LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

	CONTROL BLOCK:
1	LICENSEE CODE 14 15 15 LICENSE NOVIBER 57 CAT 56
1 3 €	SOURCE LIG 0 5 0 0 0 2 9 6 7 1 0 0 7 8 2 3 1 1 0 5 8 2 6 EVENT DATE 74 15 REPORT DATE 80 ENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
IJL	During normal operation, while performing SI 4.1.A-7 on unit 3, reactor high
II L	water level switch (LIS-3-203D sw. #2) as-found calibration was 583.57 inches.
1	T.S. Table 3.2.B trip level setting is 583 inches above vessel zero, which trips the
D L	HPCI turbine. There was no effect on public health and safety. Redundant
1 C	switches were available and operable.
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8 9	SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBC
L 3.	LER RO EVENT YEAR REPORT NO. REPORT TYPE 10 31 32 32 33 31 32 ATTACHMENT PORMSUB. SUBMITTED FORMSUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER B 10 8 10 6 USE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27 Level indicating switch, LIS-3-203D sw. #2, calibration had drifted. The Barton
JL	model 288 switch was recalibrated, functionally tested, and returned to service.
71	See attached action plan for corrective action for category 3 setpoint drift.
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1 4	O 19 3 NA B Surveillance test
	THE CONTENT OF ACTIVITY (5) AUGUST OF ACTIVITY (5) NA LOCATION OF HELEASE (6) NA LOCATION OF HELEASE (6) NA LOCATION OF HELEASE (6)
1 1	1 0 0 0 (3) Z (C) NA
- 1	TEN DESCRIPTION (41)
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	OR CONTRACTOR TO FACTOR (1 V 43) NA NA
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	*AME OF PHICKARES Bobby J. Irby 2000 (205) 729-0841

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50-296 /82047 Technical Specification Involved Table 3.2.B

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.(2) * Date Due NRC 11/06/82

Event Narrative:

Units 1 and 3 were operating normally at 98-percent power and 93-percent power, respectively; unit 2 was in a refueling outage. Only unit 3 was affected by this event. While performing Surveillance Instruction 4.1.A-7 (Reactor Protection System Reactor Water Level), level indicating switch, LIS-3-203D switch 2, operated at 583.57 inches. The limit in Technical Specification Table 3.2.B is 583 inches. Above the trip setting trips the HPCI turbine. The Barton model 288 switch was recalibrated, functionally tested, and returned to service. There was no effect on public health and safety. Redundant switches were available and operable. See attached action plan for corrective action for category 3 setpoint drift.

* Previous Similar Events:

BFRO-50-259/73022W, 73033W, 73041W, 74001W, 78024, 80089, 81071, 82016 260/80004, 80029, 81004, 81055, 81068 296/77003, 80028, 81027, 81055, 82005

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision:

ACTION PLAN BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT - REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM AND CORE STANDBY COOLING SYSTEMS PRIMARY SENSOR SWITCHES

BACKGROUND

The reactor protection system (RPS), the primary containment isolation system (PCIS), and the core standby cooling systems (CSCS) use mechanical-type switches in the sensors that monitor plant process parameters. The plant technical specifications have put very close tolerances on these instruments. As a result, almost any change in switch setpoint requires submittal of a licensee event report (LER). To reduce the frequency of this type LER, the following action plan has been developed.

LONG-TERM SOLUTION

Advances in technology make it possible to replace the mechanical-type switches with a more accurate and more stable electronic transmitter/electronic switch system. This modification is a major change to these safety systems and requires fully qualified safety-grade equipment. This equipment is in limited supply and has long procurement times. TVA is presently reviewing bids for this equipment. The tie-in of the new system to the balance of the RPS, the PCIS, and the CSCS requires a refueling outage. TVA expects to install the electronic systems during the first refueling outage after receipt of equipment.

INTERIM ACTIONS

Because of the long leadtime to implement the long-term solution, several interim actions have been taken. They are based on a review of licensee event reports which can be categorized as follows:

- Category 1: Individual instruments whose setpoints have drifted two consecutive times.
- Category 2: Groups of instruments which exhibit a predictable cyclic setpoint drift pattern.
- Category 3: Individual, randomly occurring instrument setpoint drifts which cannot be put in category 1 or 2.

For each category the following action is taken.

- Category 1: The instrument is replaced with an identical instrument.
- Category 2: The margin between the instrument setting and the technical specification limit is increased.
- Category 3: The instrument is readjusted to the specificed setpoint.