



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-213

HADDAM NECK PLANT

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 134
License No. DPR-61

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (the licensee), dated June 25, 1990, supplemented dated July 19, 1990 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-61 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 134, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance, to be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



John F. Stolz, Director
Project Directorate I-4
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: January 4, 1991

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 134

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-61

DOCKET NO. 50-213

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove

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B 3/4 4-13

Insert

3/4 4-51

B 3/4 4-13

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.12 FAILED FUEL RODS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.12 The total estimated number of failed fuel rods shall not exceed 160, for more than 7 consecutive days of steady state*, power operation.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1

ACTION: With the estimated number of failed fuel rods greater than 160 for more than 7 consecutive days of steady state power operation, be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.4.12.1 The total number of failed fuel rods shall be determined using radiochemistry data for I-131 and noble gases:
- a) Initially, after 20 days of steady state power operation after refueling or restart whenever the reactor has been subcritical for more than 48 hours.
 - b) At least once per 14 days when the calculated number of failed fuel rods is less than 50, after the initial calculation performed in Specification 4.4.12.1.a.
 - c) At least once per 7 days when the calculated number of failed fuel rods is between 50 and 100, after the initial calculation performed in Specification 4.4.12.1.a.
 - d) At least once per 24 hours when the calculated number of failed fuel rods is greater than 100, after the initial calculation performed in Specification 4.4.12.1.a.

*For the purpose of this Specification, steady state operation is operation within $\pm 5\%$ of the average thermal power during 24 consecutive hours of operation.

The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

3/4.4.11 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS (Continued)

cooling. The OPERABILITY of at least one RCS vent path from the reactor vessel head and the pressurizer steam space ensures the capability exists to perform this function.

The valve redundancy of the RCS vent paths serves to minimize the probability of inadvertent or irreversible actuation while ensuring that a single failure of a vent valve, power supply or control system does not prevent isolation of the vent path.

The function, capability and testing requirements of the RCS vents are consistent with the requirements of Item II.B.1 of NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," November 1980.

3/4.4.12 FAILED FUEL RODS

As a result of the Cycle 15 debris induced fuel failures, a method has been developed to monitor the debris type of failure in addition to the more traditional types of failures. This method uses the I-131 and noble gas specific activities to estimate the total number of fuel rod failures as a result of traditional failure modes such as pellet/cladding interaction and as a result of debris damage. The correlation using the I and Xe data is based on a release rate of Xe and empirical data obtained during past operating cycles. The limit of 160 failed fuel rods ensures that the post transient iodine spiking levels remain within the assumptions of design basis radiological calculations.