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
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report Revision

This letter forwards one (1) copy of to Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 89-001, Rev. 1. Vertical lines in the right side margin indicate those sections of the LER that have been revised.

Very truly yours,



J.J. Barton
Director, Oyster Creek

JJB/JJR:jc
(ler/Covltrs)
Enclosure

cc: Mr. Thomas Martin, Administrator
Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Mr. Alexander W. Dromerick, Project Manager
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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NRC Resident Inspector
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1): Oyster Creek, Unit 1
DOCKET NUMBER (2): 0 5 0 0 0 2 1 9 1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4): Possible Loss of Main Steam Line Isolation Capability Due to Excessive Main Steam Isolation Valve Control Air Leakage

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)		REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
01	11	89	89	001	01					0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9): N
POWER LEVEL (10): 01010

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

20.402(b)	20.406(e)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(a)
20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 308A)
20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	
20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	
20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12): John Rogers, Licensing Engineer
TELEPHONE NUMBER: 610 19 9711-4189 3

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRCDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRCDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14): YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) [] NO [X]

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15): MONTH [] DAY [] YEAR []

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

In response to NRC Generic Letter 88-14, "Instrument Air Supply System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment", and concerns identified during the EOP inspection and internal review of the air system, testing was performed on the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) control air system on January 3, 1989. The purpose of the testing was to check the MSIV accumulators for water and to test control air check valve leak tightness. The testing plan could not be completed due to excessive air leakage from control air piping connections. This condition was determined reportable on January 11, 1989. The MSIV control air system leakage is attributed to the system construction. The control air system piping from the accumulator check valves to the MSIV actuators was replaced with stainless steel piping. Socket welded connections were used where practical to minimize air leakage. In addition, the accumulator check valves were replaced with a soft seat check valve to reduce leakage on the loss of instrument air. Post maintenance testing demonstrated that air leakage rate on loss of instrument air was acceptable for the MSIV to perform its safety functions. Future testing of air accumulators and related piping will be performed in accordance with the testing program developed by GPUN in response to Generic Letter 88-14. This event is reportable based on 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C&D).

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Oyster Creek, Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0150000219	LEN NUMBER (3)			PAGE (3) 0102 OF 03
		YEAR 89	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 001	REVISION NUMBER 01	

TEXT IF MORE SPACE IS REQUIRED, USE REVERSE SIDE OF FORM 3054 (17)

DATE OF OCCURRENCE

This occurrence was discovered on January 3, 1989, and determined reportable on January 11, 1989.

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

Due to excessive Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) control air system leakage, MSIV leak tightness and consequently reactor isolation could not be ensured in the event of a loss of the station instrument air system. This event is reportable based on 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C&D).

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

When the condition was discovered, the reactor was in the REFUEL mode with a reactor coolant temperature of 65°F. A refueling/maintenance outage was in progress since September 30, 1988. This condition has existed for an undetermined period of time during which the plant operated at various power levels.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

In response to NRC Generic Letter 88-1 "Instrument Air Supply Systems Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment", and concerns identified during the EOP inspection and internal review of the air system, testing was performed on the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) control air system (EIS CODE BD, LD and IX), on January 3, 1989. The purpose of the testing was to check the MSIV accumulators for water and to test control air check valve leak tightness. The testing plan could not be completed due to excessive air leakage from control air piping connections.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

The MSIV control air system leakage is attributed to the system construction. MSIV control air piping is made from threaded brass pipe assemblies which are prone to leakage due to the material, assembly method, and maintenance performed on the system over the life of the plant.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Oyster Creek, Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 1 9	LER NUMBER (3)			PAGE (4) 0 3 OF 0 8
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
		0 1	0 0 1	0 1	

TEXT IF MORE THAN 255 CHARACTERS USE SEVERAL NRC Form 255A (117)

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT

Main steam isolation is accomplished by means of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's). The MSIVs are air-operated reactor isolation valves which are air actuated to open and spring actuated with air assist to close. The MSIVs are designed to minimize coolant loss from the vessel and thus off-site doses for specific conditions. Two isolation valves are installed in each of the two 24 inch main steam lines (A and B). One valve is located on each steam line inside the primary containment (NS03A, NS03B), and the other on each steam line outside the primary containment (NS04A, NS04B).

When a reactor isolation signal is received, nitrogen or air which supplies the accumulators and actuators of the inboard MSIV's is isolated to the drywell. Control air, supplied by the station air compressors, continues to be provided to the outboard MSIVs. Upon loss of pneumatic pressure, the MSIV actuator springs will close the valve within the required time, however, the MSIVs may not meet leak rate acceptance criteria when closed by springs only. Air accumulators are available to assist the springs in closing the valves and to provide a pneumatic reserve to minimize seat leakage.

The condition is considered significant in that the air accumulators for all the MSIVs actuators may not have functioned properly due to control air piping leaks. The accumulator pneumatic reserve required to minimize seat leakage was not assured for the MSIVs following a reactor isolation signal. If a design basis accident were to occur, the assumed plant design basis leak rate could be exceeded. This condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of reactor containment and/or primary containment isolation in the event of an accident condition.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The control air system piping from the accumulator check valves to the MSIV actuators was replaced with stainless steel piping. Socket welded connections were used where practical to minimize air leakage. In addition, the accumulator check valves were replaced with a soft seat check valve to reduce leakage on the loss of instrument air. Post maintenance testing demonstrated that air leakage rate on loss of instrument air was acceptable for the MSIV to perform its safety functions.

Future testing of air accumulators and related piping will be performed in accordance with the testing program developed by GPUN in response to Generic Letter 88-14.

SIMILAR OCCURRENCES

None