

GPU Nuclear Corporation
Post Office Box 388
Route 9 South
Forked River, New Jersey 08731-0388
609 971-4000
Writer's Direct Dial Number:

January 7, 1991 C321-91-2001

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Att: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS)
Docket No. 50-219

Technical Specification Change Request No. 196 Supplementary

Information

24-Month Cycle Surveillance Extensions

This letter confirms our discussion on December 31, 1990 between G. Sadauskas and D. Distel (GPUN) and C. Doutt (NRC), regarding additional information to support a 24-month surveillance interval for the Primary and Safety Valve Position Indicator (Acoustic Monitoring System) calibration.

Technical Specification Change Request No. 196, submitted on December 17, 1990, stated that evaluation of the most recent refueling outage calibration results for the Acoustic Valve Monitoring System showed no deviations. This surveillance was conducted on March 15 and 22, 1989.

The Acoustic Valve Monitoring System instrument channels have been subjected to five (5) previous refueling outage interval calibrations since their installation in 1980. These additional calibration surveillances were performed in 1981, 1982, 1984, 1985 and 1987. Each surveillance checks 21 instrument channels of the Acoustic System for the Electromagnetic Relief Valves (EMRV) and the Code Safety Valves. This calibration data has also been evaluated and indicates the following results. The EMRV's had experienced two (2) channel surveillance failures due to defective cable aplices located in the drywell. The defective cable splice was redesigned and no similar failures have been experienced since 1987. The Code Safety Valves have experienced four (4) channel surveillance deviations due to degradation of the preamplifier and the hardline cable, and four (4) channel surveillance discrepancies due to preamplifier bias voltage alarm setpoint drift (diagnostic alarms). These eight (8) deviations for the Code Safety Valves were corrected by replacement of logic modules located in the control room or setpoint adjustments, also made from the control room, or replacement of hardline cable and preamplifier in the drywell. No other deviations have been indicated by the refueling outage

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surveillance channel calibrations from 1981 to 1989. The Technical Specification required monthly channel chack surveillances would also have identified the eight (8) deviations indicated for the Code Safety Valve Acoustic Monitoring System. The monthly surveillance essentially overlaps the refueling outage surveillance. In addition, review of the above surveillance data indicates that the accelerometer has not been a contributor to channel failure of the Acoustic Monitoring System.

This information provides additional technical justification that the proposed surveillance interval change from 18-months to 24-months (TSCR No. 196) has no effect on the safety function of the Relief and Safety Valve Position Indicator Accident Monitoring Instrumentation.

Very truly yours,

E. E. Fitzpatrick

Vice President and Director

Oyster Creek

EEF/DJD/plp

oc: Administrator, Region 1 NRC Resident Inspector Mr. Alex Dromerick, Jr.