

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

EXHIBIT A

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

7	8	9	14	15	25	26	30	37	42																			
0	1	FIL	C	R	P	3	2	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4	5
LICENSEE CODE		LICENSE NUMBER									LICENSE TYPE									CAT. II								

CONT

7	8	60	61	68	69	74	75	82	83																	
0	1	L	6	0	5	0	-	0	3	0	2	7	1	0	2	9	8	2	8	1	1	1	2	8	2	9
REPORT SOURCE		DOCKET NUMBER						EVENT DATE						REPORT DATE												

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 At 1100, on 10/29/82, containment isolation valve WDV-61 was declared

0 3 inoperable due to the omission of a leak rate test following maintenance

0 4 as required by T.S.4.6.3.1.1. Thus between 10/25/82 and 10/29/82, when

0 5 maintenance was performed, CR3 changed modes from V to III with WDV-61

0 6 inoperable. There was no effect on public health or safety. This is the

0 7 third time surveillance was not completed following maintenance and the

0 8 forty-fifth report under T.S.3.6.3.1.

7	8	9	10	11	12	13	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	40	41	42	43	44	47												
0	9	S	D	A	C	V	L	V	E	X	D	D	18	2	1	0	1	T		0	H	Z	Z	Z	0	0	0	Y	N	A	G	2	5	5									
SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE			CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE					COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.		ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SU1		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 This event was caused by personnel error. Personnel did not follow the

1 1 work instructions to leak test WDV-61 after performing maintenance.

1 2 WDV-61 was declared operable at 1440, following completion of a leak

1 3 rate test. Personnel were reinstructed on the importance of completing

1 4 work instructions as issued.

7	8	9	10	11	12	13	30	33	34	35	36	37	44	45	46	80	
1	5	C					N/A	L	A								
FACILITY STATUS		% POWER						OTHER STATUS		METHOD OF DISCOVERY						DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION	
ACTIVITY RELEASED		CONTENT OF RELEASE				AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY						LOCATION OF RELEASE					
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES		NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION											
PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION													
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		TYPE						DESCRIPTION									
PUBLICITY		DESCRIPTION															

8211170316 821112
PDR ADOCK 05000302
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY _____

NAME OF PREPARER P. G. Hughes PHONE (904) 795-3802 ext. 430

P. G. Hughes

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

REPORT NO: 50-302/82-064/01T-0
FACILITY: Crystal River Unit #3
REPORT DATE: November 12, 1982
OCCURRENCE DATE: October 29, 1982

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Following maintenance containment isolation valve, WDV-61, was not determined operable prior to mode change. This is contrary to Technical Specification 3.6.3.1.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

MODE 5 (Cold Shutdown) at the time maintenance was performed on WDV-61.
MODE 3 (Hot Standby) at the time of discovery.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On October 25, 1982, maintenance was performed on containment isolation valves WDV-60 and WDV-61. WDV-60 was removed and replaced with a welded cap because there was no valve available for replacement. Maintenance was performed on WDV-61 to replace the broken stem on the valve diaphragm. On October 26, 1982, a hydro test of the cap weld was completed satisfactorily. On October 26, 1982, Technical Specification Change Request No. 104, allowing Crystal River Unit 3 to change operational modes with WDV-60 replaced with a welded cap, was approved and issued. WDV-61 was stroke tested and time tested following maintenance. Personnel involved failed to test the valve leak rate, however, thinking that the hydro test satisfied the leak rate requirements. Thus on October 29, 1982, at 1100, during a surveillance review, it was discovered that surveillance was not completed (as required by Containment Leakage Tests - Type "B" and "C", SP-179). Between the time maintenance was completed and the omission was discovered, CR-3 changed modes from MODE 5 to MODE 3. The valve was leak tested and determined operable at 1440 on October 29, 1982.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE:

This event was caused by personnel not following the work instructions requiring leak rate testing.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

There was no effect on public health or safety. Containment isolation valve WDV-60 had been previously replaced with a welded cap isolating the affected penetration.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Personnel were reinstructed to follow work instructions as issued.

FAILURE DATA:

This was the third time surveillance was not completed after maintenance and the first report for WDV-61, and the 45th report under Technical Specification 3.6.3.1.