### ATTACHMENT 1

# Proposed Change No. 162 to Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications

Pages Deleted	Pages Inserted
34a	34a
490	49c
60b	60b
66	66

## ATTACHMENT 2

Analysis to Support Removal of the Vermont Yankee <u>Toxic Gas Monitoring System</u> (YAEC-1759, Revision 1)



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#### 3.2 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

3.2 <u>Protective Instrument Systems Specification</u> (cont'd)

#### I. Recirculation Pump Trip Instrumentation

During reactor power operation, the Recirculation Pump Trip Instrumentation shall be operative in accordance with Table 3.2.1.

- J. Deleted
- K. Degraded Grid Protective System

During reactor power operation, the emergency bus undervoltage instrumentation shall be operative in accordance with Table 3.2.8.

L. <u>Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System</u> Actuation

> When the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System is required in accordance with Specification 3.5.G, the instrumentation which initiates actuation of this system shall be operable in accordance with Table 3.2.9.

#### 4.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2 PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENT SYSTEMS

Specification (cont'd)

I. Recirculation Fump Trip Instrumentation


The Recirculation Pump Trip Instrumentation shall be functionally tested and calibrated in accordance with Table 4.2.1.


- J. Deleted
- K. Degraded Grid Protective System

The emergency bus undervoltage instrumentation shall be functionally tested and calibrated in accordance with Table 4.2.8.

L. <u>Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System</u> Actuation

> Instrumentation and Logic Systems shall be functionally tested and calibrated as indicated in Table 4.2.9.





#### 3.2 (Continued)

standby gas treatment system operation so that none of the activity released during the refueling accident leave the Reactor Building via the normal ventilation stack but that all activity is processed by the standby gas treatment system. Trip settings for the monitors in the ventilation duct are based upon initiation of the normal ventilation isolation and standby gas treatment system operation at a radiation level equivalent to the maximum site boundary dose rate of 500 mrem/year as given in Specification 3.8.E.1.a. The monitoring system in the plant stack represents a backup to this system to limit gross radioactivity releases to the environs.

The purpose of isolating the mechanical vacuum pump line is to limit release of radioactivity from the main condenser. During an accident, fission products would be transported from the reactor through the main steam line to the main condenser. The fission product radioactivity would be sensed by the main steam line radiation monitors which initiate isolation.

Post-accident instrumentation parameters for Containment Pressure, Torus Water Level, Containment Hydrogen/Oxygen Monitor, and Containment High-Range Radiation Monitor, are redundant, environmentally and seismically qualified instruments provided to enhance the operators' ability to follow the course of an event. The purpose of each of these instruments is to provide detection and measurement capability during and following an accident as required by NUREG-0737 by ensuring continuous on-scale indication of the following: containment pressure in the 0 to 275 psia range; torus water level in the 0 to 25 foot range (i.e., the bottom to 5 feet above the normal water level of the torus pool); containment hydrogen/oxygen concentrations (0 to 30% hydrogen and 0 to 25% oxygen); and containment radiation in the 1 R/br to 10<sup>7</sup> R/br gamma.

The Degraded Grid Protective System has been installed to assure that safety-related electrical equipment will not be subjected to sustained degraded voltage. This system incorporates voltage relates on 4160 Volt Emergency Buses 3 and 4 which are set to actuate at the minimum voltage required to prevent damage of safety-related equipment.

If Degraded Grid conditions exist for 10 seconds, either relay will actuate an alarm to alert operators of this condition. Based upon an assessment of these conditions the operator may choose to manually disconnect the off-site power. In addition, if an ESF signal is initiated in conjunction with low voltage below the relay setpoint for 10 seconds, the off-site power will be automatically disconnected.

