AVERAGE DAILY UNIT POWER LEVEL

DOCKET NO. 50-346
UNIT Davis-Besse Unit 1
DATE October 8, 1982
COMPLETED BY Erdal Caba
TELEPHONE (419) 259-5000, Ext. 196

MONTH September, 1982

DAY	AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-Net)	DAY	AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-Net)
1	0	17	663
2	0	18	665
3	8	19	665
4	165	20	701
5	261	21	779
6	270	22	784
7	306	23	784
8	305	24	776
9	297	25	778
10	282	26	776
11	307	27	541
12	308	28	598
13	304	29	765
14	308	30	767
15	473	31	---
16	665		

INSTRUCTIONS

On this format, list the average daily unit power level in MWe-Net for each day in the reporting month. Compute to the nearest whole megawatt.

(9/77)

OPERATING DATA REPORT

DOCKET NO. 50-346
DATE October 8, 1982
COMPLETED BY Erdal Caba
TELEPHONE (419) 259-5000, Ext. 196

OPERATING STATUS

1. Unit Name: Davis-Besse Unit 1
2. Reporting Period: September, 1982
3. Licensed Thermal Power (MWt): 2772
4. Nameplate Rating (Gross MWe): 925
5. Design Electrical Rating (Net MWe): 906
6. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Gross MWe): 918
7. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Net MWe): 874
8. If Changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (Items Number 3 Through 7) Since Last Report, Give Reasons:

Notes

9. Power Level To Which Restricted, If Any (Net MWe):
10. Reasons For Restrictions, If Any:

	This Month	Yr.-to-Date	Cumulative
11. Hours In Reporting Period	720	6,551	36,552
12. Number Of Hours Reactor Was Critical	720	2,485.9	18,715.9
13. Reactor Reserve Shutdown Hours	0	0	3,334.7
14. Hours Generator On-Line	659.2	2,366.6	17,616.8
15. Unit Reserve Shutdown Hours	1.1	1.1	1,732.5
16. Gross Thermal Energy Generated (MWH)	1,122,547	4,763,625	39,885,150
17. Gross Electrical Energy Generated (MWH)	1,791	1,574,085	13,256,336
18. Net Electrical Energy Generated (MWH)	1,267	1,465,360	12,362,645
19. Unit Service Factor	91.6	36.1	48.2
20. Unit Availability Factor	91.7	36.1	52.9
21. Unit Capacity Factor (Using MDC Net)	54.2	25.6	38.7
22. Unit Capacity Factor (Using DER Net)	52.3	24.7	37.3
23. Unit Forced Outage Rate	0	0	22.4

24. Shutdowns Scheduled Over Next 6 Months (Type, Date, and Duration of Each):

25. If Shut Down At End Of Report Period, Estimated Date of Startup:
26. Units In Test Status (Prior to Commercial Operation):

	Forecast	Achieved
INITIAL CRITICALITY		
INITIAL ELECTRICITY		
COMMERCIAL OPERATION		

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UNIT SHUTDOWNS AND POWER REDUCTIONS

DOCKET NO. 50-346
UNIT NAME Davis-Besse Unit 1
DATE October 8, 1982
COMPLETED BY Erdal Caba
TELEPHONE (419) 259-2374

REPORT MONTH September, 1982

No.	Date	Type[1]	Duration (Hours)	Reason[2]	Method of Shutting Down Reactor[3]	Licensee Event Report #	System Code[4]	Component Code[5]	Cause & Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence
4	82 03 13	S	59.7	C	4	NA	NA	NA	Unit outage which began on March 13, 1982 was completed on September 3, 1982 when the unit was placed on line.
5	82 09 03	S	1.1	B	NA	NA	NA	NA	Turbine overspeed trip test.
6	82 09 27	F	0.0	A	5	NA	RB	CRDRVE	Control Rod Group 7 started inserting for no apparent reason. The rod motion was found to be due to an internal failure in the command module in the Control Rod Drive System. See Operational Summary for further details.

1
F: Forced
S: Scheduled

2
Reason:
A-Equipment Failure (Explain)
B-Maintenance or Test
C-Refueling
D-Regulatory Restriction
E-Operator Training & License Examination
F-Administrative
G-Operational Error (Explain)
H-Other (Explain)

3
Method:
1-Manual
2-Manual Scram.
3-Automatic Scram.
4-Continuation from Previous Month
5-Load Reduction
9-Other (Explain)

4
Exhibit G - Instructions for Preparation of Data Entry Sheets for Licensee Event Report (LER) File (NUREG-0161)

5
Exhibit I - Same Source

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OPERATIONAL SUMMARY
SEPTEMBER, 1982

Zero Power Physics Testing began at 0317 hours on August 29, 1982, and the reactor was deborated to criticality at 1405 hours on August 29, 1982. Physics testing was completed at 1650 hours on September 2, 1982.

9/3/82 — At 1144 hours on September 3, 1982, the turbine generator was synchronized. The turbine overspeed trip test was successfully performed, and the turbine generator was brought on line at 1858 hours on September 3, 1982.

9/4/82 - 9/14/82 — Reactor power was slowly increased to 40 percent of full power which was attained on September 4, 1982. Physics testing at the 40 percent power level was completed at 2030 hours on September 14, 1982.

9/14/82 - 9/18/82 — Power escalation continued until 2300 hours on September 15, 1982, when 75 percent of full power was attained. The reactor power level was maintained at 75 percent until the completion of physics testing which occurred at 1800 hours on September 18, 1982.

9/20/82 - 9/27/82 — At 1500 hours on September 20, 1982, reactor power was increased at a steady rate to 86% which was reached at 1400 hours on September 21, 1982. Reactor power was maintained at approximately 86 percent until 1440 hours on September 27, 1982 when the plant experienced a power transient (and dropped to approximately 20 percent of full power) due to a failure of a module in the Control Rod Drive System. The transient was terminated when an I&C Technician removed the failed module, and the plant was restored to normal operation after the failed module card was replaced.

9/27/82 - 9/30/82 — Reactor power was increased steadily to approximately 86 percent and remained at that level for the remainder of the month.

REFUELING INFORMATION

DATE: September, 1982

1. Name of facility: Davis-Besse Unit 1

2. Scheduled date for next refueling shutdown: September 3, 1983

3. Scheduled date for restart following refueling: October 29, 1983

4. Will refueling or resumption of operation thereafter require a technical specification change or other license amendment? If answer is yes, what in general, will these be? If answer is no, has the reload fuel design and core configuration been reviewed by your Plant Safety Review Committee to determine whether any unreviewed safety questions are associated with the core reload (Ref. 10 CFR Section 50.59)?

The reload report for cycle 3 was approved by the NRC on July 28, 1982.

5. Scheduled date(s) for submitting proposed licensing action and supporting information. See response to No. 4 above

6. Important licensing considerations associated with refueling, e.g., new or different fuel design or supplier, unreviewed design or performance analysis methods, significant changes in fuel design, new operating procedures.

None identified to date

7. The number of fuel assemblies (a) in the core and (b) in the spent fuel storage pool.

(a) 177 (b) 92 - Spent Fuel Assemblies

8. The present licensed spent fuel pool storage capacity and the size of any increase in licensed storage capacity that has been requested or is planned, in number of fuel assemblies.

Present 735 Increase size by 0 (zero)

9. The projected date of the last refueling that can be discharged to the spent fuel pool assuming the present licensed capacity.

Date: Spring '92 assuming ability to unload the entire core into the spent fuel pool is maintained.

COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUESTS

FCR NO: 80-244

SYSTEM: Control Room Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HV&AC)

COMPONENT: N/A

CHANGE, TEST, OR EXPERIMENT: Facility Change Request (FCR) 80-244 was implemented to separate the air header for the normal ventilation isolation valves as outlined in BT-11076. Installation of additional solenoid valves was suggested in order to allow air to bleed faster. Also, removal of restrictive orifice valves at pneumatic actuators was presented with connectors and nipples replacing them.

REASON FOR CHANGE: Response times for the Control Room ventilation system isolation valves is not within time limits as required by Technical Specifications.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FCR 80-244 provides for the addition of solenoid valves to the air lines in the Control Room normal ventilation system. The valves are being added to allow for faster bleed-off time which in turn decreases their response time. The installation will be done similar to that of the existing system which includes Class 1E electrical equipment and seismic Class 1 installation. The testing accomplished under FCR 80-244 has demonstrated that the response time required for these valves will be met. This change does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

FCR NO: 80-225

SYSTEM: Component Cooling Water and Service Water

COMPONENT: SW 1395 and SW 1399 interlocks

CHANGE, TEST, OR EXPERIMENT: The proposed change is represented by the deletion of the auto closure for SW 1395 and SW 1399 from Component Cooling Water (CCW) pump motor breakers.

REASON FOR CHANGE: This Facility Change Request calls for deleting the auto closure of valves SW 1399 and SW 1395 from CCW pump motor breakers. In the present system, if CCW pump 1 (3) was running, valve SW 1395 will automatically go closed. Similarly if CCW pump 2 (3) was running, valve SW 1395 will automatically go closed. These valves govern the flow of Service Water (SW) to the Turbine Plant Cooling Water (TPCW) system. Thus when both trains of CCW system are in operation, SW to TPCW is isolated. During normal operation, only one CCW pump functions; however, another CCW pump must often be placed in service for CCW, Decay Heat, High Pressure Injection, Diesel Generators and Makeup Pump testing. When the second CCW pump is placed in service (especially in warm weather or at times when circulating water temperature is high), the circulating water cannot adequately cool the TPCW system. This may cause upsets in generator hydrogen, turbine oil temperature and various other areas. Furthermore, when the loop 2 of the Circulating Water System is out of operation, no method of cooling TPCW system exists except for the SW system. Also, during startup or shutdown of the plant, one CCW pump supplies the decay heat cooler, while the other pump supplies nonessential equipment such as reactor coolant pumps. This Facility Change Request allows the usage of SW to supply the TPCW system under the aforesaid conditions.

SAFETY EVALUATION

The subject valves are automatically closed by Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) Incident Level 2 and on low pressure for SW pump headers. Pressure switches isolate the valves when SW header pressure is below 50 psig, providing pump runout protection for SW pumps. Thus, with the CCW pump interlock to these valves eliminated, the SW pumps are still adequately protected against runout.

By removal of CCW pump interlock, valves SW 1395 and SW 1399 can be opened when two CCW pumps are in operation (assuming no SFAS actuation and normal SW header pressure). This Facility Change Request also provides for administrative control to prevent opening SW 1399 and SW 1395 to preserve system redundancy and channel separation of the SW system. The SW system also supplies water to the Containment Air Coolers, CCW heat exchangers and Control Room emergency condensing units. Since these valves are isolated on SFAS Incident Level 2, adequate capacity will still be available during a loss of coolant accident.

Pursuant to the above, the changes provided by this Facility Change Request do not involve an unreviewed safety question.

COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUESTS

FCR NO: 79-093

SYSTEM: Control Room Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HV&AC)

COMPONENT: SI9-1,2

CHANGE, TEST, OR EXPERIMENT: Facility Change Request (FCR) 79-093 was implemented to change the location of the Control Room humidifers.

REASON FOR CHANGE: Air coming out of the humidifers was condensing upon contact with the main stream of air. This was causing moisture to form on the side of the ductwork, which then ran into the Control Room isolation dampers HV5301A,B and HV5311A,B. As a result, the paint on the dampers blistered allowing rust to form, thereby preventing the dampers from seating properly in a closed position. These dampers are a part of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System which must be operable in Modes 1-4 according to Technical Specifications. This event was reported in License Event Report NP-33-79-62.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This modification relocates the Control Room HV&AC humidifiers inlet connections on the main duct to a point downstream of the isolation dampers. Tying of the supply and exhaust ductwork (non-Q) to the "Q" portion of the Control Room normal ventilation system ductwork will not have any adverse impact. An unreviewed safety question does not exist.