U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK: 10 IPLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 6 5 01 "2"T REPORT 1 SOURCE L EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (1) During refueling outage, while performing a routine inspection, a small pinhole leak was discovered in a 3-inch fire protection line which supplies water to ten (10) cable-tray fixed water spray systems. The systems remained operable 4 until removed from service for repair (T.S. 3.11.A.5). There was no effect on 5 public health and safety. There are no redundant systems but a patrolling firewatch was established during repairs in accordance with Technical Specification 3.11.A.2. SYSTEM CODE CAUSE 80 CAUSE COMP CODE SUBCODE VALVE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE 1 I | P | E | X | X | (14)P A SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION LERINO EVENT YEAR CODE TYPE (17) REPORT 8 0 0131 01 1013 L NUMBER SHUTDOWN METHOD EFFECT ON PLANT ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPRD-4 PRIME COMP COMPONENT ACTIO'S HOURS (22) FORM SUB. SUPPLIER 10 Z (20) 18) X (19 10 1 01 Z (21) 01 N (24) L (25 X 19 19 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) The pipe failure appears to be caused by a through-wall pitting corrosion attack. The through-wall hole was repaired by welding and hydrostatically tested. A patrolling firewatch was established during repairs. Ultrasonic tests will be conducted to determine the extent of this problem. Testing and determination will be completed by February 1, 1983. 80 METHOD OF DISCOVERY A POWER (30)OTHER STATUS DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) 0 0 0 B (21) Routine inspection CONTENT ЯŬ HE HELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF HELEASE (9) 2 (1) NA NA 15 CREDNEL EXPENSES 44 80 DESCRIPTION (31) NA PEN OFFICE CONTRACT 1.1 80 Pre. 2 8 4 5 4 5 stanprist. (41) 0 0 0 NA A. () F ((11) A. (40) (11) FAC(11) Y (1) CONPUTING. Z NA 8211090178 821 PERLICT 102 OF SCHIPTOUR (10 PDR ADOCK 0260 PDR NHC USE ONLY N t 111111 140 53 Tom Keckeisen NAME OF PHERAPER -(205) 729-0838 Section of

 Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Form BF 17 BF 15.2 2/12/82

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50-<u>260</u> / <u>82030</u> Technical Specification Involved <u>3.11.A.2/3.11.A.5</u> Reported Under Technical Specification <u>6.7.2.b.(2</u>* Date Due NRC <u>11/05/82</u>

Event Narrative:

Unit 1 was operating at 98-percent power; unit 2 was in a refueling outage; and unit 3 was operating at 98-percent power. Only unit 2 was affected by the event. While performing a routine inspection, a small pinhole was discovered in a 3-inch fire protection line which supplies water to 10 cable-tray fixed wate . spray systems. The systems remained operable until removed from service per Technical Specification (T.S.) 3.11.A.5. There was no effect on public health and safety. There are no redundant systems, but a patrolling firewatch was established during repairs in accordance with T.S. 3.11.A.2. The pipe failure appears to be caused by a through-wall pitting corrosion attack. The throughwall hole was repaired by welding and hydrostatically tested. Through-wall leaks have occurred in raw water systems in the past. The pipe has been removed and sent offsite for a metallurgical analysis. The results of this investigation showed that through-wall pitting was caused by a sulfide corrosion attack. It was concluded that stagnant raw water pipes would be ultrasonically tested for wall thinning or pitting. The lowest stagnant points of all safety-related fire protection systems were tested and the evaluation confirmed that widespread corrosion and/or degradation had not occurred in the fire protection system. Ultrasonic tests will also be conducted on this section of pipe to determine the extent of corrosion damage and the possible need for piping replacement. This testing and determination will be completed by February 1, 1983.

* Previous Similar Events:

BFR0-50-260/82029

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor *Revision: