

CONTROL BLOCK: [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

[0] [1] [P] [A] [S] [E] [S] [1] [2] [0] [0] - [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] - [0] [0] [3] [4] [1] [1] [1] [1] [1] [4] [ ] [ ] [5]

LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 37 CAT 38

CON'T

[0] [1] [L] [6] [0] [5] [0] [0] [0] [3] [8] [7] [7] [1] [0] [1] [5] [8] [2] [8] [1] [0] [2] [9] [8] [2] [9]

REPORT SOURCE 60 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

[0] [2] | During an outage from startup testing, it was determined that a failure of |  
[0] [3] | one of several valves to open would cause a loss of flow in the Emergency |  
[0] [4] | Service Water System, thus rendering the Diesel Generators inoperable shortly |  
[0] [5] | after their initiation. This was determined reportable per 6.9.1.8.h. |  
[0] [6] | No adverse consequences exist, in that, the unit will remain shutdown until |  
[0] [7] | a resolution is determined and implemented. |

[0] [9] [W] [G] [11] [B] [12] [A] [13] [Z] [Z] [Z] [Z] [Z] [Z] [14] [Z] [15] [Z] [16]

SYSTEM CODE 9 10 CAUSE CODE 11 CAUSE SUBCODE 12 COMPONENT CODE 13 19 COMP. SUBCODE 17 VALVE SUBCODE 20

[17] [8] [2] [ ] [ ] [0] [2] [4] [ ] [ ] [0] [1] [ ] [ ] [ ] [0]

LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 17 EVENT YEAR 21 22 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 23 24 26 OCCURRENCE CODE 27 28 29 REPORT TYPE 30 REVISION NO. 32

[Z] [18] [X] [19] [Z] [20] [Z] [21] [0] [0] [0] [0] [Y] [23] [N] [24] [Z] [25] [Z] [9] [9] [9]

ACTION TAKEN 33 FUTURE ACTION 34 EFFECT ON PLANT 35 SHUTDOWN METHOD 36 HOURS 37 38 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED 40 NPRD-4 FORM SUB. 42 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER 43 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER (26) 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

[1] [0] | The event is the result of finding an unanalyzed single failure which |  
[1] [1] | renders the ESW system inoperable. No immediate corrective action was taken |  
[1] [2] | except to prevent startup. Several interim and long term fixes are being |  
[1] [3] | reviewed. Resolution will be noted in a follow up report. |

[1] [5] [B] [28] [0] [0] [0] [0] [29] n/a [Z] [31] n/a

FACILITY STATUS 7 8 9 % POWER 10 11 12 OTHER STATUS 13 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY 31 32 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 33

[1] [6] [Z] [33] [Z] [34] n/a [ ] [ ] n/a

ACTIVITY CONTENT 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

[1] [7] [0] [0] [0] [37] [Z] [38] n/a

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 39 TYPE 40 DESCRIPTION 41

[1] [8] [0] [0] [0] [40] n/a

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 41 DESCRIPTION 42

[1] [9] [Z] [42] n/a

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE 43 DESCRIPTION 44

[2] [0] [N] [44] n/a

PUBLICITY ISSUED 45 DESCRIPTION 46

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Attachment

Licensee Event Report 82-024/01T-0

The design basis of the plant requires that the Emergency Service Water System, a system necessary to mitigate the consequences of an accident, be designed such that a single failure of any active component and the coincidental Loss of Offsite Power, would not impair its function. A design deficiency has been determined, which permits a single failure to result in the inability of the ESW System to perform its function. This is reportable per 6.9.1.8.h.

Each ESW loop terminates at a junction where flow can be routed through either the spray network or through the bypass valves.

The single failure which results in the loss of ESW is a failure of either the ESW bypass valve HV-01222A or check valve 0-11-053 to open. The check valves are in the common header taking flow from the Diesel Generators. A failure of one of these valves would prevent the "A" ESW train from providing cooling to the Diesel Generators. Additionally, the ESW would not transfer to the "B" train because the "A" pump would remain in operation.