


## **Omaha Public Power District**

1623 HARNEY & OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68102 & TELEPHONE 536-4000 AREA CODE 402

August 30, 1982 LIC-82-310



Mr. J. T. Collins, Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011

Reference: Docket No. 50-285

Dear Mr. Collins:

## INPO Evaluation of the Fort Calhoun Station Emergency Preparedness Program

At your request, please find attached a copy of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) evaluation report which provides the results of their March, 1982 review of the Fort Calhoun Station emergency preparedness program.

Sincerely,

W. C. Jones Division Manager Production Operations

WCJ/TLP:jmm

Attachment

11090226 82102 R ADOCK 050007

cc: LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036



Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

1820 Water Place Atlanta, Georgia 30339 Telephone 404 953-3600

April 22, 1982

Mr. William Miller Assistant General Manager Omaha Public Power District 1623 Harney Street Omaha, Nebraska 68102

Dear Mr. Miller:

INPO conducted a review of the emergency preparedness program at the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station (FCNS) and the Omaha Public Power District headquarters during the week of March 15, 1982. The items reviewed, as well as comments, were presented to you at the exit meeting on March 18, 1982.

Based on our review, the team concluded that a viable emergency preparedness program is in place to support operations at FCNS. The team observed the following items during the review that strengthen the plant and corporate response capabilities:

- In the area of the <u>Emergency Plan</u>, the Plant Surveillance Test Program encompasses the emergency plan, procedures, equipment and facilities. This program is more extensive than those observed at other plants. The thorough and well documented letters of agreement with off-site supporting groups and agencies were also noted.
- In the area of <u>Facilities and Equipment</u>, the team noted the EOF Tag Assignment Board, which provides identification of emergency response personnel as well as a listing of their responsibilities. This is an innovative procedure and a good practice.
- In the <u>Emergency Public Information</u> area, it was noted that a well organized <u>Emergency Information Plan</u> is in place. It was also noted that a great deal of

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> emphasis has been placed on public and media information and education, particularly the intensive program to provide emergency information to transients in the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). This also is considered a good practice.

The team also identified areas where there are opportunities for improvement. The following are considered to be the most important:

- O The Emergency Plan contains unnecessary detail. Detailed information concerning dose calculation methods, population data for the EPZ, evacuation time estimates, shielding data and examples of public information releases would be more appropriately placed in appendices to the plan or in implementing procedures.
- The document control system for the Emergency Plan, Implementing Procedures Manual and Call List should be improved. Uncontrolled copies of the Emergency Plan were found in the EOF. The latest revisions of several implementing procedures were not contained in a controlled copy of the Implementing Procedures Manual located in the TSC. The Document Control System Manual contains no record of the issuance of the controlled Call List.
- <u>The General Employee Training at the plant does not</u> <u>include several key emergency preparedness items.</u> The training does not give a description of the FCNS emergency preparedness program, actual recordings of plant emergency signals, description of accountability procedures nor a description of evacuation routes from the assembly point.
- The permanent mounting locations in the emergency vehicles for the SAM-2 analyzer and shielding container should be changed. The present location prevents operation of the SAM-2 during cold weather conditions (vehicle tailgate must be closed).
- The interim Postaccident Sampling System should be improved. The present configuration of the system does not provide adequate shielding for personnel protection and does not allow sampling of containment air.
- O Present accident classification methods in the Emergency Plan should be revised. The present system is confusing to operators and is not being used.

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- Personnel staffing for long-term operation of an emergency public information effort should be strengthened.
- The present implementing procedures for emergency public information should be increased in scope. The procedures do not address with sufficient specificity rumor control, employee communications, government relations, financial relations, or media monitoring.
- Training in emergency public information is not available to technical personnel supporting public information activities.
- O There is no provision in the emergency public information procedures for handling special media requests.

We would welcome any suggestions for improving the conduct or emphasis of our Review and Assistance visits. Any questions regarding this report or the visit may be directed to me or the team leader, Travis Beard, at (404) 953-3600.

Sincerely,

P. W. Lyon, Director Radiological Protection & Emergency Preparedness Division

PWL: jky

cc: Bernard W. Reznicek W. C. Jones Richard L. Andrews K.M.J. Morris F. F. Franco E. P. Wilkinson