and alcohol abuse policy which includes an employee assistance program and first line supervisory input through a continual observation/awareness program. All security personnel involved in access control have received training in drug abuse and awareness and have been effective in detecting and denying access to individuals who are under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

~~(COFI)~~ In addition, pre-employment screening of company employees for drug use, and spot testing of nuclear employees have been effective in assuring that employees are fit for duty. ~~(COFI)~~

9. IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 82-07: INADEQUATE SECURITY SCREENING PROGRAMS, DATED MARCH 16, 1982

NMPC Action:

This notice was reviewed for applicability to Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2. Clearance requirements, as contained in the approved Security and Safeguards Contingency Plan, are specified in the boilerplate contained in all bid specifications, thus ensuring that contractors and subcontractors are made aware of the requirement that their employees must be screened prior to being granted unescorted access to the protected and vital areas of the stations. All clearances are evaluated and granted by NMPC security personnel. In the event that a contractor's clearance program is accepted in lieu of the licensee's, the contractor's program is audited by NMPC security personnel to ensure accuracy and completeness. (See also paragraph 11, below.)

10. IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 82-46: DEFECTIVE AND OBSOLETE COMBINATION PADLOCKS, DATED NOVEMBER 26, 1982

NMPC Action:

The Notice was reviewed by the licensee. All Sargent and Greenleaf padlocks used to secure Safeguards Information at Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 are Model 8077-A. All such locks have been checked by the licensee to confirm that they do not have 1981 backplates.

11. IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 83-15: FALSIFIED PRE-EMPLOYMENT SCREENING RECORDS, DATED MARCH 23, 1983

NMPC Action:

The Notice was reviewed by the licensee. Only a limited number of contractor clearance programs are accepted at Nine Mile Point. These programs are periodically audited by NMPC personnel to ensure accuracy and completeness of program. All other clearances are granted by NMPC after the criteria established in the approved Security and Safeguards Contingency Plan have been satisfied.

12. IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 83-27: OPERATIONAL RESPONSE TO EVENTS CONCERNING DELIBERATE ACTS DIRECTED AGAINST PLANT EQUIPMENT, DATED MAY 4, 1983

NMPC Action:

This Notice was reviewed by the licensee. Security procedures, to cope

with radiological sabotage and other threats to safety, were developed in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(h)(1) and Appendix C of Part 73. The licensee believes, based on response to past incidents, that established operational and security procedures are adequate to ensure the evaluation of any deliberate act directed against plant equipment and the implementation of proper actions to mitigate the safety consequences.

13. IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 83-36: IMPACT OF SECURITY PRACTICES ON SAFE OPERATIONS, DATED JUNE 9, 1983

NMPC Action:

The Notice was reviewed by the licensee and the concerns were addressed in the Security and Safeguards Contingency Plan for Unit 2 which was submitted to NRC. Specifically, the following measures have been taken to address the concerns.

- a. ~~(COFI)~~ Assurance of prompt operator access to operating spaces and equipment is achieved by providing [redacted] to on-duty operations personnel. These [redacted] may be used to open security doors which lock in the closed position in the event of loss of electrical power or access control computer failure. [redacted] are issued and carried by on duty operations personnel and are turned in to security prior to exiting the protected area. Additional [redacted] are issued to the Station Shift Supervisor in the event other individuals, who are authorized, require access. ~~(COFI)~~
- b. ~~(COFI)~~ [redacted] are not a part of the security system at Nine Mile Point. Keypad card readers, however, are used at all unoccupied vital areas and at some vital area entrances. These devices require that [redacted] In the event of an emergency, however, the [redacted] carried by all operations personnel will override any security hardware and permit unimpeded access. ~~(COFI)~~
- c. Although the Security and Safeguard Contingency Plan, Emergency Response Plan and Emergency Operating Procedures have been developed independently, they are generally consistent in their response matrix. Inconsistencies which were identified during the drills at the Unit 1 were resolved.
- d. Annual audits of the security program are conducted by the Safety Review and Audit Board (SRAB) using experienced QA auditors and security consultants. These audits are performed under the cognizance of the plant Safety Operations Review Committee (SORC). In addition, any changes to security hardware or computer software are treated as modifications and require a safety analysis and review by SORC and SRAB.

~~PART 2.790(d) INFORMATION~~

6

e. General Employee Training, which is attended annually by all station personnel who have unescorted access to the station, provides indoctrination into the roles and responsibilities of all disciplines and organizations.

14. IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 83-68: RESPIRATOR USER WARNING: DEFECTIVE SELF-CONTAINED BREATHING APPARATUS AIR CYLINDERS, DATED OCTOBER 11, 1983

NMPC Action:

The licensee determined that this Notice was not applicable to the security organization. Members of the Nuclear Security Organization do not utilize self contained respiratory equipment; only negative pressure devices are used by security personnel.

15. IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 83-83: USE OF PORTABLE RADIO TRANSMITTERS INSIDE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, DATED DECEMBER 19, 1983

NMPC Action:

~~(COFI)~~ The licensee reviewed this Notice and initiated actions to address the problem of radio frequency interference (RFI) generated by portable radio transmitters. Plans are being developed to increase the density of the radiax network and to decrease its power level. In addition, the power output of portable radios will be [REDACTED]. Tests have indicated that these modifications will not degrade the reliability of communications within the station. If future testing shows that certain pieces of equipment are more susceptible to RFI than others, such equipment will be identified and the use of portable radios in close proximity to it will be administratively controlled. A memorandum was issued by on November 16, 1984 directing that two way radios not be used [REDACTED]

~~(COFI)~~

16. IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 84-07: DESIGN BASIS THREAT AND REVIEW OF VEHICULAR ACCESS CONTROLS, DATED FEBRUARY 3, 1984

NMPC Action:

~~(COFI)~~ The Information Notice was reviewed for applicability to Unit 2. The licensee believes that the [REDACTED] on the vehicle approach, and the use of [REDACTED] should preclude vehicle penetration. ~~(COFI)~~

17. IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-04: INADEQUATE MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY RESPONSE DRILLS, DATED JANUARY 17, 1985

NMPC Action:

The Notice was reviewed by the licensee's security training personnel. All participants in drills conducted at Nine Mile Point are assigned to

~~PART 2.790(d) INFORMATION~~

training, briefed and examined prior to the conduct of any exercise. Additionally, on-duty security personnel are made aware of the drill, and prior coordination with station operations personnel is carried out.

~~REDACTED~~
FEB 05 1988

Docket Nos. 50-220
50-410

License Nos. DPR-63
NPF-69

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
ATTN: Mr. Joseph P. Beratta
Manager, System Security
300 Erie Boulevard West
Syracuse, New York 13202

Information in this record was deleted
in accordance with the Freedom of Information
Act, exemptions b1, b7
FOIA-90-269

Gentlemen:

Subject: Combined Inspection No. 50-220/87-14 and 50-410/87-30

This refers to the routine physical security inspection conducted by Mr. W. G. Martin, of this office on July 27-31, 1987, at Scriba, New York, of activities authorized by NRC License Nos. DPR-63 and NPF-69 and to the discussions of our findings held by Mr. Martin with Mr. D. D. O'Hara and other members of your staff at the conclusion of the inspection.

Areas examined during this inspection are described in the NRC Region I Inspection Report which is enclosed with this letter. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observations by the inspector.

Based on the results of this inspection, it appears that one of your activities was not conducted in full compliance with NRC requirements as set forth in Paragraph 5 of the enclosed inspection report. This violation was identified by Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation personnel and adequately corrected prior to the completion of the inspection; therefore, no response is required.

Paragraph 5 in the enclosed inspection report contains details of your security program that have been determined to be exempt from public disclosure in accordance with 10 CFR 73.21 (Safeguards Information). Therefore, the paragraph will not be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room and will receive limited distribution. This letter and the remaining portions of the inspection report will be placed in the Public Document Room, in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a).

~~REDACTED~~

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION
UPON DISCLOSURE THIS
PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

CIR SG NMP 87-14/30 - 0001.0.0
01/05/88

K/4

8802170306

FEB 05 1988

Your cooperation with us is appreciated.

Sincerely,

Original Signed By:
Richard P. Keimig

Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Radiation Safety
and Safeguards

Enclosure: Combined Inspection Nos. 50-220/87-14 and 50-410/87-30 (Paragraph 5 contains Safeguards Information (SGI))

cc w/encl (w/o SGI):

T. E. Lemppes, Vice President, Nuclear Generation
C. Beckham, Manager Nuclear Quality Assurance Operations
T. Perkins, General Superintendent, Nuclear Generation
W. Hansen, Manager Corporate Quality Assurance
T. Roman, Unit 1 Station Superintendent
J. Aldrich, Unit 1 Superintendent, Operations
W. Drews, Technical Superintendent
J. A. Perry, Vice President, Quality Assurance
D. Quamme, NMP-2 Project Director
R. B. Abbott, Station Superintendent
Troy B. Conner, J. , Esquire
John W. Keib, Esquire
Director, Power Division
Public Document Room (PDR)
Local Public Document Room (LPDR)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
NRC Resident Inspector (w/SGI)
State of New York

bcc w/encl (w/o SGI):

Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
NRC Project Inspector
Management Assistant, DRMA (w/o encls)
Section Chief, DRP
Robert J. Bores, DRSS

RI:DRSS
WMartin/gcb

1/25/88

RI:DRSS
Keimig

1/25/88

RI:DRSS
Bores

1/25/88

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

CIR SG NMP 87-14/30 - 0002.0.0
01/05/88

RR Keimig / J. Keimig
(NAME) (SIGNATURE)
NRC Region I 2-5-88
(ORGANIZATION) (DATE)



U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I

Report Nos. 50-220/87-14
50-410/87-30

Docket Nos. 50-220
50-410

License Nos. DPR-63
NPF-69

Licensee: Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
300 Erie Boulevard, West
Syracuse, New York 13202

Facility Name: Nine Mile Point, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: Scriba, New York

Inspection Conducted: July 27-31, 1987

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS
(SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION)

Inspector: W. G. Martin
W. G. Martin, Physical Security Inspector

1/25/88
date

Approved by: R. Keimig
Richard R. Keimig, Chief
Safeguards Section, RSS

1-26-88
date

Inspection Summary: Routine, Announced Physical Security Inspection on
July 27-31, 1987 Report Nos. 50-220/87-14 and 50-410/87-30

Areas Inspected: Security Plan; Locks, Keys, and Combinations; Barriers
(Protected and Vital Areas); Lighting; Assessment Aids; Detection Aids
(Protected Area); Alarm Stations; Communications; Security Contingency Plan
Implementation; and Training and Qualification Plan.

Results: The licensee was in compliance with NRC requirements in the areas
examined, except as follows: a degraded vital area barrier was identified by
the licensee during the inspection.

THE INFORMATION ON THIS PAGE
IS DEEMED TO BE APPROPRIATE
FOR RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

035-RI- 88-08
Copy 1 of 4 Copies
4 Pages

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
JAN 1984



8802170314

DETAILS

1. Key Persons Contacted

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation

D. D. O'Hara, Assistant Nuclear Security specialist
G. R. Gilmer, Supervisor, Technical Services
H. G. Christensen, Supervisor, Nuclear Security Clearance
C. Ouderkirk, Supervisor, Nuclear Security Records
J. A. Dilk, Training Instructor
W. A. Mittag, Training Instructor
L. Stephens-Twining, Safeguards Information Custodian
R. Miller, Captain, Security Operations
R. Comins, Captain, Security Operations
P. Harthett, Sergeant, Security Operations
P. Salerno, Sergeant, Security Operations

USNRC

W. A. Cook, Senior Resident Inspector

2. Security Plan

The inspector reviewed the licensee's NRC-approved Physical Security Plan and determined that no changes had been made since the previous physical security inspection.

3. Locks, Keys, and Combinations

The inspector confirmed that the licensee's key and lock control program was being administered in accordance with the NRC-approved Physical Security Plan and appropriate implementing procedures.

4. Physical Barriers - Protected Area

The inspector observed the entire protected area barrier and determined that the licensee is maintaining it in accordance with the NRC-approved Physical Security Plan.

5. Physical Barriers - Vital Areas

The inspector observed that the licensee maintained the physical barriers surrounding the vital areas in conformance with the NRC-approved Physical Security Plan with the exception of the degraded vital area barrier discussed below. This degraded barrier was identified by the licensee during the inspection and was adequately and promptly corrected prior to completion of the inspection.

[REDACTED]

(SGI) On July 28, 1987, at approximately 11:20 a.m., two members of the security organization informed security supervision that an unsecured "access hatch" leading to the [REDACTED] had the remote potential to allow an unauthorized individual access to the [REDACTED] which is a vital area. The access hatch is located approximately 18 feet above the roof of the [REDACTED] building. However, an existing ladder on the roof provided a potential for gaining access to the hatch and then into the vital area if an individual had access to the roof. The door leading onto the roof of the [REDACTED] building is locked, but not alarmed, and the key is controlled by security and the station shift supervisor. Prior to opening this door, existing administrative procedures required that the station shift supervisor be notified. Additionally, the walls of the [REDACTED] building are sheer, over 20 feet high in most areas and therefore, do not present an exploitable path to the roof. (SGI)

~~(SGI)~~ Immediate compensatory measures were taken by the licensee, by placing a guard on the roof until the hatch was secured with a security lock and then placing the immediate area on an hourly internal patrol. The ladder was removed on July 30, 1987. Access to the hatch could only be accomplished now by scaling a sheer wall of 18 feet, which is not considered possible. ~~(SGI)~~

The inspector determined that the matter was not a significant safeguards problem and stated that it was considered to be a licensee identified violation of the NRC-approved Physical Security and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Paragraph 2.2.1.

6. Lighting

The inspector observed the lighting within the protected area during hours of darkness (8:30 p.m. to 10:30 p.m.) on July 29, 1987. All areas were lighted to levels committed to in the NRC-approved Physical Security Plan and were sufficient to allow detection and observation of unauthorized activities.

7. Assessment Aids

The inspector observed the operation of the assessment aids during daylight and darkness (as described above) and determined that they were functioning as committed to in the NRC-approved Physical Security Plan.

8. Detection Aids - Protected Area

The inspector reviewed the detection aids around the protected area, and in the presence of licensee security personnel, randomly tested segments of the perimeter intrusion detection system. The inspector determined the detection aids to be adequate and in accordance with the NRC-approved Physical Security Plan.

[REDACTED]

9. Alarm Stations

The inspector confirmed through direct observation that the central alarm station (CAS) and the secondary alarm station (SAS) were in conformance with the NRC-approved Physical Security Plan. Both CAS and SAS operators demonstrated adequate skill and knowledge in the performance of their duties.

10. Communications

The inspector observed requested testing of communications capabilities between the central alarm station (CAS) and required on-site and off-site locations. They were found to be in accordance with the NRC-approved Physical Security Plan.

11. Security Contingency Plan Implementation Review

The inspector reviewed the licensee's NRC-approved Security Contingency Plan and implementing procedures. The inspector noted that the licensee had conducted ten security contingency drills between June 22, 1987 and July 23, 1987, all of which were participated in by the operations organization. In addition, the inspector also noted that the security organization actively participated in the site emergency drill conducted on July 21, 1987.

12. Personnel Training and Qualifications - General Requirement

The inspector reviewed selected training records and procedures and found them to be in accordance with the NRC-approved Training and Qualifications Plan.

13. Exit Interview

The inspector met with the licensee representatives listed in paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on July 31, 1987. At that time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed and the findings presented.

At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspector.