



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

October 27, 1982

Mr. R. C. Haynes
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75
DOCKET NO. 50-311
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-123/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-123/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

H. J. Midura
General Manager -
Salem Operations

RF:ks *752*

CC: Distribution

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PDR ADOCK 05000311
E PDR

The Energy People

IRE

Report Number: 82-123/03L

Report Date: 10-27-82

Occurrence Date: 10-10-82

Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 2
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

No. 21 Containment Fan Coil Unit - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-346.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 82% - Unit Load 900 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 2100 hours, October 10, 1982, during routine surveillance, the Control Room Operator discovered that service water flow to No. 21 Containment Fan Coil Unit (CFCU) was 2400 GPM, less than the 2500 GPM required in low speed operation. No. 21 CFCU was declared inoperable, and Technical Specification Action Statement 3.6.2.3.a was entered. Both containment spray systems were operable throughout the occurrence.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Investigation of the problem revealed that the setpoint on the flow controller at the local service water control panel was low. The controller tested satisfactorily, and no reason for the setpoint change was discovered. No problems of a similar nature have occurred recently. A low setpoint could result from controller drift or from local operation of the setpoint adjustment by any unidentified individual, although no evidence was found pointing to either of these possibilities.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The CFCU's operate in conjunction with the containment spray systems to remove heat and radioactive contamination from the containment atmosphere in the event of a design basis accident. Operability of this equipment is necessary to ensure offsite radiation dose is maintained within the limits of 10CFR100.

Because containment cooling capability was provided by redundant CFCU's and the containment spray systems, the occurrence involved no risk to the health or safety of the public. The event constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (continued)

Action Statement 3.6.2.3.a requires:

With one group of CFCU's inoperable and both containment spray systems operable, restore the inoperable group of cooling fans to operable status within 7 days, or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:


The flow controller setpoint was adjusted to 2750 GPM, and No. 21 CFCU was satisfactorily tested. No further problems with the unit were noted. The CFCU was declared operable at 0500 hours, October 11, 1982, and Action Statement 3.6.2.3.a was terminated.

To address the possibility that the controller was operated locally, discussion of the incident and its safety implications will be incorporated into the station training program. Controller drift is a natural phenomenon involving largely external factors and requiring no further action.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable.

Prepared By R. Frahm



General Manager -
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 82-96