

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | V | A | S | P | S | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | _____ | 5
6 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 31 CAT 36

CON'T
0 1 | REPORT SOURCE | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 8 | 2 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 9 | 8 | 2 | 9
60 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
0 2 | With Unit 1 at 40 percent power, one of two required boric acid flow paths to the
0 3 | core became unavailable and BIT recirc was terminated due to the temporary loss of
0 4 | Boric Acid Transfer Pump 1-CH-P-2A. This is contrary to T.S. 3.2.C.4 and 3.3.A.3,
0 5 | and is reportable per T.S. 6.6.2.b(2). Since the transfer pump was returned back
0 6 | to service within 3 minutes and the redundant pump remained operable, the health
0 7 | and safety of the public would not have been affected.

0 8 | _____ 80

0 9 | SYSTEM CODE | P | C | 11 | CAUSE CODE | X | 12 | CAUSE SUBCODE | Z | 13 | COMPONENT CODE | P | U | M | P | X | X | 14 | COMP. SUBCODE | B | 15 | VALVE SUBCODE | Z | 16
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | 8 | 2 | 21 | 22 | _____ | 23 | _____ | 24 | _____ | 25 | _____ | 26 | _____ | 27 | _____ | 28 | 0 | 3 | 29 | _____ | 30 | L | 31 | _____ | 32 | 0 |
ACTION TAKEN | X | 18 | FUTURE ACTION | Z | 19 | EFFECT ON PLANT | Z | 20 | SHUTDOWN METHOD | Z | 21 | HOURS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | Y | 23 | NPD-4 FORM SUB. | N | 24 | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | A | 25 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | G | 2 | 0 | 0 | 26
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
1 0 | The motor trip appears to have been a random incident. The pump breaker was
1 1 | reset and flow verified to the VCT and blender.
1 2 | _____
1 3 | _____
1 4 | _____ 80

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS | X | 28 | % POWER | 0 | 4 | 0 | 29 | OTHER STATUS | NA | 30 | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | A | 31 | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | NA | 32
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

1 6 | ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | NA | 35 | LOCATION OF RELEASE | NA | 36
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

1 7 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | TYPE | Z | 38 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 39
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

1 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 41
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

1 9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE | Z | 42 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 43
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

2 0 | PUBLICITY ISSUED | N | 44 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 45
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
NAME OF PREPARED: J. L. Wilson PHONE (804) 357-3184
80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

28-716-01

ATTACHMENT 1
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1
DOCKET NO: 50-280
REPORT NO: 82-112/03L-0
EVENT DATE: 10-17-82

TITLE OF EVENT: LOSS OF "A" BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP

1. Description of Event:

With Unit One at 40% power and ramping up, boric acid flow to the blender and Boron Injection Tank were lost due to Boric Acid Transfer Pump 1-CH-P-2A tripping off. This resulted in unavailability of one of two Boration Flow paths to the core and the loss of continuous recirculation of the Boron Injection Tank (BIT) for approximately 3 minutes, until 1-CH-P-2A was returned to service.

This event is contrary to Technical Specification 3.2.C.4 and 3.3.A.3, and is reportable as per T. S. 6.6.2.b(2).

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Systems:

During an accident condition, the normal boric acid supply is isolated and boric acid is supplied from the refueling water storage tank. Boron Injection Tank recirc flow interruption is permitted for up to two hours as per T. S. 3.3.B.1D. Therefore, the health and safety of the public would not have been affected.

3. Cause of the Event:

The motor trip appears to have been a random incident.

4. Immediate Corrective Action:

The breaker for transfer pump 1-CH-P-2A was reset and flow to the BIT and blender verified.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action:

Boric Acid Transfer Pump 1-CH-P-2A was tested satisfactory.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:

None deemed necessary.

7. Generic Implications:

None.