

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | 1 | L | Q | A | D | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | _____ | 5
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 58

CON'T
0 1 | REPORT SOURCE | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 8 | 2 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 9 | 8 | 2 | 9
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
0 2 | On October 13, 1982, at approximately 0720 hours, the unit was being started up
0 3 | following a Maintenance Outage and Drywell to Suppression Pool differential pressure
0 4 | was 0 psid. At this time it was observed that the Suppression Pool level was 1/2
0 5 | inch below Technical Specification limits of -2.0 inches. This level assures
0 6 | adequate steam condensation during a design basis accident at 100% power. Design
0 7 | calculations are conservative and power was less than 30% of rated throughout this
0 8 | event. Thus, there was no affect on safe unit operation as a result of this
7 8 9 occurrence. 80

0 9 | SYSTEM CODE | S | A | 11 | CAUSE CODE | A | 12 | CAUSE SUBCODE | A | 13 | COMPONENT CODE | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | 14 | COMP. SUBCODE | Z | 15 | VALVE SUBCODE | Z | 16
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20
17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | 8 | 2 | 21 | 22 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | 0 | 2 | 0 | 23 | OCCURRENCE CODE | 0 | 3 | 28 | 29 | REPORT TYPE | L | 30 | REVISION NO. | 0 | 31 | 32
ACTION TAKEN | X | 18 | FUTURE ACTION | 1 | 19 | EFFECT ON PLANT | Z | 20 | SHUTDOWN METHOD | Z | 21 | HOURS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | Y | 23 | NPRD-4 FORM SUB. | N | 24 | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | Z | 25 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | Z | 9 | 9 | 9 | 26
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
1 0 | At approximately 0400 hours, on October 13, the Suppression Pool level was found to
1 1 | be -2.0 inches. Normally water would have been added at this time. The Operator
1 2 | was preoccupied with the Reactor startup and deferred the addition of water until
1 3 | later. During the next shift panel checks, the level was found to be below the
1 4 | Technical Specification limits. Proper level was restored within 2 hours of the
7 8 9 discovery of the occurrence. This event will be discussed during the
weekly Operation's Department meeting. 80

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS | C | 28 | % POWER | 0 | 2 | 9 | 29 | OTHER STATUS | NA | 30 | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | A | 31 | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | Operator Observation | 32
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80
1 6 | ACTIVITY CONTENT | Z | 33 | RELEASED OF RELEASE | Z | 34 | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | NA | 35 | LOCATION OF RELEASE | NA | 36
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80
1 7 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | TYPE | Z | 38 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 39
7 8 9 11 12 13 80
1 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 41
7 8 9 11 12 80
1 9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY | Z | 42 | TYPE | NA | 43 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 44
7 8 9 10 80
2 0 | PUBLICITY | 1 | 44 | ISSUED DESCRIPTION | NA | 45
7 8 9 10 80

8211190268 821029
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U.S. NRC FORM 7-77-20

- I. LER NUMBER: LER/RO 32-20/03L-0
- II. LICENSEE NAME: Commonwealth Edison Company
Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
- III. FACILITY NAME: Unit Two
- IV. DOCKET NUMBER: 050-265
- V. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On October 13, 1982, during normal startup operations and with the Drywell to Suppression Chamber differential pressure at 0 psid, the Suppression Pool water level was observed to be approximately 1/2 inch below the Technical Specification 3.7.A.1.b limit of -2.0 inches. Water was immediately added via the Condensate System to restore the Suppression Pool level to normal. Reactor power was held at approximately 29 percent throughout this occurrence.

VI. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

The normal volume of water in the Suppression Pool is calculated to be the amount required to completely condense the steam blown down to the Suppression Chamber during a design basis accident at full Reactor power. These calculations are based on conservative assumptions of heat transfer and steam flow. Therefore, the limits on the Suppression Pool water level are conservative. The Reactor was operating at approximately 29 percent power and the limits of the Suppression Pool water levels are based on full power operation, thus, this occurrence did not affect the safe operation of the plant nor the health and safety of the public.

VII. CAUSE:

At approximately 0400 hours, on October 13, the Nuclear Station Operator performed the Operations Department Weekly Summary of Daily Surveillance, QOS 005-S1. At this time, the Suppression Pool level was recorded as -2.0 inches, and thus, was within operating limits. Normally, the Operator would have added water to the pool at this level, but the Operator was preoccupied with the unit startup and deferred raising the level until later. During the next shift panel checks, at about 0800 hours, the Suppression Pool level indication revealed the level was below Technical Specification limits.

VIII. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The immediate action taken was to add water to the Suppression Pool to bring the volume of water within Technical Specification limits. A Suppression Pool level of -2.0 inches was established approximately two hours after the realization that the level was below the Technical Specification limit.

To prevent a future occurrence of this nature, the occurrence will be discussed with the Operators at the next weekly safety meeting.