



MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

Helping Build Mississippi

P. O. BOX 1640, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39205

November 9, 1982

NUCLEAR PRODUCTION DEPARTMENT

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attention: Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director

Dear Mr. Denton:

SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-416 and 50-417
License No. NPF-13
File 0260/0277/L-860.0/L-403.0
Ref: AECM-82/171 and
AECM-82/454
IE Notice 79-22 and Control
Systems Failures; Operating
License Conditions 2.C (25)
& (26)
AECM-82/536

Mississippi Power & Light Company (MP&L) submitted reports on Control Systems Failures and IE Information Notice 79-22 by way of MP&L letters AECM-82/454, dated October 25, 1982, and AECM-82/171, dated April 26, 1982, respectively. Discussions held on November 8, 1982 with Mr. M. J. Virgillio the Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch (ICSB) revealed two areas requiring further investigation and clarification.

The first regarded environmental effects on balance of plant instrumentation (AECM-82/454 Page 3 of 5 - Question B, Items 5, 17, and 20). A major reason for not including environmental effects on balance of plant instrumentation was the relative time scale of environmental effects on plant transients. Environmental effects could be expected to first effect a transient after there has been sufficient time for such effects to cause an instrument failure (on the order of minutes). Many failures of this type were, in effect, evaluated as a part of the evaluation on IEB 79-27. For the evaluation conducted for IEN 79-22 and the Control System Failures issue, however, the concerns were short term transient analysis effects such as reactor vessel pressurization and MCPR where limiting values occur very rapidly after transient initiation (on the order of seconds). For such analyses, the concern was prompt failure of instruments which could be caused by pipe whip or jet impingement.

Further clarification was also requested concerning the statement found in AECM-82/171 - Attachment 1, Page 1 that "...single active failure assumed per MEB 3-1 in FSAR Chapter 3.6 was not used."

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
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In addition, we were alerted to the ongoing review by the Mechanical Engineering Branch (as requested by ICSB) of the MP&L interpretation of MEB Branch Technical Position 3-1, however, no action is required by MP&L at this time.

Further information providing the requested justification and clarification will be submitted for your review. MP&L is committed to resolving these issues and to the implementation of any required changes prior to startup following the first refueling outage in accordance with Operating License Condition 2.C(25).

Yours truly,



L. F. Dale
Manager of Nuclear Services

RAW/SHH/JDR:sap

cc: Mr. N. L. Stampley
Mr. R. B. McGehee
Mr. T. B. Conner
Mr. G. B. Taylor

Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director
Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta St., N.W., Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303