MANAGEMENT CHILDRES



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November 4, 1982 MP-4289

Mr. Ronald C. Haynes Regional Administrator, Region 1 Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Reference:

Provisional License DPR-21

Docket No. 50-245

Reportable Occurrence RO-82-23/3L

Dear Mr. Haynes:

This letter forwards the Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence RO-82-23/3L required to be submitted within thirty days pursuant to the requirements of the Millstone Unit 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.d. An additional three copies of the report are enclosed.

Yours truly,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

Station Superintendent Millstone Nuclear Power Station

EJM/TST:ejl

Attachment: LER RO-82-23/3L

cc: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C. (30) Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control,

Washington, D. C. (3)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, c/o Document Management Branch,

Washington, D. C. 20555

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Attachment to LER 82-23/3L Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. Millstone Nuclear Power Station-Unit 1 Provisional License Number DPR-21 Docket Number 50-245

Identification of Occurrence

Abnormal degradation was discovered in the reactor coolant pressure boundry when 2 primary containment isolation valves failed to satisfy the Technical Specification limit for local leak rate testing.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

Prior to occurrence the unit was shutdown for a refueling outage.

Description of Occurrence

On October 5, 1982, at 1500 hours, while performing the Local Leak Rate Test on the Recirculation System sample isolation valves 1-RR-36 and 1-RR-37, both valves failed to meet the acceptance criteria of 19.95 standard cubic feet per hour (SCFH) which is the maximum allowed leakage per valve (Technical Specification 4.7.A.3.f). The as found combined leakage from both valves was 41 SCFH.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

Investigation of the disassembled valves revealed seat erosion on both valves and plug erosion on valve 1-RR-37 only.

Analysis of Occurrence

Failure of the two Recirculation System sample isolation valves to meet the required acceptance criteria did not compromise primary containment integrity. Remote operated valves FSO-9-75G-1 and G-2 would have been available to maintain primary containment integrity. Additionally the manual valve located at the Reactor Clean-up System sampling hood is kept in the closed position at all times except when sampling.

Corrective Action

New seats and plugs were installed in both valves. The valves were retested and met the required acceptance criteria with a leakage of .095 SCFH.

Similar occurrences: RO 79-19/3L, 80-14/1T