



Tennessee Valley Authority, 1101 Market Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402

Joseph R. Bynum
Vice President, Nuclear Operations

~~JUN~~ 14 1991

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555


Dear Sir:

TVA - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO. 50-259 -
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT
BFRO-50-259/90020

The enclosed report provides details concerning an unplanned engineered safety feature actuation which occurred during the performance of a relay time delay test. This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



J. R. Bynum

Enclosure
cc: See page 2

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

INPO Records Center
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Resident Inspector, BFN

Regional Administration
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Thierry M. Ross
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
One White Flint, North
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, Maryland 20852

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) | PAGE (3)
Brown's Ferry Unit 1 050002 | 5 | 910 | 0 | 2

TITLE (4)
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation During Relay Testing Caused by Personnel Error

EVENT DAY (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
11	21	490	020	0	0	01	14	91			050002

OPERATING MODE (9) N THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following)(11)

20.402(b)	20.405(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in
20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	Abstract below and in
20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	Text, NRC Form 366A)
20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
Clare S. Hsieh, Compliance Licensing Engineer	205729-2046

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMIT ON DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) _____

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On December 14, 1990 at 0400 hours, 480V shutdown board 1B was deenergized when the normal feeder breaker to the board was tripped during a time delay relay test. The deenergization of the shutdown board in turn deenergized reactor protection system bus 1B and the Primary Containment Isolation System logic relays powered by the bus, resulting in the isolation of group 2 valves. The completion of group 2 isolation logic is considered a plant engineered safety feature.

TVA is presently conducting an investigation of this event. TVA will report the results in a supplement to this LER. The supplement will be submitted by January 31, 1991.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		SEQUENTIAL	REVISION		
		YEAR	NUMBER	NUMBER	
Browns Ferry Unit 1	0500025990	02	00	00	2 OF 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On December 14, 1990 at 0400 hours, unit 1 480V shutdown board 1B [ED] was deenergized when the normal feeder breaker to the board was tripped during a time delay relay test. The deenergization of this shutdown board in turn deenergized Reactor Protection System (RPS) [JC] bus 1B and the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) [JM] logic relays powered by the bus, resulting in the isolation of group 2 valves (drywell floor and equipment drains discharge valves). The completion of group 2 isolation logic is considered a plant engineered safety feature (ESF). PCIS group 3, 6 and 8 isolations did not occur since the system logic has been removed from service. Additionally, the control room emergency ventilation system [VI] and the standby gas treatment system [BH] did not start since they were secured to prevent autostart. All other actions from a loss of the 480V shutdown board and RPS bus 1B were received as expected.

Operations personnel were notified immediately after the event and transferred the shutdown board from its normal power supply (480V transformer TS1B) to its alternate supply (480V transformer TS1E) and restored to operation the loads that had been deenergized.

All three units were shutdown and defueled at the time of this event. No fuel handling or operations over spent fuel were in progress during this event.

This event resulted in the unplanned isolations of the ESF systems. Accordingly, TVA considers it reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

TVA is presently conducting an investigation of this event. TVA will report the results in a supplement to this LER. The supplement will be submitted by January 31, 1991.

COMMITMENTS

TVA will submit a supplement to this LER.

Note: EIIIS Codes are identified in the text as [XX].