

CP&L

Carolina Power & Light Company

Brunswick Nuclear Project
P. O. Box 10429
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January 10, 1991

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
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 1
DOCKET NO. 50-325
LICENSE NO. DPR-71
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 1-90-025

Gentlemen:

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is submitted in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September 1983.

Very truly yours,



J. L. Harness, General Manager
Brunswick Nuclear Project

WRT/

Enclosure

cc: Mr. S. D. Ebnetter
Mr. N. B. Le
BSEP NRC Resident Office

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ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) **Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Unit 1**

DOCKET NUMBER (2)
05000325

PAGE (3)

01 OF 03

TITLE (4) **PARTIAL GROUP 6 ISOLATION DUE TO PROCEDURAL INADEQUACY IN PLANT MODIFICATION**

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)					REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQ. NO.	REV. NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER		
12	12	90	90	-	025	-	00	01	10	91		

OPERATING MODE (9) 5	POWER LEVEL (10) 000	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 72.71(b)						
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 72.71(c)						
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract and Text)						
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)							
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)							
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)									

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME **WILLIAM R. TOLER, REGULATORY COMPLIANCE**

TELEPHONE NUMBER

(919) 457-2701

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

Unit 1 was in mode 5 (Refueling) with the Reactor defueled. The Containment Atmosphere Control System (CAC) was lined up for Primary Containment Ventilating. On December 12, 1990 at 1736 a partial Group 6 isolation occurred. A relay (A71-K17) was deenergized in order to perform Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Plant Modification 90-012, but due to inadequate installation instructions, contacts 3-4 on the relay were not jumpered which allowed an isolation signal to cause several CAC valves to close.

The cause of this event was drawing error. Investigation revealed that A71-K17 contacts 3-4 had been inadvertently removed from the logic drawing during AS-BUILDING for a previous plant modification. Corrective action to preclude repetition will be to revise the drawing and review the event with appropriate engineering personnel.

The partial Group 6 isolation resulted in securing the Primary Containment purge, but since this did not result in any adverse consequences, the Group 6 was not reset until after completion of the modification work. There was no safety significance. Another unexpected ESF actuation resulting from implementation of Plant Modification 90-012 is reported in LER 1-90-027.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)				PAGE (3)
	05000325	YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		02 of 03
		90	-	025	-	

TEXT (IF MORE SPACE IS REQUIRED, USE ADDITIONAL NRC FORM 365A'S) (17)

EVENT

A relay was deenergized in order to perform a Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) modification. Due to an inadequate plant modification installation procedure, contacts on the relay were not jumpered which allowed an isolation signal to cause several Containment Atmosphere Control System (CAC) valves to close.

INITIAL CONDITIONS

Unit 1 was in mode 5 (Refueling) with the Reactor defueled. Plant Modification 90-012, providing divisionalized power to PCIS isolation valve position indicators, was in progress. The Containment Atmosphere Control System was lined up for Primary Containment Ventilating.

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On December 12, 1990 at 1845, during Control Board walkdown for turnover, it was noted that Inboard Suppression Pool Purge Exhaust Valve CAC-V7 and Inboard Drywell Purge Exhaust Valve CAC-V9 were closed and the 1A Drywell Purge Fan was running with no suction path. Utilizing Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS) data, it was found that at 1736 a partial Group 6 isolation had occurred. All associated Group 6 isolation valves that were supposed to isolate did isolate, with the exception of those valves that were under clearance. The partial Group 6 isolation resulted in securing the Primary Containment purge, but since this did not result in any adverse consequences, the Group 6 was not reset until after completion of the current modification work.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of this event was drawing error. Contacts 3-4 were inadvertently removed from drawing 1-PP-55109, sheet 7.

EVENT INVESTIGATION

As a result of the unexpected Reactor Building Ventilation Isolation, Containment Atmosphere Control Isolation (Group 6) and Standby Gas Treatment System "B" start event that occurred on December 5, 1990 (LER 1-90-027), it was determined that the modification work would be done with Reactor Protection System power distribution panel C71-P001 circuits CB5A and CB5B energized. The work would have to be done "HOT"; however, in order to reroute the existing power feed to the A71-K17 relay, it had to be deenergized, therefore to maintain circuit continuity, a series of temporary jumpers had to be installed. This (daisy chain) would allow the work to proceed without impacting other plant equipment.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)				PAGE (3)
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Unit 1	05000325	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	03 of 03	
		90	- 025	- 00		

TEXT (IF MORE SPACE IS REQUIRED, USE ADDITIONAL NRC FORM 366A'S) (17)

The plant modification was revised to include additional steps to install these temporary jumpers, but the installation procedure was inadequate in that it did not jumper A71-K17 contacts 3-4 because drawing number 1-FP-55109, sheet 7, did not contain any information on these contacts. When the Modification Engineer was going through the logic prints to determine which relay contacts required jumpering, the need for jumpering contacts 3-4 was not realized. Subsequent investigation found that these contacts had been removed from sheet 7 during AS-BUILDING per previous Plant Modification 80-133.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Corrective action to preclude repetition will include:

- 1) Revise drawing number 1-FP-55109, sheet 7, to include contacts 3-4.
- 2) Field verify the corresponding Unit 2 drawing and revise, if necessary.

In addition, this event will be reviewed by appropriate modification support (OM&M) engineers and Nuclear Engineering Department (NED) engineers.

EVENT ASSESSMENT

There was no safety significance. The Reactor was defueled and the valves actuated to the position required to complete their safety function. Another unexpected Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation resulting from implementation of Plant Modification 90-012 is reported in LER 1-90-027.

EIIS CODES

PCIS	JM
Isolation Logic Relay	JM/RLY
CAC	BB
Suppression Pool Purge Exhaust Valve	BB/ISV
Drywell Purge Exhaust Valve	BB/ISV