



Tennessee Valley Authority, 1101 Market Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402

Joseph R. Bynum
Vice President, Nuclear Operations

JAN 22 1991

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555


Dear Sir:

TVA - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO. 50-259 -
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT
BFRO-50-259/90021

The enclosed report provides details concerning a violation of technical specifications that occurred when personnel performing roving fire watch duties could not enter an area. This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY


J. R. Bynum

Enclosure
cc: see page 2

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PDR ADOCK 05000259
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

JAN 22 1991

cc (Enclosure):

INPO Records Center
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Resident Inspector, BFN

Regional Administration
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Mr. Thierry M. Ross
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
One White Flint, North
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, Maryland 20852

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Browns Ferry Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)
050002591 OF 02

TITLE (4) Hourly Fire Watch Could Not Enter Vital Area, Placing the Plant
in Violation of Technical Specifications

EVENT DAY (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)	
0	9	27	9	0	0	2	1	0	0	050000	

OPERATING MODE (9) THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 4:
(Check one or more of the following)(11)

<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify in
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	Abstract below and in
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	Text, NRC Form 366A)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Steve Austin, Compliance Engineer	205729-2049

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRPDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRPDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO
DATE (15) 021491

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On December 22, 1990, it was determined that on September 27, 1990, proper compensatory actions had not been taken for fire protection detection systems out of service when an hourly roving fire watch could not enter "A" 4160V shutdown board room to perform a visual inspection of the area, thus violating technical specifications.

TVA is presently conducting an investigation of this event. TVA will report the results in a supplement to this LER. The supplement will be submitted by February 14, 1991.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)					
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL	REVISION	OF	PAGES				
			NUMBER	NUMBER						
Browns Ferry Unit 1	0500025990	0	2	1	0	0	2	OF	0	2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On December 22, 1990, it was determined that on September 27, 1990, proper compensatory actions had not been taken for fire protection detection systems [IC] out of service when an hourly fire watch could not enter "A" 4160V shutdown board room [NA] to perform a visual inspection of the area, thus violating technical specifications.

On September 27, 1990 at 1955 hours, the "A" 4160V shutdown board room was inspected by an hourly roving fire watch as required by compensatory measures for a fire protection equipment and barrier penetration removal from service permit (Attachment F).

At 2050 hours, the "A" 480V diesel auxiliary board [ED] was returned to its normal power supply during a planned evolution. Transfer of the "A" 480V diesel auxiliary board will cause a loss of the security card reading [IA] system, and for this planned evolution, security was required to manually lock vital area doors. Upon arriving at the locked door of "A" 4160V shutdown board room, the fire watch verified the temperature of the door surface was normal and, from the outward flow of air, there was no fire.

At 2130 hours, the fire watch returned to "A" 4160V shutdown board room, entered the room, and visually verified that no fire had occurred.

During this event, units 1, 2, and 3 were defueled. Failure to properly implement compensatory measures for the Attachment F resulted in a violation of technical specifications. This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

The event described in this LER is similar to the events that resulted in LERs 259/90018 and 259/90019. TVA is currently conducting an investigation of this event. TVA will report the results in a supplement.

Commitment

TVA will issue a supplement to this LER on February 14, 1991.