

ENCLOSURE 1

NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Duke Power Company  
Catawba Units 1 and 2

Docket Nos. 50-413, 50-414  
License Nos. NPF-35, NPF-52

During the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted on November 4, 1990 to December 8, 1990, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, (1990), the violations are listed below:

- A. Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the activities referenced in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Implicit in this is the stipulation that the procedures be adequate for the task being performed.

Station Directive 2.12.7, Section 4.3, requires that any group/section (person) responsible for degrading any fire barrier, including fire doors, is responsible for ensuring that a fire watch is provided until the barrier is returned to service.

Operations Management Procedure 2-17, Control Room and Unit Supervisor Logbooks, requires in Section 7.0, General Instructions, that sufficient logbook entries shall be made to permit the reconstruction of the sequence of events during a shift. Further, Section 10.0, Unit Supervisor Logbook Entries, requires that entries in the unit supervisor's logbook shall provide a detailed chronological word description of problems identified during the shift and the corrective action initiated.

Station Directive 2.8.1, Problem Investigation Process and Regulatory Reporting, section 4.0, requires that any employee who has knowledge of a problem that meets the criteria of Enclosure 3 of the same directive, is responsible to inform his supervisor or responsible technical contact to initiate an investigation. Section 5.1 of the directive requires that a identified problem that meets the criteria in Enclosure 3 shall be documented as soon as practical and delivered promptly to the Compliance Section, thus initiating the investigation process.

Procedure OP/2/A/6250/06, Main Steam, Enclosure 4.3, requires that valve 2SV-66, the Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Line Drain, be closed, and its associated pipe cap installed when the system is aligned for plant operation.

Contrary to the above:

1. On November 30, 1990, maintenance personnel degraded fire barrier TS27#1, the fire door to Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Pump (CAPT) control panel room, but failed to follow Station Directive 2.12.7, in that the personnel blocked the door open and departed the area without establishing a fire watch.
2. On November 30, 1990, the Unit 1 operations supervisor was informed that fire door TS27#1 had been degraded and a fire watch had not been posted. Subsequently, when the Control Room and Unit Supervisor Logbooks were reviewed, it was detected that the licensee had failed to document the event/problem.
3. On November 30, 1990, an event occurred involving the licensee's failure to post a fire watch for a degraded fire barrier. A Problem Investigation Report (PIR) was required to have been initiated as soon as practical after detection of the problem, but the licensee failed to initiate the Report until December 5, 1990, after conversations between the licensee and the resident inspectors concluded that a PIR was appropriate.
4. On November 14, 1990, during a stroke test on the 2B Steam Generator PORV 2SV-13, the licensee failed to follow OP/2/A/6250/06, in that 2SV-66 was found open and its pipe cap had not been installed. This resulted in an inadvertent steam release during the performance of the stroke test.

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I) and applies to Units 1 and 2.

- B. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI requires in part that a test program be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that structures, systems, and components will perform satisfactorily inservice is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures.

Contrary to the above, on September 21, 1990, required stroke and leak rate tests were not performed on containment isolation valve VP 17A after the valve had been cycled during maintenance. This resulted in the licensee's failure to detect that the valve had not closed properly when cycled, which in turn rendered the valve inoperable. The unit was operated from September 25, until November 7 in Modes 1-4 during which time the valve was required to be operable.

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I) and applies to Unit 2 only.


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Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Duke Power Company is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and if applicable, a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in the Notice, an order may be issued to show cause why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

  
Alan R. Herdt, Chief  
Reactor Projects Branch 3  
Division of Reactor Projects

Dated at Atlanta, Georgia  
this 21<sup>st</sup> day of Dec 1990