| NAC FOR | U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION |
|-------------------|--|
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT |
| | CONTROL BLOCK: |
| | NYJAFI1 UICENSEE CODE 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |
| | REPORT L 6 0 50 00 33 30 10 06 812 311 1001 82 3 SOURCE 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 |
| 02 | During normal operation, it was determined that the isolation valves |
| 03 | (02-39 and 40) associated with penetration X-41 did not isolate on |
| 04 | all signals required by TS Table 3.7-1. The TS table was found to be |
| 0 5 | in error in that a properly reviewed and approved design change made |
| 06 | during initial construction was not reflected in the Technical |
| 07 | Specifications. No hazard to the public exists. |
| 03 | See attachment for details. |
| | SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE CAUSE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SU |
| 7 3 | $\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $ |
| 10 | During construction of the plant the signals were properly reviewen |
| | and changed. The FOAR was not updated to refete that the leave the |
| 1 2 | fore TS did not get updated. Ine immediate action was to reave the |
| 13 | valves closed. The long-term corrective action is to submit a change |
| | to the TS and FSAR. See attachment for details. |
| 15 | ACILITY STATUS N POWER OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32 E 23 1 0 0 0 NA A 31 Operator Observation 30 |
| 1 <u>5</u> 7 3 | ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE 36 NA 10 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 30 10 11 10 11 10 11 10 11 10 11 10 11 10 11 10 10 |
| 1 7 7 8 | 0 10 Z 38 CESCRIPTION (39) |
| 1 3 | 0 |
| 1 9 | Z 42 NA S PDR 3 30 30 30 3 30 NRC USE ONLY 155UED DESCRIPTION 45 |
| 2 0 | N (44) NA 68 69 80 5 |
| Sec. 1 | NAME OF PREPARER R. J. CONVERSE PHONE 342-3840 |

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-333

ATTACHMENT TO LER -045/03L-0

PAGE 1 of 1

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

The fundamental cause of this event was the failure to update the FSAR for this item during the construction phases of the plant. This action would have updated the Technical Specifications because at that time it was part of the FSAR. The original design of the isolation signals for the reactor water sample valves included isolations for the following events:

- 1. Reactor vessel low level.
- 2. Main Steam Line high radiation.
- 3. Main Steam Line high flow.
- 4. Main Steam Line high temperature.
- 5. Main Steam Line low pressure.

Plant records indicate that in July, 1973, the NSSS supplier initiated a Field Disposition Instruction that eliminated all the isolations except Reactor Vessel Low Level and Main Steam Line High Radiation. This change was made for two reasons:

- 1. The other three signals are for Main Steam Line break conditions and should not have applied to the Reactor Water Sample Valves.
- Ensures that reactor water sampling can be accomplished for the events involving the signals that were not appropriate to these valves.

The three signals that were removed do not apply to the sample valve therefore, the event has no adverse consequences.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The immediate action was to keep the valves closed until the new Technical Specification is approved.

The permanent corrective action will be a Technical Specification submittal that corrects Table 3.7-1.