

Termissiae Valley Authority, 4101 Market Street, Chattanooga, Termissiae, 37402

Joseph R. Bynum Vise President Nuclear Operations

JAN 1 0 1991

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

TVA - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR- 33 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT EFRO-50-259/90018

The enclosed report provides details concerning the fire watch observations which were performed late on nine required areas due to personnel error; thereby exceeding technical specification requirements. This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

J. K. Bynum

Enclosure cc: See page 2

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Enclosure
cc (Enclosure):
 INFO Records Center
 Suite 1500
 1100 Circle 75 Parkway
 Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Resident Inspector, BFN

Regional Administration U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Thierry M. Ross U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852

NRC Form 366	RC Form 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 6-89) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)					Approved OMB No. 3150-0104 Expires 4/30/92		
(6-89)								
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ABSTRACT (Lim	it to '400 spaces, i.i	approximately	fifteen single-sp	ace typewrit	ten lines) (16)		

On December 11, 1990 at 2148, the Security Micro Access Computer (MAC)-540 malfunctioned and automatically shutdown in the degrade mode. This resulted in requiring a security officer to be dispatched to lock vital area doors for ensuring unauthorized access did not occur. The locking of vital area doors detained a firewatch from entering battery board room number 1 Elevation 593 in the Control Bay Building. This contributed to a required technical specification (TS) hourly firewatch tour from being performed on time.

TVA is presently conducting an investigation of this event. TVA will report the results in a supplement to this LER. The supplement will be submitted by February 14, 1991.

NPC Form 366A (6-89)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Approved OMB No. 3150-0104 Expires 4/30/92

LICENSEE EVERY REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2	0 1	LER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Description of Event

At 2148 hours on December 11, 1990, the Security Micro Access Control Computer (MAC)-540 [IA] malfunctioned. The computer automatically shutdown as designed to a degrade mode. This resulted in requiring a security officer (utility) to be dispatched to lock vital area doors as required by security procedures in the Control Bay Building. The security officer toured the vital areas prior to securing them. These compensatory measures are required to ensure that vital area doors are not entered by unauthorized personnel while the computer is in the degrade mode. At 2151 hours personnel performing firewatch duties (utility laborer) attempted to access the door of battery board room number 1 which was locked by the security officer; therefore, the door would not physically open. The firewatch then made unsuccessful attempts to contact a licensed-utility shift operating supervisor (SOS) to notify the SOS of the potential to exceed a TS requirement. At this time the security officer noticed the firewatch. A brief discussion ensued; however, this communication activity was hampered by the firewatch's concern to notify the SOS of the condition. As this was occurring, a security shift supervisor arrived at the secondary alarm station, he deenergized the MAC-540 for thirty seconds, reenergized it, and the computer came on line. At 2201 hours, the security officer, who was dispatched to lock the doors, was notified that the computer was online and he could proceed to unlock the vital area doors. At 2202 hours, the security officer unlocked door 642, and at that time it was noted that the hourly firewatch tour TS requirement had been exceeded. Subsequent observations or eight other doors on the firewatch's tour revealed that the hourly firewatch tour requirement was also exceeded by less than 10 minutes.

TVA is presently conducting an investigation of this event. TVA will report the results in a supplement to this LER. The supplement will be submitted by February 14, 1991.

Commitment

TVA will submit a supplement to this LER.

Energy Industry Identification EIIS codes are identified in the text as [XX].